Lord Elgin, Sir John George Bourinot [best ereader for pdf txt] 📗

and supervision of business.

On the other hand, in the United States, the speaker of the House of Representatives becomes, from the very force of circumstances, a political leader, and the spectacle is presented--in fact from the time of Henry Clay--so strange to us familiar with English methods, of decisions given by him with clearly party objects, and of committees formed by him with purely political aims, as likely as not with a view to thwart the ambition either of a president who is looking to a second term or of some prominent member of the cabinet who has presidential aspirations. And all this lowering of the dignity of the chair is due to the absence of a responsible minister to lead the House. The very position which the speaker is forced to take from time to time--notably in the case of Mr. Reed[30]--is clearly the result of the defects in the constitutional system of the United States, and is so much evidence that a responsible party leader is an absolute necessity in congress. A legislature must be led, and congress has been attempting to get out of a crucial difficulty by all sorts of questionable shifts which only show the inherent weakness of the existing system.

In the absence of any provision for the unity of policy between the executive and legislative authorities of the United States, it is impossible for any nation to have a positive guarantee that a treaty it may negotiate with the former can be ratified. The sovereign of Great Britain enters into treaties with foreign powers with the advice and assistance of his constitutional advisers, who are immediately responsible to parliament for their counsel in such matters. In theory it is the prerogative of the Crown to make a treaty; in practice it is that of the ministry. It is not constitutionally imperative to refer such treaties to parliament for its approval--the consent of the Crown is sufficient; but it is sometimes done under exceptional circumstances, as in the case of the cession of Heligoland. In any event the action of the ministry in the matter is invariably open to the review of parliament, and the ministry may be censured by an adverse vote for the advice given to the sovereign, and forced to retire from office. In the United States the senate must ratify all treaties by a two-thirds vote, but unless there is a majority in that House of the same political complexion as the president the treaty may be refused. No cabinet minister is present, to lead the House, as in England, and assume all the responsibility of the president's action. It is almost impossible to suppose that an English ministry would consent to a treaty that would be unpopular in parliament and the country. The existence of the government would depend on its action. In the United States both president and senate have divided responsibilities. The constitution makes no provision for unity in such important matters of national obligation.

The great advantages of the English, or Canadian, system lie in the interest created among all classes of the people by the discussions of the different legislative bodies. Parliamentary debate involves the fate of cabinets, and the public mind is consequently led to study all issues of importance. The people know and feel that they must be called upon sooner or later to decide between the parties contending on the floor of the legislature, and consequently are obliged to give an intelligent consideration to public affairs. Let us see what Bagehot, ablest of critics, says on this point:--


"At present there is business in their attention (that is to
say, of the English or Canadian people). They assist at the
determining crisis; they assist or help it. Whether the
government will go out or remain is determined by the debate
and by the division in parliament And the opinion out of
doors, the secret pervading disposition of society, has a
great influence on that division. The nation feels that its
judgment is important, and it strives to judge. It succeeds
in deciding because the debates and the discussions give it
the facts and arguments. But under the presidential
government the nation has, except at the electing moment, no
influence; it has not the ballot-box before it; its virtue
is gone and it must wait till its instant of despotism again
returns. There are doubtless debates in the legislature, but
they are prologues without a play. The prize of power is not
in the gift of the legislature. No presidential country
needs to form daily delicate opinions, or is helped in
forming them."


Then when the people do go to the ballot-box, they cannot intelligently influence the policy of the government. If they vote for a president, then congress may have a policy quite different from his; if they vote for members of congress, they cannot change the opinions of the president. If the president changes his cabinet at any time, they have nothing to say about it, for its members are not important as wheels in the legislative machinery. Congress may pass a bill of which the people express their disapproval at the first opportunity when they choose a new congress, but still it may remain on the statute-book because the senate holds views different from the newly elected House, and cannot be politically changed until after a long series of legislative elections. As Professor Woodrow Wilson well puts it in an able essay:--[31]


"Public opinion has no easy vehicle for its judgments, no
quick channels for its action. Nothing about the system is
direct and simple. Authority is perplexingly subdivided and
distributed, and responsibility has to be hunted down in
out-of-the-way corners. So that the sum of the whole matter
is that the means of working for the fruits of good
government are not readily to be found. The average citizen
may be excused for esteeming government at best but a
haphazard affair upon which his vote and all his influence
can have but little effect. How is his choice of
representative in congress to affect the policy of the
country as regards the questions in which he is most
interested if the man for whom he votes has no chance of
getting on the standing committee which has virtual charge
of those questions? How is it to make any difference who is
chosen president? Has the president any great authority in
matters of vital policy? It seems a thing of despair to get
any assurance that any vote he may cast will even in an
infinitesimal degree affect the essential courses of
administration. There are so many cooks mixing their
ingredients in the national broth that it seems hopeless,
this thing of changing one cook at a time."


Under such a system it cannot be expected that the people will take the same deep interest in elections and feel as directly responsible for the character of the government as when they can at one election and by one verdict decide the fate of a government, whose policy on great issues must be thoroughly explained to them at the polls. This method of popular government is more real and substantial than a system which does not allow the people to influence congressional legislation and administrative action through a set of men sitting in congress and having a common policy.

I think it does not require any very elaborate argument to show that when men feel and know that the ability they show in parliament may be sooner or later rewarded by a seat on the treasury benches, and that they will then have a determining voice in the government of the country, be it dominion or province, they must be stimulated by a keener interest in public life, a closer watchfulness over legislation and administration, a greater readiness for discussing all public questions, and a more studied appreciation of public opinion outside the legislative halls. Every man in parliament is a premier _in posse_. While asking my readers to recall what I have already said as to the effect of responsible government on the public men and people of Canada, I shall also here refer them to some authorities worthy of all respect.

Mr. Bagehot says with his usual clearness:--[32]


"To belong to a debating society adhering to an executive
(and this is no inapt description of a congress under a
presidential constitution) is not an object to stir a noble
ambition, and is a position to encourage idleness. The
members of a parliament excluded from office can never be
comparable, much less equal, to those of a parliament not
excluded from office. The presidential government by its
nature divides political life into two halves, an executive
half and a legislative half, and by so dividing it, makes
neither half worth a man's having--worth his making it a
continuous career--worthy to absorb, as cabinet government
absorbs, his whole soul. The statesmen from whom a nation
chooses under a presidential system are much inferior to
those from whom it chooses under a cabinet system, while the
selecting apparatus is also far less discerning."


An American writer, Prof. Denslow,[33] does not hesitate to express the opinion very emphatically that "as it is, in no country do the people feel such an overwhelming sense of the littleness of the men in charge of public affairs" as in the United States. And in another place he dwells on the fact that "responsible government educates office-holders into a high and honourable sense of their accountability to the people," and makes "statesmanship a permanent pursuit followed by a skilled class of men."

Prof. Woodrow Wilson says that,[34] so far from men being trained to legislation by congressional government, "independence and ability are repressed under the tyranny of the rules, and practically the favour of the popular branch of congress is concentrated in the speaker and a few--very few--expert parliamentarians." Elsewhere he shows that "responsibility is spread thin, and no vote or debate can gather it." As a matter of fact and experience, he comes to the conclusion "the more power is divided the more irresponsible it becomes and the petty character of the leadership of each committee contributes towards making its despotism sure by making its duties interesting."

Professor James Bryee, it will be admitted, is one of the fairest of critics in his review of the institutions of the United States; but he, too, comes to the conclusion[35] that the system of congressional government destroys the unity of the House (of representatives) as a legislative body; prevents the capacity of the best members from being brought to bear upon any one piece of legislation, however important; cramps debate; lessens the cohesion and harmony of legislation; gives facilities for the exercise of underhand and even corrupt influence; reduces responsibility; lowers the interest of the nation in the proceedings of congress.

In another place,[36] after considering the relations between the executive and the legislature, he expresses his opinion that the framers of the constitution have "so narrowed the sphere of the executive as to prevent it from leading the country, or even its own party in the country." They endeavoured "to make members of congress independent, but in doing so