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id="id00838">"Your despatches of 5:30 and 5:50, and Wilson's despatches, forwarded by you, have been received. It will take Smith quite all day to disembark; but if I find there is no immediate necessity to retain him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to circumstances. If you can prevent Hood from turning your position at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin."

Again I telegraphed at 9:50 A. M.:

"My trains are coming in all right, and half of the troops are here and the other half about five miles out, coming on in good order, with light skirmishing. I will have all across the river this evening. Wilson is here, and has his cavalry on my flank. I do not know where Forrest is. He may have gone east, but, no doubt, will strike our flank and rear again soon. Wilson is entirely unable to cope with him. Of course I cannot prevent Hood from crossing the Harpeth whenever he may attempt it. Do you desire me to hold on here until compelled to fall back?"

And at 11 A. M. I telegraphed: "Troops and trains in all right."

At noon I answered as follows General Thomas's last despatch:

"Your despatch of 10:25 A. M. is received. I am satisfied that I have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate, during the last three days might have proved disastrous. I don't want to get into so tight a place again; yet I will cheerfully act in accordance with your views of expediency, if you think it important to hold Hood back as long as possible. When you get all your troops together, and the cavalry in effective condition, we can easily whip Hood, and, I believe, make the campaign a decisive one. Before that, the most we can do is to husband our strength and increase it as much as possible. I fear the troops which were stationed on the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out of the way as soon as possible, and watch Hood carefully. Possibly I may be able to hold him here, but do not expect to be able to do so long."

This despatch shows not only my opinion at that time of the kind of "place" I had been in, but my belief that the character of that situation had been due largely to Thomas's action in leaving me without the expected reinforcements, and in not providing the means of crossing the Harpeth River.

HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN

The following seems to show that General Thomas did not even then see the importance of prompt concentration of all his available force in front of the enemy, but expected me, with two corps, to fight the entire hostile force until he could complete his concentration at Nashville. Even before the battle of Franklin he seems to have thought he could take his time to concentrate, reorganize his cavalry, and then "try Hood again."

  "Nashville, November 30, 1864.
"Major-General Schofield, Franklin:

"General Smith reported to me this morning that one division of his troops is still behind; we must therefore try to hold Hood where he is now until those troops can get up, and the steamers return. After that we will concentrate here, reorganize our cavalry, and try Hood again. Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer? Answer, giving your views; and I should like to know what Wilson thinks he can do to aid you in holding Hood.

  "Geo. H. Thomas,
  "Major-General U. S. Vols, Commanding."

Thereupon, in the following telegram, dated 3 P. M., I proposed Brentwood as a point where A. J. Smith's and all the other troops could surely unite with mine:

"I have just received your despatch asking whether I can hold Hood here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has a large force, probably two corps, in my front, and seems preparing to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing to-morrow in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night, if he attempts it. A worse position than this for an inferior force could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General Wilson this evening. I think he can do very little. I have no doubt Forrest will be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief. It appears to me that I ought to take position at Brentwood at once. If A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesboro' garrison join me there, I ought to be able to hold Hood in check for some time. I have just learned that the enemy's cavalry is already crossing three miles above. I will have lively times with my trains again."

This despatch gives a very accurate estimate of the true situation at that time, except perhaps that I did not then fully appreciate how much our cavalry had gained in effective strength by the reinforcements that had joined the corps in the field during the retreat. I judged by the experience of the previous day (November 29). But the result was very different in the afternoon of the 30th, when our cavalry repulsed and drove back that of the enemy; at the same time the infantry assault was repulsed at Franklin. There was no apprehension of the result of an attack in front at Franklin, but of a move of Hood to cross the river above and strike for Nashville before I could effect a junction with the troops then at that place.

The following despatches must have been sent either during the progress of the battle, or very soon afterward:

"Please send A. J. Smith's division to Brentwood early to-morrow morning. Also please send to Brentwood to-morrow morning 1,000,000 rounds infantry ammunition, 2000 rounds 3-inch, and 1000 rounds light twelve artillery."

In reply to my advice, the following order to fall back to Nashville was sent by Thomas before the battle, but was received by me after the heavy fighting had ceased. Communication was interrupted for a short time during the transfer of the telegraph station from the town of Franklin to a place on the north side of the Harpeth, rendered necessary by the battle.

"Nashville, November 30, 1864. "Your despatch of 3 P. M. is received. Send back your trains to this place at once, and hold your troops in readiness to march to Brentwood, and thence to this place, as soon as your trains are fairly on the way, so disposing your force as to cover the wagon- train. Have all railroad trains sent back immediately. Notify General Wilson of my instructions. He will govern himself accordingly. Relieve all garrisons in blockhouses and send back by railroad trains last over the road. Acknowledge receipt.

"Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General."

HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN

The following is my first report to General Thomas, sent immediately after the battle:

"The enemy made a heavy and persistent attack with about two corps, commencing at 4 P. M. and lasting until after dark. He was repulsed at all points with very heavy loss—probably five or six thousand men. Our losses probably not more than one fourth that number.(17) We have captured about one thousand men, including one brigadier- general. Your despatch of this P. M. is received. I had already given the orders you direct, and am now executing them."

Before the battle, and in anticipation of the order from General Thomas, the trains had been sent back and the preparations made for the army to retire to Brentwood, the troops to commence withdrawing from the line on the south side of the river immediately after dark. In consequence of the battle, the movement of the troops was suspended until midnight. General Thomas promptly replied to my first report in these words:

"Your telegram is just received. It is glorious news, and I congratulate you and the brave men of your command; but you must look out that the enemy does not still persist. The courier you sent to General Cooper, at Widow Dean's, could not reach there, and reports that he was chased by rebel cavalry on the whole route, and finally came into this place. Major-General Steedman, with five thousand men, should be here in the morning. When he arrives I will start General A. J. Smith's command and General Steedman's troops to your assistance at Brentwood."

[( 1) See his "Memoirs," Vol. II, pp. 162, 163.]

[( 2) It appears from General Thomas's report that he did have in his department, by November 29, the mounted cavalry force stated by General Sherman—viz., 7700; but only 4800 of that force joined the army in the field before the enemy forced the crossing of Duck River. The remaining 2900 were not available for service in the field until after the crisis of the campaign was passed so far as the cavalry could affect it.]

[( 3) See. Vol. XLV, parts I and ii.]

[( 4) See Vols. XXXIX and XLV.]

[( 5) See General Thomas's report: War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 33.]

[( 6) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1017.]

[( 7) Thomas to Steedman, November 25: War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1050.]

[( 8) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 535.]

[( 9) Ibid., p. 536.]

[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 685.]

[(11) Ibid.]

[(12) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I.]

[(13) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1143.]

[(14) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1108.]

[(15) Cooper commanded the brigade guarding the river below Columbia.]

[(16) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1137.]

[(17) At that time I did not know of our loss in prisoners, having thought nearly all of Wagner's two brigades had come in with those I had seen running to the rear.]

CHAPTER XII After the Battle of Franklin—The Arrival at Nashville—General Thomas's Greeting—A Refreshing Sleep—Services of the Cavalry Corps and the Fourth Army Corps—Hood's Mistake after Crossing Duck River—An Incident of the Atlanta Campaign Bearing on Hood's Character—An Embarrassing Method of Transmitting Messages in Cipher —The Aggressive Policy of the South.

Early the next morning (December 1), after receiving at Brentwood oral orders from General Thomas to continue the retreat to Nashville, I lay on the ground until the main body of the troops had passed and I had learned from the cavalry and from the infantry rear-guard that nothing could occur in the rear which would require my attention. I then rode forward and reported to General Thomas, whom I found waiting for me at the place he had selected for the Twenty-third Corps in the defensive line about Nashville. He greeted me in his usual cordial but undemonstrative way, congratulated me, and said I had done "well." I have often thought that I may not have shown due appreciation of his kindness at that moment, for I did not then feel very grateful to him; but he gave no indication that he thought me unappreciative of his approbation. On the contrary, he said in the kindest manner that I appeared "tired." To which I replied, "Yes, I am very tired." That was about all the conversation we had that day.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN

As soon as I saw that my troops were moving into the position he had indicated to the division commanders before my

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