Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt [story books to read .TXT] 📗

United States build the canal through her territory. As long as it was doubtful which route we would decide upon, Colombia extended every promise of friendly cooperation; at the Pan-American Congress in Mexico her delegate joined in the unanimous vote which requested the United States forthwith to build the canal; and at her eager request we negotiated the Hay-Herran Treaty with her, which gave us the right to build the canal across Panama. A board of experts sent to the Isthmus had reported that this route was better than the Nicaragua route, and that it would be well to build the canal over it provided we could purchase the rights of the French company for forty million dollars; but that otherwise they would advise taking the Nicaragua route. Ever since 1846 we had had a treaty with the power then in control of the Isthmus, the Republic of New Granada, the predecessor of the Republic of Colombia and of the present Republic of Panama, by which treaty the United States was guaranteed free and open right of way across the Isthmus of Panama by any mode of communication that might be constructed, while in return our Government guaranteed the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus with a view to the preservation of free transit.

 

For nearly fifty years we had asserted the right to prevent the closing of this highway of commerce. Secretary of State Cass in 1858

officially stated the American position as follows: “Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, and none of these local governments, even if administered with more regard to the just demands of other nations than they have been, would be permitted, in a spirit of Eastern isolation, to close the gates of intercourse of the great highways of the world, and justify the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them, or, what is almost equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust relations as would prevent their general use.”

 

We had again and again been forced to intervene to protect the transit across the Isthmus, and the intervention was frequently at the request of Colombia herself. The effort to build a canal by private capital had been made under De Lesseps and had resulted in lamentable failure.

Every serious proposal to build the canal in such manner had been abandoned. The United States had repeatedly announced that we would not permit it to be built or controlled by any old-world government.

Colombia was utterly impotent to build it herself. Under these circumstances it had become a matter of imperative obligation that we should build it ourselves without further delay.

 

I took final action in 1903. During the preceding fifty-three years the Governments of New Granada and of its successor, Colombia, had been in a constant state of flux; and the State of Panama had sometimes been treated as almost independent, in a loose Federal league, and sometimes as the mere property of the Government at Bogota; and there had been innumerable appeals to arms, sometimes of adequate, sometimes for inadequate, reasons. The following is a partial list of the disturbances on the Isthmus of Panama during the period in question, as reported to us by our consuls. It is not possible to give a complete list, and some of the reports that speak of “revolutions” must mean unsuccessful revolutions: May 22, 1850.—Outbreak; two Americans killed. War vessel demanded to quell outbreak.

 

October, 1850.—Revolutionary plot to bring about independence of the Isthmus.

 

July 22, 1851.—Revolution in four Southern provinces.

 

November 14, 1851.—Outbreak at Chagres. Man-of-war requested for Chagres.

 

June 27, 1853.—Insurrection at Bogota, and consequent disturbance on Isthmus. War vessel demanded.

 

May 23, 1854.—Political disturbances. War vessel requested.

 

June 28, 1854.—Attempted revolution.

 

October 24, 1854.—Independence of Isthmus demanded by provincial legislature.

 

April, 1856.—Riot, and massacre of Americans.

 

May 4, 1856.—Riot.

 

May 18, 1856.—Riot.

 

June 3, 1856.—Riot.

 

October 2, 1856.—Conflict between two native parties. United States force landed.

 

December 18, 1858.—Attempted secession of Panama.

 

April, 1859.—Riots.

 

September, 1860.—Outbreak.

 

October 4, 1860.—Landing of United States forces in consequence.

 

May 23, 1861.—Intervention of the United States force required, by intendente.

 

October 2, 1861.—Insurrection and civil war.

 

April 4, 1862.—Measures to prevent rebels crossing Isthmus.

 

June 13, 1862.—Mosquera’s troops refused admittance to Panama.

 

March, 1865.—Revolution, and United States troops landed.

 

August, 1865.—Riots; unsuccessful attempt to invade Panama.

 

March, 1866.—Unsuccessful revolution.

 

April, 1867.—Attempt to overthrow Government.

 

August, 1867.—Attempt at revolution.

 

July 5, 1868.—Revolution; provisional government inaugurated.

 

August 29, 1868.—Revolution; provisional government overthrown.

 

April, 1871.—Revolution; followed apparently by counter revolution.

 

April, 1873.—Revolution and civil war which lasted to October, 1875.

 

August, 1876.—Civil war which lasted until April, 1877.

 

July, 1878.—Rebellion.

 

December, 1878.—Revolt.

 

April, 1879.—Revolution.

 

June, 1879.—Revolution.

 

March, 1883.—Riot.

 

May, 1883.—Riot.

 

June, 1884.—Revolutionary attempt.

 

December, 1884.—Revolutionary attempt.

 

January, 1885.—Revolutionary disturbances.

 

March, 1885.—Revolution.

 

April, 1887.—Disturbance on Panama Railroad.

 

November, 1887.—Disturbance on line of canal.

 

January, 1889.—Riot.

 

January, 1895.—Revolution which lasted until April.

 

March, 1895.—Incendiary attempt.

 

October, 1899.—Revolution.

 

February, 1900, to July, 1900.—Revolution.

 

January, 1901.—Revolution.

 

July, 1901.—Revolutionary disturbances.

 

September, 1901.—City of Colon taken by rebels.

 

March, 1902.—Revolutionary disturbances.

 

July, 1902.—Revolution

 

The above is only a partial list of the revolutions, rebellions, insurrections, riots, and other outbreaks that occurred during the period in question; yet they number fifty-three for the fifty-three years, and they showed a tendency to increase, rather than decrease, in numbers and intensity. One of them lasted for nearly three years before it was quelled; another for nearly a year. In short, the experience of over half a century had shown Colombia to be utterly incapable of keeping order on the Isthmus. Only the active interference of the United States had enabled her to preserve so much as a semblance of sovereignty. Had it not been for the exercise by the United States of the police power in her interest, her connection with the Isthmus would have been sundered long before it was. In 1856, in 1860, in 1873, in 1885, in 1901, and again in 1902, sailors and marines from United States warships were forced to land in order to patrol the Isthmus, to protect life and property, and to see that the transit across the Isthmus was kept open. In 1861, in 1862, in 1885, and in 1900, the Colombian Government asked that the United States Government would land troops to protect Colombian interests and maintain order on the Isthmus. The people of Panama during the preceding twenty years had three times sought to establish their independence by revolution or secession—in 1885, in 1895, and in 1899.

 

The peculiar relations of the United States toward the Isthmus, and the acquiescence by Colombia in acts which were quite incompatible with the theory of her having an absolute and unconditioned sovereignty on the Isthmus, are illustrated by the following three telegrams between two of our naval officers whose ships were at the Isthmus, and the Secretary of the Navy on the occasion of the first outbreak that occurred on the Isthmus after I became President (a year before Panama became independent):

 

September 12, 1902.

 

Ranger, Panama:

 

United States guarantees perfect neutrality of Isthmus and that a free transit from sea to sea be not interrupted or embarrassed.

… Any transportation of troops which might contravene these provisions of treaty should not be sanctioned by you, nor should use of road be permitted which might convert the line of transit into theater of hostility.

 

MOODY.

 

COLON, September 20, 1902.

 

Secretary Navy, Washington:

 

Everything is conceded. The United States guards and guarantees traffic and the line of transit. To-day I permitted the exchange of Colombian troops from Panama to Colon, about 1000 men each way, the troops without arms in trains guarded by American naval force in the same manner as other passengers; arms and ammunition in separate train, guarded also by naval force in the same manner as other freight.

 

MCLEAN.

 

PANAMA, October 3, 1902.

 

Secretary Navy,

Washington, D.C.:

 

Have sent this communication to the American Consul at Panama: “Inform Governor, while trains running under United States protection, I must decline transportation any combatants, ammunition, arms, which might cause interruption to traffic or convert line of transit into theater hostilities.”

 

CASEY.

 

When the Government in nominal control of the Isthmus continually besought American interference to protect the “rights” it could not itself protect, and permitted our Government to transport Colombian troops unarmed, under protection of our own armed men, while the Colombian arms and ammunition came in a separate train, it is obvious that the Colombian “sovereignty” was of such a character as to warrant our insisting that inasmuch as it only existed because of our protection there should be in requital a sense of the obligations that the acceptance of this protection implied.

 

Meanwhile Colombia was under a dictatorship. In 1898 M. A. Sanclamente was elected President, and J. M. Maroquin Vice-President, of the Republic of Colombia. On July 31, 1900, the Vice-President, Maroquin, executed a “coup d’etat” by seizing the person of the President, Sanclamente, and imprisoning him at a place a few miles out of Bogota.

Maroquin thereupon declared himself possessed of the executive power because of “the absence of the President”—a delightful touch of unconscious humor. He then issued a decree that public order was disturbed, and, upon that ground, assumed to himself legislative power under another provision of the constitution; that is, having himself disturbed the public order, he alleged the disturbance as a justification for seizing absolute power. Thenceforth Maroquin, without the aid of any legislative body, ruled as a dictator, combining the supreme executive, legislative, civil, and military authorities, in the so-called Republic of Colombia. The “absence” of Sanclamente from the capital became permanent by his death in prison in the year 1902. When the people of Panama declared their independence in November, 1903, no Congress had sat in Colombia since the year 1898, except the special Congress called by Maroquin to reject the canal treaty, and which did reject it by a unanimous vote, and adjourned without legislating on any other subject. The constitution of 1886 had taken away from Panama the power of self-government and vested it in Columbia. The coup d’etat of Maroquin took away from Colombia herself the power of government and vested it in an irresponsible dictator.

 

Consideration of the above facts ought to be enough to show any human being that we were not dealing with normal conditions on the Isthmus and in Colombia. We were dealing with the government of an irresponsible alien dictator, and with a condition of affairs on the Isthmus itself which was marked by one uninterrupted series of outbreaks and revolutions. As for the “consent of the governed”

theory, that absolutely justified our action; the people on the Isthmus were the “governed”; they were governed by Colombia, without their consent, and they unanimously repudiated the Colombian government, and demanded that the United States build the canal.

 

I had done everything possible, personally and through Secretary Hay, to persuade the Colombian Government to keep faith. Under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, it was explicitly provided that the United States should build the canal, should control, police and protect it, and keep it open to the vessels of all nations on equal terms. We had assumed the position of guarantor of the canal, including, of course, the building of the canal, and of its peaceful use by all the world.

The enterprise was recognized everywhere as responding to an international need. It was a mere travesty on justice to treat the government in possession of the Isthmus as having the