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self-control and modesty of the other pupils of Gau@dapâda [Footnote ref 2]. There is some dispute about the date of S'a@nkara, but accepting the date proposed by Bha@n@darkar, Pa@thak and Deussen, we may consider it to be 788 A.D. [Footnote ref 3], and suppose that in order to be able to teach S'a@nkara, Gau@dapâda must have been living till at least 800 A.D.

Gau@dapâda thus flourished after all the great Buddhist teachers As'vagho@sa, Nâgârjuna, Asa@nga and Vasubandhu; and I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his kârikâs for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upani@sads tallied with those of Buddha. Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his kârikâs he says that he adores that great man (dvipadâm varam) who by knowledge as wide as the sky realized (sambuddha) that all appearances (dharma) were like the vacuous sky (gaganopamam [Footnote ref 4]. He then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (des'ita) that the touch of untouch (aspars'ayoga—probably referring to Nirvâ@na) was the good that produced happiness to all beings, and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor found any contradiction in it (avivâda@h aviruddhas'ca). Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents, whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (jâta) is of non-existents (abhûtasya); there are others who quarrel with them and say that neither the existents nor non-existents are liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being (advayamajâtim). He agrees with those who hold that there is no coming into being [Footnote ref 5]. In IV. 19 of his kârikâ he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was no coming into being in any way (sarvathâ Buddhairajâti@h paridîpita@h).

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[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, Anandâs'rama edition, p. 214.]

[Footnote 2: Anandâs'rama edition of S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, p. 21.]

[Footnote 3: Telang wishes to put S'a@nkara's date somewhere in the 8th century, and Ve@nkates'vara would have him in 805 A.D.-897 A.D., as he did not believe that S'a@nkara could have lived only for 32 years. J.R.A.S. 1916.]

[Footnote 4: Compare Lankâvatâra, p. 29, Katha@m ca gaganopamam.]

[Footnote 5: Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, IV. 2, 4.]

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Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (vastuvâdi), who since they found things and could deal with them and were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of origination (jâti). In IV. 90 he refers to agrayâna which we know to be a name of Mahâyâna. Again, in IV. 98 and 99 he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature. These the Buddhas, the emancipated one (mukta) and the leaders know first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances (dharma) were knowledge. He then closes the kârikâs with an adoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha [Footnote ref 1].

Gau@dapâda's work is divided into four chapters: (i) Âgama (scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4) Alâtas'ânti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is more in the way of explaining the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad by virtue of which the entire work is known as Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ. The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts of Gau@dapâda's work, not particularly connected with the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad.

In the first chapter Gau@dapâda begins with the three apparent manifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of the external world while we are awake (vis'va or vais'vânara âtmâ), (2) as the experiencer in the dream state (taijasa âtmâ), (3) as the experiencer in deep sleep (su@supti), called the prâjña when there is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure bliss (ânanda). He who knows these three as one is never attached to his experiences. Gau@dapâda then enumerates some theories of creation: some think that the world has proceeded as a creation from the prâ@na (vital activity), others consider creation as an expansion (vibhûti) of that cause from which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is like dream (svapna) and magic (mâyâ); others, that creation proceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds from time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord (bhogârtham) or for his play only (kri@dârtham), for such is the nature (svabhâva) of the Lord, that he creates, but he cannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.

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[Footnote 1: Gau@dapâda's kârikâ IV. 100. In my translation I have not followed S'a@nkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain away even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in Gau@dapâda's kârikâ. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as Gau@dapâda's kârikâs seemed to indicate. I have followed the same principle in giving the short exposition of Gau@dapâda's philosophy below.]

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Gau@dapâda does not indicate his preference one way or the other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (ad@r@s@ta), unrelationable (avyavahâryam), ungraspable (agrâhyam), indefinable (alak@sa@na), unthinkable (acintyam), unspeakable (avyapades'ya), the essence as oneness with the self (ekâtmapratyayasâra), as the extinction of the appearance (prapañcopas'ama), the quiescent (s'ântam), the good (s'ivam), the one (advaita) [Footnote ref 1]. The world-appearance (prapañca) would have ceased if it had existed, but all this duality is mere mâyâ (magic or illusion), the one is the ultimately real (paramârthata@h). In the second chapter Gau@dapâda says that what is meant by calling the world a dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside, but both of them are but illusory creations of the self. What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived, and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first the imagination of a perceiver or soul (jîva) and then along with it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms. There is neither any production nor any destruction (na nirodho, na cotpatti@h), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is striving, no one who wants to be released [Footnote ref 2]. Imagination finds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense

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[Footnote 1: Compare in Nâgârjuna's first kârikâ the idea of prapañcopas'amam s'ivam. Anirodhamanutpâdamanucchedamas'âs'vatam anekârthamanânârthamanâgamamanirgamam ya@h pratîtyasamutpâdam prapañcopas'amam s'ivam des'ayâmâva sambuddhastam vande vadatâmvaram. Compare also Nâgârjuna's Chapter on Nirvâ@naparîk@sâ, Pûrvopalambhopas'ama@h prapañcopas'ama@h s'iva@h na kvacit kasyacit kas'cit dharmmo buddhenades'ita@h. So far as I know the Buddhists were the first to use the words prapañcopas'aman s'ivam.]

[Footnote 2: Compare Nâgârjuna's k@arikâ, "anirodhamanutpâdam" in Mâdhyamikav@rtti, B.T.S., p. 3.]

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of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (advaya) is false; it is only the oneness (advayatâ) that is good. There is no many, nor are things different or non-different (na nânedam …na p@rthag nâp@rthak) [Footnote ref 1]. The sages who have transcended attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all appearance (nirvikalpa@h prapañcopas'ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 2].

In the third chapter Gau@dapâda says that truth is like the void(âkâs'a) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from âkâs'a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams (svapna) and mâyâ (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed upon the one (advaita) by mâyâ. The truth is immortal, it cannot therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition of mâyâ upon it [Footnote ref 3]. One mind appears as many in the dream, as also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless state, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everything to be misery (du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya) one should stop all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken the mind (citta) into its final dissolution (laya) and pacify it when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (sukham) and by wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction; when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (sarvajña).

In the fourth chapter, called the Alats'ânti, Gau@dapâda further

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[Footnote 1: Compare _Mâdhyamikakârikâ, B.T.S., p.3 anekârtham anânârtham, etc.]

[Footnote 2: Compare Lankâvatârasûtra, p.78, Advayâsamsâraparinirvâ@nvatsarvadharmâ@h tasmât tarhi mahâmate S'unyatânutpâdâdvayani@hsvabhâvalak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h; also 8,46, Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tyânavabodhanât vijñânânâm svacittad@r@s@tyamâtrânavatâre@na mahâmate vâlaprthagjanâ@h bhâvâbhâvasvabhâvaparamârthad@r@s@tidvayvâdino bhavanti.]

[Footnote 3: Compare Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, B.T.S. p. 196, Âkâs'am s'as'as'@r@ngañca bandhyâyâ@h putra eva ca asantas'câbhivyajyante tathâbhâvena kalpanâ, with Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, III. 28, Asato mâyayâ janma tatvato naiva jâyate bandhyâputro na tattvena mâyâya vâpi jâyate.]

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describes this final state [Footnote ref l]. All the dharmas (appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote: ref 2]. Gau@dapâda then follows a dialectical form of argument which reminds us of Nâgârjuna. Gau@dapâda continues thus: Those who regard kâra@na (cause) as the kâryya (effect in a potential form) cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (aja), for it suffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing? If it is said that things come into being from that which has no production, there is no example with which such a case may be illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a right conclusion about the regressus ad infinitum of cause and effect (hetu and phala)? Without reference to the effect there is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect. Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth, neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature (svabhâvatah), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot be said to have a production. All experience (prajñapti) is dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there would be none of the afflictions (sa@mkles'a) that we suffer. When we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (citta) does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest them, for since things do not exist they are not different from their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations. Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are really traversing the reason of vacuity (khe), for all production is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of

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[Footnote 1: The very name Alâta@sânti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, B.T.S., p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the S'ataka.]

[Footnote 2: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini, "Codanâlak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah." Dharma is determined by the injunctions of the Vedas.]

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production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like a magical or illusory elephant (mâyâhastî) and exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one knowledge (vijñâna) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness (avastutva), the cessation (s'ântam). As the movement of burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it

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