Practical Argumentation, George K. Pattee [reading the story of the txt] 📗

This method consists of combining the process just described with the argument from antecedent probability. A reduction of wages in one cotton mill is a sign that there may be a reduction in other cotton mills. Here the reasoning goes from effect to effect, passing, however, though perhaps the reasoner is not aware that the process is so complex, through a cause common to both effects. In full, the reasoning would be: a reduction in the first mill is the result of the cause “hard times”; it is then antecedently probable that this cause will produce a similar reduction of wages in other mills.

This method may be represented by the following figure:—

Cause Effect Effect

Only one effect is known; the other effect is inferred, first, by a process of reasoning from a known effect to an unknown cause, and secondly, by the process of reasoning from this assumed cause to an unknown effect.

This method of reasoning is sound and legitimate when both effects have the same cause. Its weakness lies in the fact that it may be attacked on two sides: on the reasoning from effect to cause, and on the reasoning from cause to effect. If the connection can be broken in either process, the argument is overthrown. The tests to be used have already been given.

 

3. ARGUMENT FROM EXAMPLE.

Argument from example is the name given to the process by which one reasons that what has been true under certain circumstances will again be true under the same or similar circumstances. In using this method of reasoning one argues that whenever several persons or things or conditions are alike in some respects, any given cause operating upon them will in each case produce the same effect; any line of action adopted by them will in each case have the same result.

There are two divisions of argument from example. When the resemblance between the things compared is close, the process is called argument by generalization; when the resemblance is so slight that there can be no direct comparison, but only a comparison of functions, the process is called argument from analogy.

ARGUMENT BY GENERALIZATION. If one finds that a certain mastiff becomes with training an excellent watch dog, he may reasonably take it for granted that training will produce the same result in another dog of the same breed. If a college student with certain pronounced physical and mental characteristics is known to be an exceptionally good football player, the athletic trainer is sure to reason by generalization that another student with these same characteristics would be a valuable addition to the team. Burke in his Speech on Conciliation uses this kind of reasoning when he says that just as Turkey and Spain have found it necessary to govern their distant possessions with a loose rein, so, too, England will be obliged to govern the American Colonies leniently.

Benjamin Harrison used this method of argument in the following quotation:—

That we give back to Porto Rico all the revenue derived from the customs we levy, does not seem to me to soften our dealings with her people. Our fathers were not mollified by the suggestion that the tea and stamp taxes would be expended wholly for the benefit of the colonies. It is to say: We do not need this money; it is only levied to show that your country is no part of the United States, and that you are not citizens of the United States, save at our pleasure. [Footnote: North American Review, January, 1901, p. 17.]

Argument by generalization very rarely constitutes absolute proof. In dealing with things, it may do so in rare cases; in dealing with human actions, almost never. The reason why it can establish only a strong probability lies in a weakness in the process of reasoning.

Notice that while this kind of argument apparently reasons directly from the example cited to the case in hand, there is in reality an intermediate step. This step is a general truth of which both the known fact and the fact to be proved must be instances. When it is argued that since one mastiff makes a good watch dog another mastiff will also make a good watch dog, the reasoning passes through the general statement, “All mastiffs make good watch dogs.”

Graphically the process might be represented thus:—

General Law / / Known Fact Fact to be Proved

This method is very much like the method of reasoning from effect to effect, except that here the intermediate step does not cause, but merely accounts for the facts. In the illustration taken from Burke, the known fact is that neither Turkey nor Spain can govern their distant provinces despotically. The general law is that no country can govern a distant dependency harshly. The fact proved is that England cannot play the despot with the American Colonies.

The weakness of this sort of reasoning is now easily seen. In the first place, there are few general laws governing human action that always hold true. In the second place, unless there is a very strong resemblance between the cases compared, unless they are alike in all essential particulars, they will not both be examples of the working of one general law.

The following quotation points out an error that might be made from too hasty reasoning by example:—

On August 23d the Southern Railway, which since 1902 had been paying 5 per cent. annual dividends on its preferred stock, voted to reduce those dividends from a 5 per cent. annual rate to one of 3. Five days later, on August 28th, the Erie Railroad, which had been paying 4 per cent … announced that it would pay no cash dividend this time, but would issue to the amount of the usual 4 per cent. dividend, what it called dividend warrants, which were practically notes at 4 per cent. redeemable in cash in 1907.

It was natural that this action regarding dividends should have awakened much uneasiness…. To predict a similar cutting of dividends by other railway companies would, however, be unwarranted. The case of the Southern Railway and the Erie was peculiar. Each had been classed among the financially weak railways of the country. Both were reorganized from absolute railway wrecks, and in each the new scheme of capitalization was proposed to the markets at a time when recovery from the depression of 1893 had not made such progress as it had achieved when the greater companies, like the Union Pacific, were reorganized. The result was that, with both these railways, provisions of working capital and adjustment of liabilities to the possible needs of an active industrial future were inadequately made. [Footnote: Alexander D. Noyes, The Forum, October-December, 1907, p.198.]

An excellent illustration of how to refute argument by generalization is found in the following quotation. It has been said that since England finds free trade beneficial, the United States should adopt the same policy. Mr. Reed, a leading advocate of protection, points out the weakness of this argument.

According to the usual story that is told, England had been engaged with a long and vain struggle with the demon of protection, and had been year after year sinking farther into the depths, until at a moment when she was in her distress and saddest plight, her manufacturing system broke down, “protection, having destroyed home trade by reducing,” as Mr. Atkinson says, “the entire population to beggary, destitution, and want.” Mr. Cobden and his friends providentially appeared, and after a hard struggle established a principle for all time and for all the world, and straightway England enjoyed the sum of human happiness. Hence all good nations should do as England has done and be happy ever after.

Suppose England, instead of being a little island in the sea, had been the half of a great continent full of raw material, capable of an internal commerce which would rival the commerce of all the rest of the world.

Suppose every year new millions were flocking to her shores, and every one of those new millions in a few years, as soon as they tasted the delights of a broader life, would become as great a consumer as any one of her own people.

Suppose that these millions, and the 70,000,000 already gathered under the folds of her flag, were every year demanding and receiving a higher wage and therefore broadening her market as fast as her machinery could furnish production. Suppose she had produced cheap food beyond all her wants, and that her laborers spent so much money that whether wheat was sixty cents a bushel or twice that sum hardly entered the thoughts of one of them except when some democratic tariff bill was paralyzing his business.

Suppose that she was not only but a cannon shot from France, but that every country in Europe had been brought as near to her as Baltimore is to Washington—for that is what cheap ocean freights mean between us and European producers. Suppose all those countries had her machinery, her skilled workmen, her industrial system, and labor forty per cent. cheaper. Suppose under that state of facts, with all her manufactures proclaiming against it, frantic in their disapproval, England had been called upon by Cobden to make the plunge into free trade, would she have done it? Not if Cobden had been backed by the angelic host. History gives England credit for great sense. [Footnote: Thomas B. Reed, Speech in House of Representatives, Feb. 1, 1904.]

ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. When two instances of objects which are unlike in themselves, but which perform similar functions or have similar relations, are compared for the sake of showing that what is true in one case is true in the other, the process is called argument from analogy. The following quotation is a good illustration of this kind of argument:—

“Mr. Pinchot compared our present consumption of wood to the case of a man in an open boat at sea, cut adrift from some shipwreck and with but a few days’ supply of water on board. He drinks all the water the first day, simply because he is thirsty, though he knows that the water will not last long. The American people know that their wood supply will last but a few decades. Yet they shut their eyes to the facts.”

Water and wood are not alike in themselves; they cannot be directly compared, but they are alike in the relations they bear to other circumstances.

When President Lincoln refused to change generals at a certain time during the Civil War, saying that it was not wise to “swap horses while crossing a stream,” he reasoned from analogy. Since the horse in taking its master across the stream and the general in conducting a campaign are totally unlike in themselves but have similar relations, the argument is from analogy and not from generalization.

It is easy to see that such reasoning never constitutes indubitable proof. If argument from generalization, where the objects compared differ from each other in only a few respects, is weak, plainly, argument from analogy is much weaker, since the objects are alike merely in the relations they bear.

Though argument from analogy does not constitute proof, yet it is often valuable as a means of illustration. Truths frequently need illumination more than verification, and in such cases this sort of comparison may be very useful. Many proverbs are condensed arguments from analogy, their strength depending upon the similarity between the known case and the case in hand. It is not hard to find the analogy in these expressions: “Lightning never strikes twice in the same place”; “Don’t count your chickens before they are hatched”; “A fool and his money are soon parted.”

The student who has carefully read this chapter up to this