Ethics, Aristotle [classic literature books TXT] 📗
![](/uploads/posts/books/2/6/4/9/6/ethics.jpg)
- Author: Aristotle
- Performer: 019283407X
Book online «Ethics, Aristotle [classic literature books TXT] 📗». Author Aristotle
P 137, l. 29. [Greek:–-] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:–-] would be its chief Instrument.
P. 138, l. 16. The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:–-].
P. 139, l. 16. In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.
Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.
P. 139, l. 27. [Greek:–-], “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.)
P. 139, l. 32. Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is [Greek:–-] proper) or not-Self, i.e. either one’s family=[Greek:–-], or one’s community=[Greek:–-], but here the supreme and subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Greek:–-], the latter [Greek:–-] proper, whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.
P. 140, l. 16. But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace’s account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler’s first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence in fact of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence i.e. love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].
P. 140, l. 17. More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from experience.
P. 140, l. 23. This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.
P. 140, l. 27. An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1. chap. viii.)
P. 141, l. 1. Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.
P. 141, l. 12. I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense, “Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take much trouble about such a point.
P. 141, l. 25. The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), “a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”
The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun. The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side next to the sun.
P. 141, l. 34. Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.
P. 142, l. 19. The End does not sanctify the Means.
P. 142, l. 28. The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right means to the Grand End of all. P. 142,1. 34. The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].
P. 143,1 27. We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].
P. 144, 1 i. Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. [Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is [Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek: nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is [Greek: phronimos]?
P. 144, 1. 7. See note, on p. 140.
P 144 1.19. There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of [Greek: nous], i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.
P. 144, 1. 25. i.e. of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
P 144,1 27. See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e. by [Greek: ethismos]).
All that is pleasant is to be done, This is pleasant, This is to be done
By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, i.e. on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5. P. 145, l. 4. The consequentia is this:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and therefore, etc.
P. 145, l. 22. This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10,
{ [Greek: to men hygieias poi�tikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai] { [Greek: to de phylaktikon], { [Greek: to de s�mantikon].
Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
P. 146, l. 11. Healthiness is the formal cause of health. Medicine is the efficient.
See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud h� hygieia kai ho iatros homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
P. 146, l. 17. [Greek: phron�sis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.
P. 146, l. 19. This is another case of an observation being thrown in obiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
P. 146, l. 22. See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.
P. 147, l. 6. The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.
P. 147, l. 13. See the note on [Greek: Arch�] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,
“This particular action is––.”
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar dei prattein h� m�, to telos aut�s estin] i.e. [Greek: t�s phron�seos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.)
P. 147, l. 19. “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici.
P. 147, l. 26. The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.
P. 147, l. 30. Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek t�s aret�s].
P. 148, l. 10. It must be remembered, that [Greek: phron�sis] is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it. P. 152, 1. 1. The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men may be than what they are. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.
P. 152, 1. 17. This illustrates the expression, “Deceits of the Flesh.”
P. 156, 1. 12. Another reading omits the [Greek:–-]; the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.”
P. 158, 1. 4. Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:–-] [Greek–-]
P. 158, 1. 8. Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.
P 158, 1. 31. As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red Gauntlet.”
P. 159, 1. 23. That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise, it is true, that “all that is sweet is pleasant,” it is true also, that “this is sweet,” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to the major i.e. the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind “All excess is to be avoided,” at a certain time his [Greek:–-] tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided,” and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But [Greek:–-], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in place of the minor premise “This is excess,” its own
Comments (0)