Problems of Life and Mind. Second series, George Henry Lewes [e book reading free TXT] 📗
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19. It is difficult to resist such evidence as is here manifested. The brainless frog “chooses” a new plan when the old one fails, just as the waking child chooses. And an illustration of how sensations guide and determine movements, may be seen in another observation of the brainless frog, when, as often happens, it does not hit upon either of the plans just mentioned, but remains apparently restless and helpless; if under these circumstances we perform a part of the action for it, it will complete what we have begun: if we rub the irritated leg, at some distance from the spot where the acid is, with the foot of the other, the frog suddenly avails itself of this guiding sensation, and at once directs its foot to the irritated spot.
In these experiments on the triton and the frog, the evidence of sensation and volition is all the stronger, because the reactions produced by irritations are not uniform. If when a decapitated animal were stimulated it always reacted in precisely the same way, and never chose new means on the failure of the old, it would be conceivable to attribute the results to simple reflex action—i. e. the mechanical transference of an impulse along a prescribed path. It is possible so to conceive the breathing, or the swallowing mechanism: the impression may be directly reflected on certain groups of muscles. But I cannot conceive a machine suddenly striking out new methods, when the old methods fail. I cannot conceive a machine thrown into disorder when its accustomed actions fail, and in this disorder suddenly lighting upon an action likely to succeed, and continuing that; but I can conceive this to be done by an organism, for my own experience and observation of animals assures me that this is always the way new lines of action are adopted. And this which is observed of the unmutilated animal, I have just shown to be observed of the brainless animal; wherefore the conclusion is, that if ever the frog is sentient, if ever its actions are guided by sensation, they are so when its brain is removed.
20. Schröder van der Kolk thinks that Pflüger was deceived in attributing sensation and volition to the frog, because the reflex actions are, he says, so nicely adapted to their ends, that they are undistinguishable from voluntary actions. The mechanism is such that, by means of the communications established between various groups of cells, all these actions adapted to an end may be excited by every stimulus. But I deny the fact. I deny that all the actions are awakened by every stimulus. Only some few are awakened, and those are not always the same, nor do they follow the same order of succession. One decapitated frog does not behave exactly like another under similar circumstances; does not behave exactly like himself at different seasons; unlike a machine, he manifests spontaneity in his actions, and volition in the direction of his actions.
21. The reader will notice that my illustrations show these actions of the brainless animal to have the same external characters as those of the unmutilated animals. I am therefore not here concerned to prove the psychical nature of these actions, unless it be granted that the unmutilated animal has sensation and volition. This of course can only be inferred, not proved. But the inference must not be allowed in the one case and refused in the other. Young rabbits and puppies when taken from their mothers manifest discomfort by restless movement and whining. Do they feel the discomfort they thus express? If ever rabbits and puppies may be said to feel, we must answer, Yes. Well, if the brain be removed from rabbits and puppies, precisely similar phenomena are observed when these young animals are taken from their mothers. “I observed the motions, which seemed the result of discomfort, quickly cease when I warmed the young rabbit by breathing on it. After a while it was completely at rest, and seemed sunk in deep sleep; occasionally, however, it moved one of its legs without any external stimulus having been applied, and this not spasmodically, but in the manner of a sleeping animal.”237 Is this cessation of the restlessness, when warmth is restored, not evidence of sensation? We see an infant restless, struggling, and squalling; and we believe that it is hungry, or that some other sensations agitate it; it is put to the breast, and its squalls subside; or a finger is placed in its mouth, and it sucks that, in a peaceful lull, for a few moments, to recommence squalling when the finger yields no satisfaction. If we accept these as signs of sensation, I do not see how we can deny such sensation to the brainless animal which will also cease to cry, and will suck the delusive finger.
22. One of the earliest advocates of the Reflex Theory sums up his observations in these words: “It is clear that brainless animals, although without sensation, because not endowed with mind, nevertheless, by means of external impressions which operate incessantly on them, perform all the acts and manifest all the activity of the sentient animal; everything that is effected sensationally and volitionally, they effect by means of the organic forces of the impressions.”238 Call Sensibility one of the organic forces, if you please, but so long as the acts performed are not only the same as those of a sentient animal, but are performed by the same mechanism, they have every claim to the character of sensational acts which can be urged in the case of these animals when the brain is present. And the only reason on which this claim is disputed is the assumed loss of all sensation with the loss of the brain. Here, therefore, lies the central point to be determined.
DEDUCTIONS FROM GENERAL LAWS.
23. The evidence is of two kinds: deductions from the general laws of nervous action, and inductions from particular manifestations. The former furnish a presumption, the latter a proof.
The central process which initiates a reflex action may be excited by the external stimulation of a peripheral nerve, by the internal stimulation of a peripheral nerve, or by the irradiation from some other part of the central tissue. The last-named stimulations are the least intelligible, because they are so varied and complex, and so remote from observation; among them may be placed, 1°, the organized impulses of Instinct and Habit, with their fixed modes of manifestation; 2°, the organized impulses of Emotion, which are more variable in their manifestations, because more fluctuating in their conditions; 3°, the organized impulses of Intellect, the most variable of all. Whether we shrink on the contact of a cold substance or on hearing a sudden sound,—at the sight of a terrible object,—at the imaginary vision of the object,—or because we feign the terror which is thus expressed,—the reflex mechanism of shrinking is in each case the same, and the neural process discharged on the muscles is the same; but the state of Feeling which originated the change—or, in strictly physiological terms, the inciting neural process which preceded this reflex neural process—was in each case somewhat different, yet in each case was a mode of Sensibility.
24. The property of Sensibility belongs to the whole central tissue; and we have every reason to believe that unless it is excited no reflex takes place, whereas when it is exaggerated—as in epilepsy, or under strychnine—the reflex discharges are convulsive. When anæsthetics are given, consciousness first disappears, and then reflexion. When the sensorium is powerfully excited by other stimuli, the normal stimulus fails to excite either consciousness or reflexion. Hence our conclusion is that for consciousness, on the one hand, and normal reflexion, on the other, the proximate condition is a change in the sensorium; or—to phrase it more familiarly—Feeling is necessary for reflex action.
The difficulty in apprehending this lies in the ambiguity of the term Feeling. Many readers who would find no difficulty in admitting Sensibility as a necessary element in reflex action, will resist the idea of identifying Sensibility with Feeling. But this repugnance must be overcome if we are to understand the various modes of Sensibility which represent Feeling in animals, and its varieties in ourselves. We understand how the general Sensibility manifests itself in markedly different sensations—how that of the optic centre differs from that of the auditory centre, and both from a spinal centre. The tones of a violin are not the same as the tones of a violoncello, both differ from the tones of a key-bugle: yet they all come under the same general laws of tonality. So, as I often insist, the tissues in brain and cord being the same, their properties must be the same, their laws of excitation, irradiation, and combination the same, through all the varieties in their manifestations due to varieties of innervation. Hence it is that there are reflex cerebral processes no less than reflex spinal processes: the motor impulse from, the hemispheres on the corpora striata, or from posterior gray substance on anterior gray substance, is similar to that from the anterior gray substance on the motor nerves. The difference in reflexes arises from the terminal organs; as the difference in sensations arises from the surfaces stimulated. But not only are there reflex processes in the brain, of the same order as those in the cord, there are volitional processes in the cord of the same order as those in the brain. And in both the processes are sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious. No evidence suggests that in the conscious action there is a sensorial process, and a purely physical process in the unconscious action—only a different relation of one sensorial process to others.
25. Let us contrast a cerebral and a spinal process, in respect to the three stages of stimulation, irradiation, and discharge. A luminous impression stimulates my retina, this excites my sensorium, in which second stage I am conscious of the luminous sensation; the final discharge is a perception, or a mental articulation of the name of the luminous object. But the irradiation may perhaps not have been such as to cause a conscious sensation, because the requisite neural elements were already grouped in some other way; in this case there is an unconscious discharge on some motor group, and instead of perceiving and naming the luminous object, I move my head, or my band, or my whole body, avoiding the object, or grasping at it. A third issue is possible: the irradiation, instead of exciting a definite perception, or a definite movement, may be merged in the stream of simultaneous excitations, and thus form the component of a group, and the discharge of this group will be a perception or a movement.
It is the same with a spinal process. An impression on the skin is irradiated in the cord, and the response is a movement, of which we are conscious, or unconscious. Here also a third issue is possible: the irradiation may be merged in a stream of simultaneous excitations, modifying them and modified by them, thus forming a component in some ulterior discharge.
26. The obstacle in the way of recognizing that cerebral processes and spinal processes are of the same order of sensorial phenomena, and have the same physiological significance when considered irrespective of the group of organs they call into activity, is similar to the obstacle which has prevented psychologists from recognizing the identity of the logical process in the combinations of Feeling and the combinations of Thought, i. e. the Logic of Feeling and the Logic of Signs. This obstacle is the fixing attention on the diversity of the effects when the same process operates with different
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