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suppose that, accustomed to pounce upon moving food, it is unable to resist the impulse of this leading sensation.

74. The presence of the brain not sufficing, in the absence of the leading sensation, we shall now see that the absence of the brain will not prevent the execution of the instinctive action, if the leading sensation be present. The brainless bird sees a heap of grain, or a pan of water, but no more recognizes them by sight alone than the frog recognizes the dead flies; yet if the bird’s feet be placed in the water, this sensation will suffice to make him drink; if placed amid the grain, this sensation will (sometimes) suffice to make him feed. Lussana and Lemoigne state that their brainless pigeons ate and drank with avidity when their feet were placed in grain and water.281 M. Krishaber removed the hemispheres from a pigeon, and observed that when his beak was thrust into a heap of hempseed the head was quickly withdrawn, whereas when the beak was plunged into water the bird drank eagerly. Every day he was forced to feed the bird by pouring the seed into its throat, but every day it drank when the beak was thrust into the pan of water.282 Brücke noticed that his brainless hen, which made no attempt to peck at the grain under her very eyes, began pecking if the grain were thrown on the ground with force, so as to produce a rattling sound. The sensation of hearing was here more perfect than that of vision, and sufficed to awaken the state of feeling necessary to initiate the pecking movement.283

75. Somewhat analogous phenomena are observed in Aphasia. The patient can see printed or written letters, and even copy them; but he cannot read, i. e. interpret, these symbols; as the birds see the grain, but cannot connect this sensation with others. These letters and words, which the patient cannot interpret when seen, he can interpret when heard; he can not only understand them when spoken, but write them if they are dictated to him. The birds recognize the grain and water (or act as if they did) when other sensations than those of sight are excited. Sound is the leading element in Language, both spoken and written. We hear the words even when we see them, but we do not see them when we hear them. The visible symbols are accessory and subordinate. But to the born deaf the visible symbols dominate. How one sensation will determine a particular group of movements which cannot be effected by any other stimulus is abundantly illustrated in disease no less than in experiment. Here is a very luminous example: Gratiolet had a patient for six months under his eye incapable of articulating a single word, owing to the incoherence of her incessant utterance—she babbled sounds, but could not group the syllables into a recognizable word. Yet she could sing the words of any song she knew, the musical sensations being sufficient to guide her vocal organs. “Ainsi la mémoire, infidèle dans le cas où les mots étaient des idées, devenait claire et précise quand les mots étaient des chansons.”284

76. These illustrations plainly tell how the brainless animal may starve amid his food, failing to perceive it because the leading sensation is not excited; and how the same animal may manifest his feeding instinct if the mechanism be set going by a leading sensation. We are told, indeed, that in the absence of the brain the actions are mechanical reflexes from impressions, and not comparable with the complex processes determined by perception. I think, however, that the only difference is in degree of complexity: a combination of touch, temperature, and muscular movement will be simpler than one which also combines sight, smell, and the revived images of associated sensations. The sight of a sheep affects the instinctive mechanism of a wolf only when combined with the leading element of smell. Place a stuffed sheep in a field, and no wolf will approach and spring on it, whereas the blind wolf will find and capture the real sheep; and I believe that were it practicable to remove the brain without injury to the organ of scent and the powers of locomotion, the wolf would track and capture the living sheep.

77. The outcome of this discussion is that the mechanism of each instinct is the adjustment of the organs which effect the instinctive action; and this adjustment is not simply a cerebral process, but a complex of many sensorial processes; consequently the instinct cannot be exclusively localized in the brain, although the cerebral process may be a very important element in the adjustment. This is true even on the supposition that in speaking of Instinct we refer only to the state of feeling which originates the action—separating the psychological from the physiological aspect of the phenomenon. For the brain minus the organism is obviously incapable of feelings; whereas the organism minus the brain is obviously capable of sensibilities adequate to determine the actions. Thus the feeling of hunger which prompts the alimentary actions does not arise if the animal is satiated, nor does the sexual feeling which prompts generative actions arise when the animal is castrated; but each arises when the organism is in a particular state. In vain will food be placed before the satiated animal, or a female before the castrated male; food and female are seen and recognized, but no desires are excited, in spite of the brain and its supposed instincts. On the contrary, when the brain is removed, the need of the organism for food is felt, and this need determines restless movements, which are directed by certain other sensations, and the instinctive action of feeding is finally effected; although, of course, the removal of the brain has so disturbed the normal mechanism of the instinct that the action is imperfect. Renzi says that an animal deprived of its brain has lost the intelligence which enables it to seek and seize its food, but not the instinct, since it still has the desire for food. The following experiment may illustrate this. Renzi wounded superficially one optic thalamus of a frog without injuring the external margin, or optic tract. The frog showed no appreciable loss of sight, but hopped timidly away whenever approached. Then both thalami were divided transversely, the optic tract still being spared. This frog remained motionless under every threat. It manifested no alarm, and even when directly irritated, only crawled or hopped away like a brainless frog. Sight still so far remained that obstacles were avoided.285 Now since this animal’s brain was intact, and its organs of movement were capable of responding to stimulation, how are we to explain the loss of its instinct of self-preservation? The frog perceived no danger in a threatening approach, yet perceived an obstacle and avoided it, getting under it if there were room enough, crawling beside it if that was the easier escape. Why did one vision prompt the movements of escape, and another fail? Was it not that in the one case the normal pathway was still open, in the other closed? We know that one injury will destroy the perception of color without destroying that of light and shadow; so one injury may destroy the combination of neural processes necessary for the perception of a danger, without destroying those necessary for the perception of a hindrance. If all actions depend on their mechanical conditions, they must be disturbed according to the disturbance of the conditions. Nothnagel found that after removing the nucleus lentiformis on both sides of a rabbit, leaving all the rest of the encephalon intact, the rabbit hopped when its tail was pinched; yet although starting at the sound when hands were loudly clapped, did not hop as a normal rabbit does; nor although closing his eyes when a light was brought near them, did he ever move aside. No feeling of danger was excited by sound or sight. In striking contrast are the phenomena manifested by a rabbit whose corpora striata have been removed: it is with difficulty made to hop by pinching its skin, whereas noises and sights cause it to make terrified bounds.286

78. No sooner do we analyze the conditions of an instinct than we see the error of regarding instincts as localized in the brain. The cerebral process is only one factor in the product—an important factor, no doubt, since the cerebrum is the supreme centre of incitation and regulation; but its absence does not wholly carry away the activity of the mechanism, sentient and motor, on which the instincts depend, it only carries away one source of stimulation and regulation.

79. An instinct depends on a connate mechanism. Let us glance for a moment at a parallel case of an ordinary reflex action, also dependent on a connate mechanism, say that of sneezing. When the inner surface of the nose is stimulated by snuff, or other irritant, the nasal branch of the trigeminus is excited, and the effects are first a deep inspiration, then a closure of the respiratory orifices by the tongue, which in turn excites a spasmodic expiration. But the same effects are producible from quite different stimulations—namely, that of the ciliary nerves on sudden exposure to a glare of sunshine—or of the skin nerves on a sudden draught of cold air. Brücke remarks that there is perhaps no spot on the surface of the body from which this reflex may not be excited in very sensitive people. He knew a gentleman who always sneezed when in winter he laid hold of a cold door-bell; and the fit of sneezing was only arrested by giving him a crust of bread or something hard to gnaw. Now just as the connate mechanism of sneezing may be set in action by a variety of stimulations, so may the connate mechanism of an instinct.

ACQUISITION.

80. Not only may Discrimination and Instinct be manifested in the absence of the brain, but even the acquisition of new modes of reaction, such as are classed under Learning through Experience. The objection is sometimes urged that animals without their brains only manifest single reactions on stimulation—the pinched foot is withdrawn, and then remains motionless until again pinched. But although the stimulation does not excite a consecutive series of movements, because there is no cerebrum to react in successive stimulation, this does not prove the absence of sensation in the one movement which is excited. If my hand be lying on the table, and something irritates it, my hand is withdrawn, and then remains as motionless as the limb of the brainless animal, until some fresh stimulation, external or internal, moves it. Although removal of the brain causes a manifest reduction in the variety and succession of the movements, all experimenters are agreed that animals acquire a certain dexterity in executing actions which they had previously failed to carry out after removal of their brains. “There is,” says Freusberg, “a decided improvement acquired in the reactions of the motor centres after division of the spinal cord, not indeed in vigor, but in delicacy. Removed from the regulating influence of the brain, the legs acquired through practice a power of self-regulation.” Nor is this wonderful: pathways are made easy by repetition of impulses, and new adaptations form new adjustments. It is thus all learning is effected—intelligent, and automatic. Nor is there any force in the objection that the power thus acquired speedily disappears, so that if the stimulations are effected at long intervals the reactions do not manifest their acquired dexterity. The spinal centres forget, as the cerebral centres forget; but they also remember, i. e. they learn.

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