Criminal Psychology, Hans Gross [motivational books for students .txt] 📗

That all people are equally subject to habit, is not asserted. The thing is a matter of disposition, in the sense of the recurrence of past ideas or tendencies. We must assume that an inclination evinced by idea A makes possible ideas a´, a´´, a´´´. Habits may develop according to these dispositions, but the knowledge of the conditions of this development we do not yet possess. Nevertheless, we tend to assume that the famous historian X and the famous Countess Y will not get the habit of drinking or opium-smoking—but in this case our assumption is deduced from their circumstances, and not from their personality. Hence, it is difficult to say with certainty that a person is incapable of acquiring this or that habit. So that it is of importance, when the question arises, to discover the existence of implied habits whenever these are asserted in the face of apparently contradictory conditions. There is a certain presumption for the correctness of the implication, when, e.g., the practised physician asserts that he counted the pulse for a minute without a watch, or when the merchant accurately estimates the weight of goods within a few grams, etc. But it will be just as well to test the assertion, since, without this test, the possibility of error is still great.

Somebody asserts, e.g., that he had been distracted and had paid no attention to what two persons close to him had said. Suddenly he began to take notice and found himself able to recapitulate all their remarks. Or again, a musician, who is almost altogether deaf, says that he is so accustomed to music that in spite of his deafness he is able to hear the smallest discord in the orchestra. Yet again, we hear of insignificant, hardly controllable habits that become accidentally significant in a criminal case. Thus the crime of arson was observed by the firebrand’s neighbor, who could have seen the action through the window, only if he had leaned far out of it. When he was asked what he wanted to see in the cold winter night, he replied, that he had the habit daily of spitting out of the window just before going to bed. Another, who was surprised in his sleep by an entering thief, had heavily wounded the latter with a great brush, “because he happened to have had it in his hand.” The happening was due to his habit of being unable to fall asleep without a brush in his hand. If such habits are demonstrable facts they serve to explain otherwise unexplainable events.

They are, however, the more difficult to establish, because they occur mainly in isolated people—old bachelors and old maids—so that their confirmation by others is rare. On the other hand, every one of us knows habits of his own or of his friends which would not be believed when cited, and which would be very difficult to prove when the need arose. The influence of habit on indifferent matters can be shown by numerous examples. There is Kant’s citation, that if anybody happened to send his doctor nine ducats the latter would have to believe that the messenger had stolen the tenth. If you give a bride most beautiful linen, but only eleven pieces, she will weep. Give her thirteen pieces, and she will certainly throw one of them away. If you keep these deep-rooted habits in mind, you may possibly say that they must have had a definite, determinative, and alternative influence on body and mind. For example, from time immemorial mankind has taken medications at definite intervals, e.g., every hour, every two hours, etc.; hence, a powder ordered every seventy-seven minutes will cause us complete surprise. But by what authority does the body require exactly these quantities of time or weight? Or again, our lectures, private or public, so and so much time? Of course it would be inconvenient if professors lectured only 52 minutes, yet how much difficulty must not the mind have met in becoming habituated to exactly 60 minutes of instruction! This habituation has been going on for a long time, and now children, like nations, regard the new in the light of the old, so that the old, especially when it is fixed by language, becomes the mind’s instrument for the control of the new. Indeed, we often stick linguistically to old things, although they have been long superannuated.

There is the characteristic state of mind which might be called the refraction of an idea by the presence of another idea. An example is the habit of saying, “Unprepared, as I have—” before beginning a speech. The speaker means to say that he has not prepared himself, but, as he really has prepared himself, both expressions come out together. This habitual concurrence of the real thought is of importance, and offers, frequently, the opportunity of correcting what is said by what is thought. This process is similar to that in which a gesture contradicts a statement. We often hear: “I had to take it because it was right there.” This assertion indicates theft through need, and at the same time, theft through opportunity. Or again, we hear: “We had not agreed, before”—this assertion denies agreement and can indicate merely, because of the added “before,” that the agreement was not of already long standing. Still again, we hear, “When we fell to the floor, I defended myself, and struck down at him.” Here what is asserted is self-defense, and what is admitted is that the enemy was underneath the speaker. Such refractions of thought occur frequently and are very important, particularly in witnesses who exaggerate or do not tell the whole truth. They are, however, rarely noticed because they require accurate observation of each word and that requires time, and our time has no time.

However important the question of heredity may be to lawyers psychologically, its application to legal needs is impossible. It would require, on the one hand, the study of all the literature concerning it, together with the particular teachings of Darwin and his disciples, and of Lombroso and his. The criminal-psychological study of it has not yet been established. The unfounded, adventurous, and arbitrary assertions of the Lombrosists have been contradicted, especially through the efforts of German investigators. But others, like Debierre in Lille, Sernoff in Moscow, Taine, Drill, Marchand have also had occasion to controvert the Italian positivists. At the same time, the problem of heredity is not dead, and will not die. This is being shown particularly in the retort of Marchand concerning the examinations he made with M. E. Koslow, in the asylum for juvenile offenders founded by the St. Petersburg Anthropological Society. Between Buckle, who absolutely denies heredity, and the latest of the modern doctrines, there are a number of intermediate views, one of which may possibly be true. There is an enormous literature which every criminalist should study.[305]

Nevertheless, this literature can tell us nothing about the legitimacy of the premise of heredity. Every educated man still believes Darwin’s doctrines, and the new theories that seek to emancipate themselves from it do so only by pushing them out of the big front door, and insinuating them through the little back door. But according to Bois-Reymond Darwinism is only the principle of the hereditary maintenance of the child’s variation from its parents. Everybody knows of real inherited characters, and many examples of it are cited. According to Ribot, suicide is hereditary; according to Despine, kleptomania; according to Lucas, vigorous sexuality; according to Darwin, hand-writing, etc. Our personal acquaintances show the inheritance of features, figure, habits, intellectual properties, particularly cleverness, such as, sense of space and time, capacity for orientation, interests, diseases, etc. Even ideas have their ancestors like men, and we learn from the study of animals how instincts, capacities, even acquired ones, are progressively inherited. And yet we refuse to believe in the congenital criminal! But the contradiction is only apparent.

A study of the works of Darwin, Weismann, DeVries, etc., shows us indubitably that no authority asserts the inheritance of great alterations appearing for the first time in an individual. And as to the inheritance of acquired characteristics, some authorities assert this to be impossible.

Until Darwin the old law of species demanded that definite traits of a species should not change through however long a period. The Darwinian principle indicates the inheritance of minute variations, intensified by sexual selection, and, in the course of time, developed into great variations. Now nobody will deny that the real criminal is different from the majority of other people. That this difference is great and essential, is inferred from the circumstance that a habit, a single characteristic, an unhappy inclination, etc., does not constitute a criminal. If a man is a thief it will not be asserted that he is otherwise like decent people, varying only in the accidental inclination to theft. We know that, besides the inclination to theft, we may assign him a dislike for honest work, lack of moral power, indifference to the laws of honor when caught, the lack of real religion,—in short, the inclination to theft must be combined with a large number of very characteristic qualities in order to make a thief of a man. There must, in a word, be a complete and profound change in his whole nature. Such great changes in the individual are never directly inherited; only particular properties can be inherited, but these do not constitute a criminal. Hence, the son of a criminal need not in his turn be a criminal.

This does not imply that in the course of generations characters might not compound themselves until a criminal type is developed, but this is as rare as the development of new species among the animals. Races are frequently selected; species develop rarely.

Prepossession, prejudice, and anticipatory opinion are, perhaps, the most dangerous foes of the criminalist. It is believed that the danger from them is not great, since, in most cases, prepossession controls only one individual, and a criminal case is dealt with by several, but this proves nothing. When the elegant teacher of horseback riding has performed his subtlest tricks, he gracefully removes his hat and bows to the public, and only at that moment does the public observe that it has been seeing something remarkable and applauds heartily, not because it has understood the difficulty of the performance, but because the rider has bowed. This happens to us however good our will. One man has a case in hand; he develops it, and if, at the proper time, he says “Voilà,” the others say, “Oh, yes,” and “Amen.” He may have been led by a prepossession, but its presence is now no longer to be perceived. Thus, though our assumptions may be most excellently meant, we still must grant that a conviction on false grounds, even when unconsciously arrived at, so suffuses a mind that the event in itself can no longer be honestly observed. To have no prejudices indicates a healthy, vigorous mind in no sense. That is indicated by the power to set aside prejudices as soon as their invalidity is demonstrated. Now this demonstration is difficult, for when a thing is recognized as a prejudice, it is one no longer. I have elsewhere,[306] under the heading “anticipatory opinion,” indicated the danger to which the examining justice is subject thereby, and have sought to show how even a false idea of location may lead to a prepossession in favor of a certain view; how vigorous the influence of the first witness is, inasmuch as we easily permit ourselves to be taken in by the earliest information, and later on lack time to convince ourselves that the matter may