Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute, Theo F. Rodenbough [e book reader free txt] 📗
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The country between Kandahar and the Helmund has the same general characteristics—plains and mountain spurs alternately,—and while generally fit for grazing is, except in a few spots, unfit for cultivation.
According to the eminent authority just quoted, the great natural strategic feature of this route is the elevated position of Atta Karez, thirty-one miles from Kandahar. He says: “On the whole road this is the narrowest gateway, and this remarkable feature and the concentration of roads [Footnote: The roads which meet at Atta Karez are: the great Herat highway passing through Kokeran and crossing the Argandab opposite Sinjari, whence it lies along the open plain all the way to Atta Karez; the road which crosses the Argandab at Panjwai; and the road from Taktipul towards Herat.] here, give to Atta Karez a strategic importance unequalled by any other spot between India and Central Asia.”
General Biddulph examined this position carefully in 1879, and discovered a site for a work which would command the valley of the Argandab and sweep the elevated open plain toward the west and northwest.
Abbaza is a village at the crossing of the Herat road over the Helmund, forty-six miles west of Atta Karez. On the west bank lies the ancient castle of Girishk. The country between the Argandab and the Helmund is rolling and inclining gradually from the hills toward the junction of these rivers. The plateau opposite Girishk is 175 feet above the river, which it commands.
The Helmund has already been described. There are numerous fords, but, at certain times, bridges would be required for military purposes. The land in the vicinity of the Helmund is very fertile and seamed with irrigating canals.
From Girishk a road via Washir runs through the hills to Herat; this is said to be cool, well supplied with water and grazing, and is a favorite military route. A road, parallel, to the south, goes through Farrah, beyond which both roads blend into one main road to the “Key.” Still another road, by Bost, Rudbar, and Lash, along the course of the river, exists. Although not so direct, it is an important route to Herat; upon this road stand the ruins of the ancient city of Bost in a wonderful state of preservation; here, as elsewhere in this region, the remains of fortifications testify to the former military importance of the spot. The citadel of Bost is built on the debris of extensive works and rises 150 feet above the river.
British Generals.—Perhaps the most prominent of modern British commanders, next to Lord Wolseley—is the young and successful soldier, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, G.C.B., C.I.E., commanding the Anglo-Indian Army of the Madras Presidency. He has already seen service in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and has been appointed to the command of one of the principal divisions of the British forces intended to oppose the threatened advance of the Russians on Herat. It was said of him by one of the most brilliant military leaders of the age,—Skobeleff: “For General Roberts I have a great admiration. He seems to me to possess all the qualities of a great general. That was a splendid march of his from Kabul to Kandahar. I think more highly of him than I do of Sir Garnet Wolseley, but there is this to be said of all your generals, they have only fought against Asiatic and savage foes. They have not commanded an army against a European enemy, and we cannot tell, therefore, what they are really made of.”
The Commander-in-chief of the Army of India, General Sir Donald M. Stewart, G.C.B., C.I.E., to whom has been intrusted the conduct of the British forces in Afghanistan, is also a very distinguished and experienced officer—probably more familiar with the nature of the probable field of operations than any other in Her Majesty’s Service.
Like the United States, the great latent power of England is indisputable, and so long as superiority at sea is maintained, time is given to render that latent power active. For the first year of the coming struggle England must lean heavily upon her navy. Nearly all the regiments of infantry are below the average peace limit, and if filled up simultaneously to a maximum war strength will include more than fifty per cent, of imperfectly trained men, and as the practice has been to fill up those corps ordered abroad with men transferred from other small regiments, it may come to pass that so-called “regular” regiments will consist largely of raw material. Colonel Trench of the British Army says “the organization of the regular cavalry is very defective,” and especially complains of the maladministration we have just noted. Demands for cavalry for the Soudan were met by a heavy drain on the already depleted strength of regiments in England. The Fifth Dragoon Guards, which stood next on the roster for foreign service, gave away nearly two hundred horses and one hundred men. Colonel Trench says that the reserve cavalry have no training, and that there is no reserve of horses. It is doubtful if more than seventy per cent. of the enlisted strength and fifty per cent. of the horses, on paper, could be put in the field now.
Allusion has already been made to the notorious weakness of the British transport system. [Footnote: Captain Gaisford, who commanded the Khaiber Levies in the Afghan campaign, recommended reforms in the system of transport and supply. He advocated certain American methods, as wind and water-mills to crush and cleanse the petrified and gravelled barley, often issued, and to cut up the inferior hay; the selection of transport employes who understand animals; and more care in transporting horses by sea.] If this has been the case in the numerous small wars in which her forces have been engaged for the last twenty-five years, what may be expected from the strain of a great international campaign.
On the other hand, Great Britain can boast of an inexhaustible capital, not alone of the revenues which have been accumulating during the last quarter of a century, but of patriotism, physical strength, courage, and endurance, peculiar to a race of conquerors.
IV.
THE RUSSIAN FORCES AND APPROACHES.
A mere glance at the ponderous military machine with which Russia enforces law and order within her vast domain, and by which she preserves and extends her power, is all that we can give here.
No army in the world has probably undergone, within the last thirty years, such a succession of extensive alterations in organization, in administrative arrangements, and in tactical regulations, as that of Russia. The Crimean War surprised it during a period of transition. Further changes of importance were carried out after that war. Once more, in 1874, the whole military system was remodelled, while ever since the Peace of San Stefano, radical reforms have been in progress, and have been prosecuted with such feverish haste, that it is difficult for the observer to keep pace with them. [Footnote: Sir L. Graham (_Journal Royal U. S. Institution_).]
The military system of Russia is based upon the principles of universal liability to serve and of territorial distribution. This applies to the entire male population, with certain exemptions or modifications on the ground, respectively, of age or education. Annually there is a “lot-drawing,” in which all over twenty, who have not already drawn lots, must take part. Those who draw blanks are excused from service with the colors, but go into the last reserve, or “Opoltschenie.”
The ordinary term of service is fifteen years,—six with the colors and nine with the reserves; a reduction is made for men serving at remote Asiatic posts; the War Office may send soldiers into the reserve before the end of their terms. Reduction is also made, from eleven to thirteen years and a half, for various degrees of educational acquirement. Exemptions are also made for family reasons and on account of peculiar occupation or profession. Individuals who personally manage their estates or direct their own commercial affairs (with the exception of venders of strong liquors) may have their entry into service postponed two years. Men are permitted to volunteer at seventeen (with consent of parents or guardians); all volunteers serve nine years in the reserve; those joining the Guards or cavalry must maintain themselves at their own expense. The total contingent demanded for army and navy in 1880 was 235,000, and 231,961 were enrolled; of this deficit of 3,039, the greater number, 3,000, were Jews.
Organization.—The Emperor is the Commander-in-Chief, who issues orders through the War Ministry, whose head is responsible for the general efficiency of the Army. There is also the “Imperial Head-quarters,” under a general officer who, in the absence of the War Minister, takes the Emperor’s orders and sees to their execution. The War Council, presided over by the War Minister, supervises all financial matters in connection with the army. There are also a High Court of Appeals, and the Head-quarters Staff, who supervise the execution of all military duties. Commissariat, artillery, engineer, medical, military education, Cossack, and judge-advocate departments complete the list of bureaus.
The military forces are arranged into nineteen army corps: five comprise three divisions of infantry; one, two divisions of cavalry; the remainder, two divisions of cavalry and one of infantry; with a due proportion of light artillery and engineers the war strength of an army corps is 42,303 combatants, 10,755 horses, and 108 guns.
When war is declared an army is formed of two or more corps. The general commanding exercises supreme control, civil and military, if the force enters the enemy’s country. His staff are detailed much as usual at an American army head-quarters in the field.
There are in the active army—_Infantry_: 768 battalions (192 regiments, 48 divisions), 54 batt. riflemen. Cavalry: 56 regular regiments (4 cuirassiers, 2 uhlans, 2 hussars, 48 dragoons); 29 regt. Cossacks, divided into 20 divisions, kept in time of peace at 768 men (864 with sub-officers) per regiment. Artillery: 51 brigades, or 303 batteries of 8 guns each; 30 horse-batteries of 6 guns each; besides 14 batteries with Cossack divisions. Fifty “parks” and 20 sections of “parks” supply each infantry brigade and cavalry division with cartridges.
THE LAND FORCES OF RUSSIA. [Footnote: Approximately from latest (1884-85) returns. (Combatants only.)]
EUROPE. Field Troops PEACE. Engineers. 21,335 Cavalry. 52,902 Infantry. 49,581 Artillery. 323,701 Total. 447,519 Horses. 71,565 Guns. 1,188 WAR. Total. 821,243 Horses. 155,149 Guns. 2,172
Reserve, Fortress, and Depot Troops PEACE. Engineers. - Cavalry. 10,504 Infantry. 23,704 Artillery. 54,995 Total. 89,203 Horses. 8,703 Guns. 144 WAR. Total. 891,404 Horses. 109,822 Guns. 1,236
CAUCASUS. Field Troops PEACE. Engineers. 1,548 Cavalry. 12,364 Infantry. 8,442 Artillery. 59,254 Total. 81,608 Horses. 15,927 Guns. 198 WAR. Total. 150,313 Horses. 31,700 Guns. 366
Reserve Fortress Troops PEACE. Engineers. - Cavalry. 5,480 Infantry. 2,860 Artillery. 2,270 Total. 10,610 Horses. 6,137 Guns. 8 WAR. Total. 51,776 Horses. 36,862 Guns. 12
TURKESTAN. PEACE. Engineers. 496 Cavalry. 6,744 Infantry. 2,468 Artillery. 12,522 Total. 22,230 Horses. 8,246 Guns. 48 WAR. Total. 34,125 Horses. 12,780 Guns. 76
SIBERIA. PEACE. Engineers. 244 Cavalry. 2,606 Infantry. 1,273 Artillery. 7,752 Total. 11,875 Horses. 3,412 Guns. 24 WAR. Total. 29,779 Horses. 14,745 Guns. 58
Grand Aggregate of the Empire. PEACE. Engineers. 23,623 Cavalry. 90,600 Infantry. 83,328 Artillery. 460,494 Total. 663,045 Horses. 113,990 Guns. 1,610 WAR. Total. 1,978,640 Horses. 367,089 Guns. 3,920
During 1884 the engineer corps was reorganized. Henceforward the peace establishment will consist of seventeen battalions of sappers; eight battalions of pontoniers; sixteen field-telegraph
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