Discourses, Epictetus [the beginning after the end read novel TXT] 📗

themselves and to talk freely with their masters. Hence Horace says, Satires ii 74:

Age, libertate Decembri,
Quando ita majores voluerunt, utere.

↩

“Insigne hoc exemplum est τοῦ εἰκῆ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς πι μέρους οὐσίαις. De quo, vide i 22, 9; ii 11, 3; ii 17, 7.” —⁠John Upton ↩

Johann Schweighäuser observes that death is in our power, as the Stoics taught; and Epictetus often tells us that the door is open. He suggests that the true reading may be καὶ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν. I think that the text is right. Epictetus asks is “Life or death” in our power. He means no more than if he had said Life only. ↩

He means that which seems to you to be false. See book III chapter XXII at 42.

“In the matter of assent then”: this is the third τόρος or “locus” or division in philosophy (book III chapter II at 1⁠–⁠5). As to the Will, compare note 114. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, “I believe, etc.,” he knows, or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God if he denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe; or in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to anything which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances.

To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when he believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark 16:11) in the received text, as it now stands, “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned” (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians; but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient: and it does not concern the present subject. ↩

The word “admire” is θαυμάσῃς in the original. The word is often used by Epictetus, and Horace uses “admirari” in this Stoical sense. See note 188. ↩

See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on μέρος. ↩

The word is ἀγγαρεία, a word of Persian origin (Herodotus, The Histories viii 98). It means here the seizure of animals for military purposes when it is necessary. John Upton refers to Matthew 5:41, Mark 15:21 for similar uses of the verb ἀγγαρεύω. ↩

Here he speaks of asses being shod. The Latin translation of the word (ὑποδημάτια) in Epictetus is “ferreas calces.” I suppose they could use nothing but iron. ↩

See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

Johann Schweighäuser suggests καταβεβλήκαμεν instead of ἀποβεβλήκαμεν, though all his manuscripts have the word in the text. I do not think that his proposed alteration is an improvement. ↩

The word is ἀποτειχίζω, which means what I have translated. The purpose of circumvallation was to take and sometimes also to destroy a fortress. Johann Schweighäuser translates the word by “destruam,” and that is perhaps not contrary to the meaning of the text; but it is not the exact meaning of the word. ↩

In this passage and in what follows we find the emphatic affirmation of the duty of conformity and of the subjection of man’s will to the will of God. The words are conclusive evidence of the doctrine of Epictetus that a man ought to subject himself in all things to the will of God or to that which he believes to be the will of God. No Christian martyr ever proclaimed a more solemn obedience to God’s will. The Christian martyr indeed has given perfect proof of his sincerity by enduring torments and death: the heathen