Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, Henrik Lunde [new ebook reader TXT] 📗

If the diplomatic effort had been as thoroughly prepared as the military, the German success could have been even more spectacular and the campaign might have been avoided. The fault must be placed at Hitler’s feet. Ribbentrop and his Foreign Office were kept in the dark about the plans for Scandinavia for security reasons.

By April 10, it was obvious that the Norwegians would resist and that a solution along the lines achieved in Denmark could only be achieved by modifications in the original ultimatum. Colonel Eriksen’s action had saved the government from capture and the Germans knew that the Norwegians were mobilizing. The German demands were not modified and Hitler’s action in allowing Quisling to form a government in Oslo only served to increase Norwegian defiance. Finally, German attempts to capture or kill the Norwegian Government by Captain Spiller’s raid and the bombing of Elverum, removed all possibilities of coming to an understanding.

French objectives, primarily to avoid or reduce the threat to their homeland by opening a new theater of war, were not achieved. The protracted war in Scandinavia and the consequent drain on German resources did not materialize. In divisional strength, only about five percent of the German Army was employed in Norway when Hitler attacked in the west. The conquest of Denmark was so quick that the combat forces employed there were available for use in the west by May.

British desires to get the Germans involved in an operation in Scandinavia were achieved but the quick victories that had been envisioned were unrealized. The German source of iron ore from Sweden was in fact secured. Sweden came under the sway of Berlin and the supply route through the Baltic was safer than before the operation.

Churchill did get Germany to react to earlier violations of Norwegian neutrality and the possibility that the Allies intended to establish themselves in Norway. However, rather than a reaction to the Allied mining, it was a full-fledged preemptive invasion that had been in planning for three months. The hope that quick victories could be achieved by enticing the Germans into an area where they would confront enormous British naval superiority was not realized. While the German Navy sustained heavy losses, the hoped for easy victories turned into a humiliating defeat.

For Norway, its policy of neutrality backed by inadequate military resources brought disaster to the country and increased suffering to its people during a five-year occupation. It is doubtful if Hitler would have undertaken the invasion if Norway had possessed a military establishment on the scale and quality, which wiser political and military leaders had provided for in World War I.

Some Reasons for German Military Success

When looking at the reason for Norwegian/Allied failure, it is most convenient to break the analysis into two periods. The first period covers the time leading up to and including the landings. The second period covers subsequent operations. Much of the German success in the initial part of the operation was due to luck and the Norwegian and Allied failure to act in a rational manner.

There can be no doubt that the German invasion would have met with disaster if Norway and the Allies had responded appropriately to the many warnings they received in the week or two leading up to April 9. A full or partial mobilization between April 5 and April 9 would have changed the events on April 9, as well as the conduct of subsequent operations. Even more limited defensive measures, such as laying minefields, full manning of coastal fortresses, and adequate infantry protection for airfields, would have made the task of the invading forces more difficult. Such measures may have prevented the quick capture of mobilization centers and depots as well as the German success in capturing the airfields at Fornebu and Sola.

The Allies and Norwegians placed too much faith in the Royal Navy and consequently underestimated German capabilities and the potential threat to the western and northern portions of Norway. The pre-conceived notion that Germany could not undertake operations in these areas led to a rejection of some of the more explicit warnings.

The British Navy could have done much more to hinder the German invasion. The obsession of its leaders with a possible German breakout into the Atlantic caused them to overlook possibilities even more damaging to their own interests by failing to search for German naval units in areas where they could be expected to be found in an invasion scenario.

Admiral Forbes’ delay in sailing from Scapa Flow to a central location in the North Sea after the sighting on April 7, allowed the main German fleet to pass the latitude where it could be intercepted. The concern with a breakout continued even after the composition of the various German flotillas indicated that they were not structured for high sea operations.

The Admiralty insistence on overwhelming superiority also worked in the Germans’ favor. R4 was abandoned at the very moment when the situation for which it was held in readiness arose. If the panic-like debarkation of the troops for R4 had not taken place, these could have been committed much earlier and with all their equipment intact. This damaging decision, taken solely by the navy, caused a chaotic equipment and supply situation for the forces when they were eventually deployed.

The Admiralty’s interference in operational matters on four different occasions in the critical 24-hour invasion period resulted in an amazing series of miscalculations and missed opportunities. First, the cruiser screen on the Norwegian coast south of Bergen was removed only hours before they would have encountered Task Force 3. Then the attack on Bergen was cancelled at a time when the Luftwaffe threat was still a minor factor. The withdrawal of the naval units in the Vestfjord approach to Narvik and Admiral Whitworth’s subsequent withdrawal from the area left the gate to Narvik unguarded. Finally, Warburton-Lee’s destroyer flotilla was dispatched to Narvik under unfavorable conditions. These actions had a great effect on subsequent operations.

The paralyzed behavior of the Norwegian