An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith [e book reader pdf TXT] 📗

gives every man of the trade a

direction where to find every other man of it.

 

A regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves, in order to provide for

their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest to manage,

renders such assemblies necessary.

 

An incorporation not only renders them necessary, but makes the act of the majority binding

upon the whole. In a free trade, an effectual combination cannot be established but by the

unanimous consent of every single trader, and it cannot last longer than every single trader

continues of the same mind. The majority of a corporation can enact a bye-law, with proper

penalties, which will limit the competition more effectually and more durably than any

voluntary combination what. ever.

 

The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better government of the trade, is without

any foundation. The real and effectual discipline which is exercised over a workman, is not

that of his corporation, but that of his customers. It is the fear of losing their employment

which restrains his frauds and corrects his negligence. An exclusive corporation necessarily

weakens the force of this discipline. A particular set of workmen must then be employed, let

them behave well or ill. It is upon this account that, in many large incorporated towns, no

tolerable workmen are to be found, even in some of the most necessary trades. If you would

have your work tolerably executed, it must be done in the suburbs, where the workmen,

having no exclusive privilege, have nothing but their character to depend upon, and you must

then smuggle it into the town as well as you can.

 

It is in this manner that the policy of Europe, by restraining the competition in some

employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them,

occasions a very important inequality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the

different employments of labour and stock.

 

Secondly, The policy of Europe, by increasing the competition in some employments beyond

what it naturally would be, occasions another inequality, of an opposite kind, in the whole of

the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock.

 

It has been considered as of so much importance that a proper number of young people should

be educated for certain professions, that sometimes the public, and sometimes the piety of

private founders, have established many pensions, scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc. for

this purpose, which draw many more people into those trades than could otherwise pretend to

follow them. In all Christian countries, I believe, the education of the greater part of

churchmen is paid for in this manner. Very few of them are educated altogether at their own

expense. The long, tedious, and expensive education, therefore, of those who are, will not

always procure them a suitable reward, the church being crowded with people, who, in order

to get employment, are willing to accept of a much smaller recompence than what such an

education would otherwise have entitled them to ; and in this manner the competition of the

poor takes away the reward of the rich. It would be indecent, no doubt, to compare either a

curate or a chaplain with a journeyman in any common trade. The pay of a curate or chaplain,

however, may very properly be considered as of the same nature with the wages of a

journeyman. They are all three paid for their work according to the contract which they may

happen to make with their respective superiors. Till after the middle of the fourteenth century,

five merks, containing about as much silver as ten pounds of our present money, was in

England the usual pay of a curate or a stipendiary parish priest, as we find it regulated by the

decrees of several different national councils. At the same period, fourpence a-day, containing

the same quantity of silver as a shilling of our present money, was declared to be the pay of a

master mason; and threepence a-day, equal to ninepence of our present money, that of a

journeyman mason. {See the Statute of Labourers, 25, Ed. III.} The wages of both these

labourer’s, therefore, supposing them to have been constantly employed, were much superior

to those of the curate. The wages of the master mason, supposing him to have been without

employment one-third of the year, would have fully equalled them. By the 12th of Queen

Anne, c. 12. it is declared, “That whereas, for want of sufficient maintenance and

encouragement to curates, the cures have, in several places, been meanly supplied, the bishop

is, therefore, empowered to appoint, by writing under his hand and seal, a sufficient certain

stipend or allowance, not exceeding fifty, and not less than twenty pounds a-year”. Forty

pounds a-year is reckoned at present very good pay for a curate; and, notwithstanding this act

of parliament, there are many curacies under twenty pounds a-year. There are journeymen

shoemakers in London who earn forty pounds a-year, and there is scarce an industrious

workman of any kind in that metropolis who does not earn more than twenty. This last sum,

indeed, does not exceed what frequently earned by common labourers in many country

parishes. Whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of workmen, it has always

been rather to lower them than to raise them. But the law has, upon many occasions,

attempted to raise the wages of curates, and, for the dignity of the church, to oblige the rectors

of parishes to give them more than the wretched maintenance which they themselves might be

willing to accept of. And, in both cases, the law seems to have been equally ineffectual, and

has never either been able to raise the wages of curates, or to sink those of labourers to the

degree that was intended; because it has never been able to hinder either the one from being

willing to accept of less than the legal allowance, on account of the indigence of their situation

and the multitude of their competitors, or the other from receiving more, on account of the

contrary competition of those who expected to derive either profit or pleasure from employing

them.

 

The great benefices and other ecclesiastical dignities support the honour of the church.

notwithstanding the mean circumstances of some of its inferior members. The respect paid to

the profession, too, makes some compensation even to them for the meanness of their

pecuniary recompence. In England, and in all Roman catholic countries, the lottery of the

church is in reality much more advantageous than is necessary. The example of the churches

of Scotland, of Geneva, and of several other protestant churches, may satisfy us, that in so

creditable a profession, in which education is so easily procured, the hopes of much more

moderate benefices will draw a sufficient number of learned, decent, and respectable men into

holy orders.

 

In professions in which there are no benefices, such as law and physic, if an equal proportion

of people were educated at the public expense, the competition would soon be so great as to

sink very much their pecuniary reward. It might then not be worth any man’s while to educate

his son to either of those professions at his own expense. They would be entirely abandoned to

such as had been educated by those public charities, whose numbers and necessities would

oblige them in general to content themselves with a very miserable recompence, to the entire

degradation of the now respectable professions of law and physic.

 

That unprosperous race of men, commonly called men of letters, are pretty much in the

situation which lawyers and physicians probably would be in, upon the foregoing supposition.

In every part of Europe, the greater part of them have been educated for the church, but have

been hindered by different reasons from entering into holy orders. They have generally,

therefore, been educated at the public expense; and their numbers are everywhere so great, as

commonly to reduce the price of their labour to a very paltry recompence.

 

Before the invention of the art of printing, the only employment by which a man of letters

could make any thing by his talents, was that of a public or private teacher, or by

communicating to other people the curious and useful knowledge which he had acquired

himself ; and this is still surely a more honourable, a more useful, and, in general, even a more

profitable employment than that other of writing for a bookseller, to which the art of printing

has given occasion. The time and study, the genius, knowledge, and application requisite to

qualify an eminent teacher of the sciences, are at least equal to what is necessary for the

greatest practitioners in law and physic. But the usual reward of the eminent teacher bears no

proportion to that of the lawyer or physician, because the trade of the one is crowded with

indigent people, who have been brought up to it at the public expense ; whereas those of the

other two are encumbered with very few who have not been educated at their own. The usual

recompence, however, of public and private teachers, small as it may appear, would

undoubtedly be less than it is, if the competition of those yet more indigent men of letters,

who write for bread, was not taken out of the market. Before the invention of the art of

printing, a scholar and a beggar seem to have been terms very nearly synonymous. The

different governors of the universities, before that time, appear to have often granted licences

to their scholars to beg.

 

In ancient times, before any charities of this kind had been established for the education of

indigent people to the learned professions, the rewards of eminent teachers appear to have

been much more considerable. Isocrates, in what is called his discourse against the sophists.

reproaches the teachers of his own times with inconsistency. ‘They make the most magnificent

promises to their scholars,” says he, ” and undertake to teach them to be wise, to be happy,

and to be just; and, in return for so important a service, they stipulate the paltry reward of four

or five minae.” “They who teach wisdom,” continues he, “ought certainly to be wise

themselves ; but if any man were to sell such a bargain for such a price, he would be

convicted of the most evident folly.” He certainly does not mean here to exaggerate the

reward, and we may be assured that it was not less than he represents it. Four minae were

equal to thirteen pounds six shillings and eightpence ; five minae to sixteen pounds thirteen

shillings and fourpence.Something not less than the largest of those two sums, therefore, must

at that time have been usually paid to the most eminent teachers at Athens. Isocrates himself

demanded ten minae, or � 33:6:8 from each scholar. When he taught at Athens, he is said to

have had a hundred scholars. I understand this to be the number whom he taught at one time,

or who attended what we would call one course of lectures ; a number which will not appear

extraordinary from so great a city to so famous a teacher, who taught, too, what was at that

time the most fashionable of all sciences, rhetoric. He must have made, therefore, by each

course of lectures, a thousand minae, or � 3335:6:8. A thousand minae, accordingly, is said by

Plutarch, in another place, to have been his didactron, or usual price of teaching. Many other

eminent teachers in those times appear to have acquired great fortunes. Georgias made a

present to the temple of Delphi of his own statue in solid gold. We must not, I presume,

suppose that it was as large as the life. His way of living,