Discourses, Epictetus [the beginning after the end read novel TXT] 📗

the things which seem to him right? Is then this criterion sufficient for him also? “It is not sufficient.” Come then to something which is superior to seeming (τοῦ δοκεῖν). “What is this?”

Observe: this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only “seems,” and a certain investigation of that which “seems” whether it “seems” rightly, and a discovery of some rule (κανόνος), as we have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a carpenter’s rule (or square) in the case of straight and crooked things.⁠—This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that all things are right which seem so to all?293 And how is it possible that contradictions can be right?⁠—Not all then, but all which seem to us to be right.⁠—How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians? why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what seems right to me or to any other man? Not at all more. What then “seems” to every man is not sufficient for determining what “is”; for neither in the case of weights or measures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In this matter then is there no rule superior to what “seems”? And how is it possible that the most necessary things among men should have no sign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger without it?294 For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their madness those who use mere “seeming” as a measure, and misuse it; so that for the future, proceeding from certain things (principles) known and made clear, we may use in the case of particular things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.

What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring? Pleasure (for example). Subject it to the rule, throw it into the balance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have confidence in it? Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to be. Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? No. Is then pleasure anything secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? Yes. Is it proper then to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that it is proper; but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of the balance.295 Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready. And to philosophize is this: to examine and confirm the rules. And then to use them when they are known is the act of a wise and good man.296

XII Of Disputation or Discussion

What things a man must learn, in order to be able to apply the art of disputation, has been accurately shown by our philosophers (the Stoics); but with respect to the proper use of the things, we are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, whom you please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he cannot discover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved the man a little, if he answers beside the purpose, he does not know how to treat him, but he then either abuses or ridicules him, and says, “He is an illiterate man; it is not possible to do anything with him.” Now a guide, when he has found a man out of the road leads him into the right way: he does not ridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you also show the illiterate man the truth, and you will see that he follows. But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule him, but rather feel your own incapacity.

How then did Socrates act? He used to compel his adversary in disputation to bear testimony to him, and he wanted no other witness.297 Therefore he could say, “I care not for other witnesses, but I am always satisfied with the evidence (testimony) of my adversary, and I do not ask the opinion of others, but only the opinion of him who is disputing with me.” For he used to make the conclusions drawn from natural notions298 so plain that every man saw the contradiction (if it existed) and withdrew from it (thus): Does the envious299 man rejoice? “By no means, but he is rather pained.”300 Well, do you think that envy is pain over evils? “And what envy is there of evils?” Therefore he made his adversary say that envy is pain over good things. Well then, would any man envy those who are nothing to him? “By no means.” Thus having completed the notion and distinctly fixed it he would go away without saying to his adversary: Define to me envy; and if the adversary had defined envy, he did not say: You have defined it badly, for the terms of the definition do not correspond to the thing defined⁠—These are technical terms, and for this reason disagreeable and hardly intelligible to illiterate men, which terms we (philosophers) cannot lay aside. But that the illiterate man himself, who follows the appearances presented to him, should be able to concede anything or