The Art of War, Sun Tzu [best english books to read for beginners TXT] 📗

correctly, perhaps, “there are times when an army must not be attacked.” Chʽên Hao says: “When you see your way to obtain a trivial advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strengths.” ↩

Capt. Calthrop says “castles”⁠—an unfortunate attempt to introduce local colour. ↩

Cf. chapter III (“The rule is⁠ ⁠…”). Tsʽao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own experience. When invading the territory of 徐州 Hsü-chou, he ignored the city of 華費 Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yü says: “No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble.” 荀罃 Hsün Ying, when urged to attack 偪陽 Pi-yang, replied: “The city is small and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, ’t will be no great feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughingstock.” In the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and manoeuvres. He said: “It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province.”780 ↩

This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and Wei Liao Tzǔ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: 兵者凶器也爭者逆德也將者死官也 “Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation of civil order!” The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity. Cf. chapter III (“He will win who has military capacity⁠ ⁠…”) and chapter X (“If fighting is sure⁠ ⁠…”). The Tʽung Tien has 將在軍 before 君命, etc. This is a gloss on the words by Chu-ko Liang, which being repeated by Tu Yu became incorporated with the text. Chang Yü thinks that these five precepts are the 五利 referred to below (“So, the student of war⁠ ⁠…”). Another theory is that the mysterious 九變 are here enumerated, starting with 圮地無舍 and ending at 地有所不爭, while the final clause 君命有所不受 embraces and as it were sums up all the nine. Thus Ho Shih says: “Even if it be your sovereign’s command to encamp in difficult country, linger in isolated positions, etc., you must not do so.” The theory is perhaps a little too ingenious to be accepted with confidence. ↩

Before 利 in the original text there is a 地 which is obviously not required. ↩

Literally, “get the advantage of the ground,” which means not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible way. Chang Yü says: “Every kind of ground is characterised by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How is it possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?” ↩

Tsʽao Kung says that the 五利 are 下五事也 “the five things that follow;” but this cannot be right. We must rather look back to the five “variations” contained above (“There are roads⁠ ⁠…”). Chia Lin (who reads 五變 here to balance the 五利) tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous lines of action, namely: “if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed.” But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages. For instance, “a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking,” and so on. Here the 變 comes in to modify the 利, and hence we see the uselessness of knowing the one without the other⁠—of having an eye for weaknesses in the enemy’s armour without being clever enough to recast one’s plans on the spur of the moment. Capt. Calthrop offers this slovenly translation: “In the management of armies, if the art of the Nine Changes be understood [sic], a knowledge of the Five Advantages is of no avail.” ↩

“Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,” says Tsʽao Kung, “the opposite state should be always present to your mind.” ↩

信, according to Tu Mu, is equivalent to 申, and 務可信也 is paraphrased by Chang Yü as 可以伸己之事. Tu Mu goes on to say: “If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations.” ↩

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