The Ego and his Own, Max Stirner [ebook reader for surface pro .txt] 📗

to be confronted with a collection of essays strung together, with a

throng of aphorisms... But, if you read this book several times; if, after

having penetrated the intimacy of each of its parts, you then traverse it as a

whole, -- gradually the fragments weld themselves together, and Stirner's

thought is revealed in all its unity, in all its force, and in all its depth."

A word about the dedication. Mackay's investigations have brought to light

that Marie Dähnhardt had nothing whatever in common with Stirner, and so was

unworthy of the honor conferred upon her. She was no Eigene. I therefore

reproduce the dedication merely in the interest of historical accuracy.

Happy as I am in the appearance of this book, my joy is not unmixed with

sorrow. The cherished project was as dear to the heart of Dr. Walker as to

mine, and I deeply grieve that he is no longer with us to share our delight in

the fruition. Nothing, however, can rob us of the masterly introduction that

he wrote for this volume (in 1903, or perhaps earlier), from which I will not

longer keep the reader. This introduction, no more than the book itself, shall

that Einzige, Death, make his Eigentum.

February, 1907.

B. R. T.

---- * ----

INTRODUCTION

Fifty years sooner or later can make little difference in the; case of a book

so revolutionary as this. It saw the light when a so-called revolutionary

movement was preparing in men's minds which agitation was, however, only a

disturbance due to desires to participate in government, and to govern and to

be governed, in a manner different to that which prevails. The

"revolutionists" of 1848 were bewitched with an idea. They were not at all the

masters of ideas. Most of those who since that time have prided themselves

upon being revolutionists have been and are likewise but the bondmen of an

idea, -- that of the different lodgment of authority.

The temptation is, of course, present to attempt an explanation of the central

thought of this work; but such an effort appears to be unnecessary to one who

has the volume in his hand. The author's care in illustrating his meaning

shows that he realized how prone the possessed man is to misunderstand

whatever is not moulded according to the fashions in thinking. The author's

learning was considerable, his command of words and ideas may never be

excelled by another, and he judged it needful to develop his argument in

manifold ways. So those who enter into the spirit of it will scarcely hope to

impress others with the same conclusion in a more summary manner. Or, if one

might deem that possible after reading Stirner, still one cannot think that it

could be done so surely. The author has made certain work of it, even though

he has to wait for his public; but still, the reception of the book by its

critics amply proves the truth of the saying that one can give another

arguments, but not understanding. The system-makers and system-believers thus

far cannot get it out of their heads that any discourse about the nature of an

ego must turn upon the common characteristics of egos, to make a systematic

scheme of what they share as a generality. The critics inquire what kind of

man the author is talking about. They repeat the question: What does he

believe in? They fail to grasp the purport of the recorded answer: "I believe

in myself"; which is attributed to a common soldier long before the time of

Stirner. They ask, what is the principle of the self-conscious egoist, the

Einzige? To this perplexity Stirner says: Change the question; put "who?"

instead of "what?" and an answer can then be given by naming him!

This, of course, is too simple for persons governed by ideas, and for persons

in quest of new governing ideas. They wish to classify the man. Now, that in

me which you can classify is not my distinguishing self. "Man" is the horizon

or zero of my existence as an individual. Over that I rise as I can. At least

I am something more than "man in general." Pre-existing worship of ideals and

disrespect for self had made of the ego at the very most a Somebody, oftener

an empty vessel to be filled with the grace or the leavings of a tyrannous

doctrine; thus a Nobody. Stirner dispels the morbid subjection, and recognizes

each one who knows and feels himself as his own property to be neither humble

Nobody nor befogged Somebody, but henceforth flat-footed and level-headed Mr.

Thisbody, who has a character and good pleasure of his own, just as he has a

name of his own. The critics who attacked this work and were answered in the

author's minor writings, rescued from oblivion by John Henry Mackay, nearly

all display the most astonishing triviality and impotent malice.

We owe to Dr. Eduard von Hartmann the unquestionable service which he rendered

by directing attention to this book in his "Philosophie des Unbewußten," the

first edition of which was published in 1869, and in other writings. I do not

begrudge Dr. von Hartmann the liberty of criticism which he used; and I think

the admirers of Stirner's teaching must quite appreciate one thing which Von

Hartmann did at a much later date. In "Der Eigene" of August 10, 1896, there

appeared a letter written by him and giving, among other things, certain data

from which to judge that, when Friedrich Nietzsche wrote his later essays,

Nietzsche was not ignorant of Stirner's book.

Von Hartmann wishes that Stirner had gone on and developed his principle. Von

Hartmann suggests that you and I are really the same spirit, looking out

through two pairs of eyes. Then, one may reply, I need not concern myself

about you, for in myself I have -- us; and at that rate Von Hartmann is merely

accusing himself of inconsistency: for, when Stirner wrote this book, Von

Hartmann's spirit was writing it; and it is just the pity that Von Hartmann in

his present form does not indorse what he said in the form of Stirner, -- that

Stirner was different from any other man; that his ego was not Fichte's

transcendental generality, but "this transitory ego of flesh and blood." It is

not as a generality that you and I differ, but as a couple of facts which are

not to be reasoned into one. "I" is somewise Hartmann, and thus Hartmann is

"I"; but I am not Hartmann, and Hartmann is not -- I. Neither am I the "I" of

Stirner; only Stirner himself was Stirner's "I." Note how comparatively

indifferent a matter it is with Stirner that one is an ego, but how

all-important it is that one be a self-conscious ego, -- a self-conscious,

self-willed person.

Those not self-conscious and self-willed are constantly acting from

self-interested motives, but clothing these in various garbs. Watch those

people closely in the light of Stirner's teaching, and they seem to be

hypocrites, they have so many good moral and religious plans of which

self-interest is at the end and bottom; but they, we may believe, do not know

that this is more than a coincidence.

In Stirner we have the philosophical foundation for political liberty. His

interest in the practical development of egoism to the dissolution of the

State and the union of free men is clear and pronounced, and harmonizes

perfectly with the economic philosophy of Josiah Warren. Allowing for

difference of temperament and language, there is a substantial agreement

between Stirner and Proudhon. Each would be free, and sees in every increase

of the number of free people and their intelligence an auxiliary force against

the oppressor. But, on the other hand, will any one for a moment seriously

contend that Nietzsche and Proudhon march together in general aim and

tendency, -- that they have anything in common except the daring to profane

the shrine and sepulchre of superstition?

Nietzsche has been much spoken of as a disciple of Stirner, and, owing to

favorable cullings from Nietzsche's writings, it has occurred that one of his

books has been supposed to contain more sense than it really does -- so long

as one had read only the extracts.

Nietzsche cites scores or hundreds of authors. Had he read everything, and not

read Stirner?

But Nietzsche is as unlike Stirner as a tight-rope performance is unlike an

algebraic equation.

Stirner loved liberty for himself, and loved to see any and all men and women

taking liberty, and he had no lust of power. Democracy to him was sham

liberty, egoism the genuine liberty.

Nietzsche, on the contrary, pours out his contempt upon democracy because it

is not aristocratic. He is predatory to the point of demanding that those who

must succumb to feline rapacity shall be taught to submit with resignation.

When he speaks of "Anarchistic dogs" scouring the streets of great civilized

cities; it is true, the context shows that he means the Communists; but his

worship of Napoleon, his bathos of anxiety for the rise of an aristocracy that

shall rule Europe for thousands of years, his idea of treating women in the

oriental fashion, show that Nietzsche has struck out in a very old path --

doing the apotheosis of tyranny. We individual egoistic Anarchists, however,

may say to the Nietzsche school, so as not to be misunderstood: We do not ask

of the Napoleons to have pity, nor of the predatory barons to do justice. They

will find it convenient for their own welfare to make terms with men who have

learned of Stirner what a man can be who worships nothing, bears allegiance to

nothing. To Nietzsche's rhodomontade of eagles in baronial form, born to prey

on industrial lambs, we rather tauntingly oppose the ironical question: Where

are your claws? What if the "eagles" are found to be plain barn-yard fowls on

which more silly fowls have fastened steel spurs to hack the victims, who,

however, have the power to disarm the sham "eagles" between two suns? Stirner

shows that men make their tyrants as they make their gods, and his purpose is

to unmake tyrants.

Nietzsche dearly loves a tyrant.

In style Stirner's work offers the greatest possible contrast to the puerile,

padded phraseology of Nietzsche's "Zarathustra" and its false imagery. Who

ever imagined such an unnatural conjuncture as an eagle "toting" a serpent in

friendship? which performance is told of in bare words, but nothing comes of

it. In Stirner we are treated to an enlivening and earnest discussion

addressed to serious minds, and every reader feels that the word is to him,

for his instruction and benefit, so far as he has mental independence and

courage to take it and use it. The startling intrepidity of this book is

infused with a whole-hearted love for all mankind, as evidenced by the fact

that the author shows not one iota of prejudice or any idea of division of men

into ranks. He would lay aside government, but would establish any regulation

deemed convenient, and for this only our convenience in