An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume [online e book reader TXT] 📗

mathematical points,

we must allow that there are physical points; that is, parts

of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by

the eye or imagination. These images, then, which are present

to the fancy or senses, are absolutely indivisible, and

consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely

less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing appears

more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them

composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite

number of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are

still supposed infinitely divisible.

 

125. The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences

seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard to time

than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in

succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a

contradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgement is not

corrupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be

able to admit of it.

 

Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to

that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and

contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances,

contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is

absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any

proposition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more

sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism

itself, which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of

geometry or the science of quantity.[33]

 

[33] It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities

and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no such

thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but that

all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to

a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular

ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea,

present to the mind. Thus when the term Horse is pronounced, we

immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white

animal, or a particular size or figure: But as that tern is

also usually though not actually present to the imagination,

are easily recalled: and our reasoning and conclusion proceed

in the same way, as if they were actually present. If this be

admitted (as seems reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of

quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but

particular, and such as are suggested by the senses and

imagination, and consequently, cannot be infinitely divisible.

It is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present, without

prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers

of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and

contempt of the ignorant by their conclusion; and this seems

the readiest solution of these difficulties.

 

126. The sceptical objections to moral evidence, or to the reasonings

concerning matter of fact, are either popular or philosophical. The

popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human

understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained

in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in

sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the

perpetual contradiction of each particular man’s opinions and

sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is needless to

insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in

common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and

cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of

argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be

insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of

Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and

employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may

flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if

not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and

by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and

sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our

nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in

the same condition as other mortals.

 

127. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere,

and display those philosophical objections, which arise from more

profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph;

while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact,

which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely

from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of

this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently

conjoined together; that we have no argument to convince us, that

objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will

likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that

nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of

our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like

other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic

insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his

own and our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all

assurance and conviction. These arguments might be displayed at greater

length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected

to result from them.

 

128. For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive

scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it

remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic,

_What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious

researches?_ He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer.

A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of

astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant

and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays

principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on

conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his

philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had,

that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he

must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life

must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail.

All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a

total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end

to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very

little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And

though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary

amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most

trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and

leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the

philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned

themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his

dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to

confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no

other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must

act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most

diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of

these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised

against them.

 

PART III.

 

129. There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical

philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in

part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when

its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common

sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to

be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see

objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising

argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to

which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who

entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their

understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They

are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them

is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves

far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy

of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of

the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect

state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a

reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve,

and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice

against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of

the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are

commonly still diffident in their determinations: and if any of the

learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and

obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by

showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over

their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal

perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In

general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which,

in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a

just reasoner.

 

130. Another species of mitigated scepticism which may be of advantage

to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts

and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are

best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The

imagination of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is

remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most

distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which

custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct Judgement observes a

contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines

itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice

and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of

poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring

us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than

to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt,

and of the impossibility, that anything, but the strong power of natural

instinct, could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to

philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect,

that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation,

philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life,

methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond

common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those

faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate

operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe,

after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can

we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may

form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature,

from, and to eternity?

 

This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect,

so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into

the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their

objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are the

proper subjects of science and enquiry.

 

131. It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of

demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend

this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere

sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number

are entirely similar, their relations become intricate