Handbook of Ethical Theory, George Stuart Fullerton [best book reader .txt] 📗

The moral here seems to be that, whatever else a man ought to do, he ought to seek his own advantage—real self-sacrifice cannot be his duty. This conviction of the unreasonableness of self-sacrifice reveals itself in another form in the doctrine that morality cannot be made completely rational unless a reconciliation between prudence and benevolence can be found; [Footnote: SIDGWICK, The Methods of Ethics, concluding chapter, Sec 5.] and in the labored attempts to show that the good of the individual must actually coincide with that of the community. [Footnote: E. g. GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec Sec 244-245. Aristotle tries to prove that he who dies for his country is impelled by self-love. He does what is honorable, and thus “gives the greater good to himself.” Ethics, Book IX, chapter viii.] It may be questioned whether the same conviction did not lurk in the back of the mind of that sternest of moralists, Kant, who denied that happiness ought to be sought at all, and yet found so irrational the divorce of virtue and happiness that he postulated a God to guarantee their union. [Footnote: The Critique of the Practical Reason, chapter ii.]

Thus, moralists of widely different schools agree in recognizing that self-interest is a principle that should not be placed second to any other. The confessed egoist only goes a step further in recognizing it as a principle that has no rival. And that men generally are inclined to regard egoism as not unnatural seems evinced by the fact that for apparently altruistic actions they are very apt to seek ulterior egoistic motives, while, if the action seems plainly egoistic, they seek no further.

Does, then, anything seem more natural than egoism? and, if natural, may it not be assumed to be proper and right?

(3) Finally, it may be urged that he who serves his own interests at all intelligently has, at least, a comprehensive aim, and does not live at random. In so far, egoism appears to be rational in a sense dwelt on above; [Footnote: Sec Sec 55-56] it harmonizes and unifies the impulses and desires of the man.

103. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST EGOISM.—What may be said against egoism?

(1) Enough has been said above to show that egoism is not inevitable, but that men actually are influenced by motives which cannot be regarded as egoistic. It is, hence, not necessary to dwell upon this point.

(2) As to the naturalness of egoism. Both the professional moralist and the man in the street may hesitate to admit that a man should neglect his own interests, and may find it natural that he should cultivate them assiduously. But it is only the exceptional man who maintains that he should have nothing else in view.

There are individuals so constituted that self-interest makes to them a peculiarly strong appeal. Others, more social by nature, may be misled by psychological theory to maintain that a man’s chief and only end is his own “satisfaction.” [Footnote: See below, chapter xxvi, 3.] Still others, realizing that both one’s own interests and the interests of one’s neighbor are natural and seemingly legitimate objects of regard, are perplexed as to the method of reconciling their apparently conflicting claims, and are betrayed into inconsistent utterances.

But it is too much to say that the professional moralist and the plain man normally regard pure egoism with favor and find it natural. In spite of our cynical maxims and our inclination to seek for ulterior motives for apparently altruistic acts, we abhor the thorough-going egoist, and we are not inclined to look upon the phenomena, let us say, of the family life, as manifestations of self-seeking.

It is worth while to remark that, even if the approach to the Cyrenaic ideal were so common as not to seem wholly unnatural, that would not prove that it ought to be embraced; it is natural for men to err, but that does not make error our duty.

(3) By the moral conviction of organized humanity, as expressed in custom, law, and public opinion, egoism stands condemned. Neither in savage life nor among civilized peoples, neither in the dawn of human history nor in its latest chapters, do we find these agencies encouraging every man to live exclusively for himself. Egoistic impulses are recognized, in that reward and punishment are allotted, but the end urged upon the attention of the individual is the common good, not his own particular good.

The social conscience has always demanded of the individual self-sacrifice, even to the extent of laying down his life, on occasion, for the public weal. And the enlightened social conscience does not regard a man as truly moral whose outward conformity to moral laws rests solely upon a basis of egoistic calculation. The very existence of the family, the tribe, the state, is a protest against pure egoism. Were all men as egoistic as Aristippus seems to have professed to be, a stable community life of any sort would be impossible.

(4) The argument that egoism is rational at least in so far as it introduces consistency into actions and unifies and harmonizes desires and impulses deserves little consideration. Any comprehensive end will do the same, and many comprehensive ends may be very trivial. One may make it the aim of one’s life to remain slender, or may devote all one’s energies to the amelioration of the social position of bald-headed men. He who counsels deliberate egoism does not recommend it merely on the score that it leads to consistent action. He does it on the ground that the end itself appeals to him as one that ought to be selected and will be selected if a man is wise. That the interest of the individual is in this sense a matter of obligation, is something to be proved, not assumed.

104. THE MORALIST’S INTEREST IN EGOISM—It has been worth while to treat at length of egoism because the doctrine takes on more or less subtle forms, and its fundamental principle, self-interest, has a significance for various ethical schools which are not, or are not considered, egoistic. Men have been vastly puzzled by the moral claims of the principle of self-interest, both plain men and professional moralists.

That prudence is not the only fundamental virtue, most men would be ready enough to admit; but is it properly speaking, a virtue at all? Ought I, for example, to try to make myself happy? Suppose I do not want to be happy, what is the source of the obligation?

Butler tells me that interest, one’s own happiness, is a manifest obligation; [Footnote: Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, Sec 8; Sermons III and XI.] Bentham, a writer of a widely different school, informs me that “the constantly proper end of action on the part of any individual at the moment of action is his real greatest happiness from that moment to the end of his life.” [Footnote: BENTHAM, Memoirs, Vol. X of Bowring’s Edition, Edinburgh, 1843, p. 560.] On the other hand, Hutcheson teaches me that I am under no obligation to be good to myself, although I am under obligation to be good to others: “Actions which flow solely from self-love, and yet evidence no want of benevolence, having no hurtful effects upon others, seem perfectly indifferent in a moral sense.” [Footnote: An Enquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sec 3, 5.] Which means that intemperance is blameworthy only so far as it is against the public interest.

May I, should I, on occasion, sacrifice myself? Thoughtful men generally recognize self-sacrifice, not only as possible, but as actual, and believe it to be at times a duty. But the moralist gives forth here an uncertain sound.

Self-interest and benevolence have been left to fight out their quarrel in a court without a judge to decide upon their conflicting claims; [Footnote: See Sec 102, the citations from Butler and Clarke.] self-sacrifice has been enjoined; [Footnote: KANT, see, later, chapter xxix.] it has been declared impossible; [Footnote: See, above, the position of Green, Sec 97; cf., below, Sec 126.] it has been denied that it can ever be a duty; [Footnote: FITE, An Introductory Study of Ethics, chapter vii, Sec 5.] the kind of self-sacrifice in question has been regarded as significant. [Footnote: SIDGWICK, The Methods of Ethics, Introduction, Sec 4.]

He who has rejected as unworthy of serious consideration the naive egoism of an Aristippus or an Epicurus is not on that account done with egoism, by any means. [Footnote: The question of self-sacrifice recurs again in chapter xxvi, 3.]