Moral Science, Alexander Bain [top non fiction books of all time TXT] 📗

we have, as mature human beings, in civilized society, a principle of action called Conscience, which we recognize as distinct from Self-love and Benevolence, as well as from the Appetites and Passions, Butler would make us believe that this is, from the first, a distinct principle of our nature. The proper reply is to analyze Conscience; showing at the same time, from its very great discrepancies in different minds, that it is a growth, or product, corresponding to the education and the circumstances of each, although of course involving the common elements of the mind.

In his Sermons on Compassion (V., VI.), he treats this as one of the Affections in his second group of the Feelings (Appetites, Passions, and Affections); vindicates its existence against Hobbes, who treated it as an indirect mode of self-regard; and shows its importance in human life, as an adjunct to Rational Benevolence and Conscience.

In discussing Benevolence (Sermon XII.) Butler's object is to show that it is not ultimately at variance with Self-love. In the introductory observations, he adverts to the historical fact, that vice and folly take different turns in different ages, and that the peculiarity of his own age is 'to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to self-interest' than formerly. He accommodates his preaching of virtue to this characteristic of his time, and promises that _there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite passion_.

His mode of arguing is still the same as in the sermons on Human Nature. Self-love does not comprehend our whole being; it is only one principle among many. It is characterized by a _subjective_ end, the _feeling_ of happiness; but we have other ends of the objective kind, the ends of our appetites, passions, and affections--food, injury to another, good to another, &c. The total happiness of our being includes all our ends. Self-love attends only to one interest, and if we are too engrossed with that, we may sacrifice other interests, and narrow the sphere of our happiness. A certain disengagement of mind is necessary to enjoyment, and the intensity of pursuit interferes with this. [This is a true remark, but misapplied; external pursuit may be so intense as nearly to do away with subjective consciousness, and therefore with pleasure; but this applies more to _objective_ ends,--wealth, the interest of others--than to self-love, which is in its nature subjective.]

Now, what applies to the Appetites and Affections applies to Benevolence; it is a distinct motive or urgency, and should have its scope like every other propensity, in order to happiness.

Such is his reasoning, grounded on his peculiar Psychology. He then adduces the ordinary arguments to show, that seeking the good of others is a positive gratification in itself, and fraught with pleasure in its consequences.

In summary, Butler's views stand thus:--

I.--His Standard of Right and Wrong is the subjective Faculty, called by him Reflection, or Conscience. He assumes such an amount of uniformity in human beings, in regard to this Faculty, as to settle all questions that arise.

II.--His Psychological scheme is the threefold division of the mind already brought out; Conscience being one division, and a distinct and primitive element of our constitution.

He has no Psychology of the Will; nor does he anywhere inquire into the problem of Liberty and Necessity.

He maintains the existence of Disinterested Benevolence, by saying that Disinterested action, as opposed to direct self-regard, is a much wider fact of our mental system, than the regard to the welfare of others. We have seen that this is a mere stroke of ingenuity, and owes its plausible appearance to his making our associated ends the primary ends of our being.

III.--With regard to the Summum Bonum, or the theory of Happiness, he holds that men cannot be happy by the pursuit of mere self; but must give way to their benevolent impulses as well, all under the guidance of conscience. In short, virtue is happiness, even in this world; and, if there be any exception to the rule, it will be rectified in another world. This is in fact the Platonic view. Men are not to pursue happiness; that would be to fall into the narrow rut of self-love, and would be a failure; they are to pursue virtue, including the good of others, and the greatest happiness will ensue to each.

It is a remarkable indication of the spirit of Butler's age, or of his estimate of it, that he would never venture to require of any one a single act of uncompensated self-sacrifice.

IV.--The substance of the Moral Code of Butler is in no respect peculiar to him. He gives no classification of our duties. His means and inducements to virtue have just been remarked upon.

V.--The relationship of Ethics to Politics and to Theology needs no remark.


FRANCIS HUTCHESON. [1694-1747.]

Hutcheson's views are to be found in his 'Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,' his 'Treatise on the Passions,' and his posthumous work, 'A System of Moral Philosophy.' The last-mentioned, as the completest exposition of his Ethics, Speculative and Practical, is followed here.

There are three books; the first treating of Human Nature and Happiness; the second, of Laws of Nature and Duties, previous to Civil Government and other adventitious states; the third, of Civil Polity.

In Book I., Chap. I., Hutcheson states that the aim of Moral Philosophy is to point out the course of action that will best promote the highest happiness and perfection of men, by the light of human nature and to the exclusion of revelation; thus to indicate the rules of conduct that make up the Law of Nature. Happiness, the end of this art, being the state of the mind arising from its several grateful perceptions or modifications, the natural course of the inquiry is to consider the various human powers, perceptions, and actions, and then to compare them so as to find what really constitutes happiness, and how it may be attained. The principles that first display themselves in childhood are the external senses, with some small powers of spontaneous motion, introducing to the mind perceptions of pleasure and pain, which becoming forthwith the object of desire and aversion, are our first notions of natural good and evil. Next to Ideas of Sensation, we acquire Concomitant ideas of Sensation from two or more senses together--number, extension, &c. Ideas of consciousness or reflection, which is another natural power of perception, complete the list of the materials of knowledge; to which, when the powers of judging and reasoning are added, all the main acts of the understanding are given. There are still, however, some finer perceptions, that may be left over until the will is disposed of.

Under the head of Will, he notes first the facts of Desire and Aversion, being new motions of the soul, distinct from, though arising out of, sensations, perceptions, and judgments. To these it is common to add Joy and Sorrow, arising in connexion with desire, though they partake more of sensations than of volitions. Acts of the will are _selfish_ or _benevolent_, according as one's own good, or (as often really in fact happens) the good of others is pursued. Two _calm_ natural determinations of the will are to be conceded; the one an invariable constant impulse towards one's own highest perfection and happiness; the other towards the universal happiness of others, when the whole system of beings is regarded without prejudice, and in the absence of the notion that their happiness interferes with our own. There are also _turbulent_ passions and appetites, whose end is their simple gratification; whereupon the violence and uneasiness cease. Some are selfish--hunger, lust, power, fame; some benevolent--pity, gratitude, parental affection, &c.; others may be of either kind--anger, envy, &c. In none of them is there any reference in the mind to the greatest happiness of self or others; and that they stand so often in real opposition to the calm motions, is sufficient proof of their distinct character, _e.g._, the opposition of lust and calm regard for one's highest interest.

In Chapter II., he takes up some finer powers of perception, and some other natural determinations of the will. Bound up with seeing and hearing are certain other powers of perception or senses--Beauty, Imitation, Harmony, Design, summed up by Addison under the name of Imagination, and all natural sources of pleasure. The two grateful perceptions of Novelty and Grandeur may be added to the list of natural determinations or senses of pleasure. To attempt to reduce the natural sense of Beauty to the discernment of real or apparent usefulness is hopeless. The next sense of the soul noted is the Sympathetic, in its two Phases of Pity or Compassion and Congratulation. This is fellow-feeling on apprehending the state of others, and proneness to relieve, without any thought of our own advantage, as seen in children. Pity is stronger than congratulation, because, whether for ourselves or others, the desire to repel evil is stronger than to pursue good. Sympathy extends to all the affections and passions; it greatly subserves the grand determination of the soul towards universal happiness.

Other finer senses have actions of men for their objects, there being a general determination of the soul to exercise all its active powers,--a universal impulse to action, bodily and intellectual. In all such action there is real pleasure, but the grand source of human happiness is the power of perceiving the _moral_ notions of actions and characters. This, the _Moral Sense_, falls to be fully discussed later. Distinct from our moral sense is the _Sense of Honour or Shame_, when we are praised or condemned by others. The _Sense of Decency or Dignity_, when the mind perceives excellence of bodily and mental powers in ourselves or others, is also natural, and distinct from the moral sense. Some would allow a natural Sense of the Ridiculous in objects or events. There follow some remarks on the tendency to associate perceptions. In addition also to the natural propensity towards action, there is a tendency in repeated action to become Habit, whereby our powers are greatly increased. Habit and Customs can raise, however, no new ideas beyond the sentiments naturally excited by the original actions.

_Sexual_ desire, wisely postponed by nature beyond the earliest years, does not, in man, end in mere sensual pleasure, but involves a natural liking of beauty as an indication of temper and manners, whereupon grow up esteem and love. Mankind have a universal desire of _offspring_, and love for their young; also an affection, though weaker, for all blood-relations. They have, further, a natural impulse to _society_ with their fellows, as an immediate principle, and are not driven to associate only by indigence. All the other principles already mentioned, having little or no exercise in solitude, would bring them together, even without family ties. Patriotism and love of country are acquired in the midst of social order.

_Natural Religion_ inevitably springs up in the best minds at sight of the benevolent order of the world, and is soon diffused among all. The principles now enumerated will be found, though in varying proportions, among all men not plainly monstrous by accident, &c.

Chapter III. treats of the Ultimate Determinations of the Will and Benevolent Affections. The question now is to find some order and subordination among the powers that have been cited, and to discover the ultimate ends of action, about which there is no reasoning. He notices various systems that make calm self-love the one leading principle of action, and specially the system that, allowing the existence of particular disinterested affections, puts the self-satisfaction felt in yielding to the generous sentiments above all other kinds of enjoyments. But, he asks, is there not also a _calm determination_ towards the good of others, without reference to private interest