The Ego and his Own, Max Stirner [ebook reader for surface pro .txt] 📗

a life of the people e. g. has not yet anywhere

appeared in such significance." Quite right, it will be a life of the people

that has nowhere appeared, because it is not a -- life of the people. -- So

Carrière then combats himself (p. 10): "Pure humanity or manhood cannot be

better represented than by a people fulfilling its mission." Why, by this

nationality only is represented. "Washed-out generality is lower than the form

complete in itself, which is itself a whole, and lives as a living member of

the truly general, the organized." Why, the people is this very "washed-out

generality," and it is only a man that is the "form complete in itself."

The impersonality of what they call "people, nation," is clear also from this:

that a people which wants to bring its I into view to the best of its power

puts at its head the ruler without will. It finds itself in the alternative

either to be subjected to a prince who realizes only *himself, his individual

pleasure --* then it does not recognize in the "absolute master" its own will,

the so-called will of the people -- or to seat on the throne a prince who

gives effect to no will of his own -- then it has a prince without will,

whose place some ingenious clockwork would perhaps fill just as well. --

Therefore insight need go only a step farther; then it becomes clear of itself

that the I of the people is an impersonal, "spiritual" power, the -- law. The

people's I, therefore, is a -- spook, not an I. I am I only by this, that I

make myself; i.e. that it is not another who makes me, but I must be my own

work. But how is it with this I of the people? Chance plays it into the

people's hand, chance gives it this or that born lord, accidents procure it

the chosen one; he is not its (the "sovereign" people's) product, as I am

my product. Conceive of one wanting to talk you into believing that you were

not your I, but Tom or Jack was your I! But so it is with the people, and

rightly. For the people has an I as little as the eleven planets counted

together have an I, though they revolve around a common center.

Bailly's utterance is representative of the slave-disposition that folks

manifest before the sovereign people, as before the prince. "I have," says he,

"no longer any extra reason when the general reason has pronounced itself. My

first law was the nation's will; as soon as it had assembled I knew nothing

beyond its sovereign will." He would have no "extra reason," and yet this

extra reason alone accomplishes everything. Just so Mirabeau inveighs in the

words, "No power on earth has the right to say to the nation's

representatives, It is my will!"

As with the Greeks, there is now a wish to make man a zoon politicon, a

citizen of the State or political man. So he ranked for a long time as a

"citizen of heaven." But the Greek fell into ignominy along with his State,

the citizen of heaven likewise falls with heaven; we, on the other hand, are

not willing to go down along with the people, the nation and nationality,

not willing to be merely political men or politicians. Since the Revolution

they have striven to "make the people happy," and in making the people happy,

great, etc., they make us unhappy: the people's good hap is -- my mishap.

What empty talk the political liberals utter with emphatic decorum is well

seen again in Nauwerck's "On Taking Part in the State". There complaint is

made of those who are indifferent and do not take part, who are not in the

full sense citizens, and the author speaks as if one could not be man at all

if one did not take a lively part in State affairs, i.e. if one were not a

politician. In this he is right; for, if the State ranks as the warder of

everything "human," we can have nothing human without taking part in it. But

what does this make out against the egoist? Nothing at all, because the egoist

is to himself the warder of the human, and has nothing to say to the State

except "Get out of my sunshine." Only when the State comes in contact with his

ownness does the egoist take an active interest in it. If the condition of the

State does not bear hard on the closet-philosopher, is he to occupy himself

with it because it is his "most sacred duty?" So long as the State does

according to his wish, what need has he to look up from his studies? Let those

who from an interest of their own want to have conditions otherwise busy

themselves with them. Not now, nor evermore, will "sacred duty" bring folks to

reflect about the State -- as little as they become disciples of science,

artists, etc., from "sacred duty." Egoism alone can impel them to it, and will

as soon as things have become much worse. If you showed folks that their

egoism demanded that they busy themselves with State affairs, you would not

have to call on them long; if, on the other hand, you appeal to their love of

fatherland etc., you will long preach to deaf hearts in behalf of this

"service of love." Certainly, in your sense the egoists will not participate

in State affairs at all.

Nauwerck utters a genuine liberal phrase on p. 16: "Man completely fulfills

his calling only in feeling and knowing himself as a member of humanity, and

being active as such. The individual cannot realize the idea of manhood if

he does not stay himself upon all humanity, if he does not draw his powers

from it like Antaeus."

In the same place it is said: "Man's relation to the res publica is degraded

to a purely private matter by the theological view; is, accordingly, made away

with by denial." As if the political view did otherwise with religion! There

religion is a "private matter."

If, instead of "sacred duty," "man's destiny," the "calling to full manhood,"

and similar commandments, it were held up to people that their self-interest

was infringed on when they let everything in the State go as it goes, then,

without declamations, they would be addressed as one will have to address them

at the decisive moment if he wants to attain his end. Instead of this, the

theology-hating author says, "If there has ever been a time when the State

laid claim to all that are hers, such a time is ours. -- The thinking man sees

in participation in the theory and practice of the State a duty, one of the

most sacred duties that rest upon him" -- and then takes under closer

consideration the "unconditional necessity that everybody participate in the

State."

He in whose head or heart or both the State is seated, he who is possessed

by the State, or the believer in the State, is a politician, and remains

such to all eternity.

"The State is the most necessary means for the complete development of

mankind." It assuredly has been so as long as we wanted to develop mankind;

but, if we want to develop ourselves, it can be to us only a means of

hindrance.

Can State and people still be reformed and bettered now? As little as the

nobility, the clergy, the church, etc.: they can be abrogated, annihilated,

done away with, not reformed. Can I change a piece of nonsense into sense by

reforming it, or must I drop it outright?

Henceforth what is to be done is no longer about the State (the form of the

State, etc.), but about me. With this all questions about the prince's power,

the constitution, etc., sink into their true abyss and their true nothingness.

I, this nothing, shall put forth my creations from myself.

To the chapter of society belongs also "the party," whose praise has of late

been sung.

In the State the party is current. "Party, party, who should not join one!"

But the individual is unique,(55) not a member of the party. He unites

freely, and separates freely again. The party is nothing but a State in the

State, and in this smaller bee- State "peace" is also to rule just as in the

greater. The very people who cry loudest that there must be an opposition in

the State inveigh against every discord in the party. A proof that they too

want only a --State. All parties are shattered not against the State, but

against the ego.(56)

One hears nothing oftener now than the admonition to remain true to his party;

party men despise nothing so much as a mugwump. One must run with his party

through thick and thin, and unconditionally approve and represent its chief

principles. It does not indeed go quite so badly here as with closed

societies, because these bind their members to fixed laws or statutes (e. g.

the orders, the Society of Jesus, etc.). But yet the party ceases to be a

union at the same moment at which it makes certain principles binding and

wants to have them assured against attacks; but this moment is the very

birth-act of the party. As party it is already a born society, a dead union,

an idea that has become fixed. As party of absolutism it cannot will that its

members should doubt the irrefragable truth of this principle; they could

cherish this doubt only if they were egoistic enough to want still to be

something outside their party, i.e. non-partisans. Non-partisans they cannot

be as party-men, but only as egoists. If you are a Protestant and belong to

that party, you must only justify Protestantism, at most "purge" it, not

reject it; if you are a Christian and belong among men to the Christian party,

you cannot be beyond this as a member of this party, but only when your

egoism, i.e. non-partisanship, impels you to it. What exertions the

Christians, down to Hegel and the Communists, have put forth to make their

party strong! They stuck to it that Christianity must contain the eternal

truth, and that one needs only to get at it, make sure of it, and justify it.

In short, the party cannot bear non-partisanship, and it is in this that

egoism appears. What matters the party to me? I shall find enough anyhow who

unite with me without swearing allegiance to my flag.

He who passes over from one party to another is at once abused as a

"turncoat." Certainly morality demands that one stand by his party, and to

become apostate from it is to spot oneself with the stain of "faithlessness";

but ownness knows no commandment of "faithlessness"; adhesion, etc., ownness

permits everything, even apostasy, defection. Unconsciously even the moral