Moral Science, Alexander Bain [top non fiction books of all time TXT] 📗

faculties and springs of action, we can discern certain relations which must exist among them by the necessity of man's moral being. Butler maintains that, by merely comparing appetite with conscience as springs of action, we see conscience is superior and ought to rule; and Whewell conceives this to be self-evident, and expresses it by stating that _the Lower parts of our nature are to be governed by the Higher_. Men being considered as social beings, capable of mutual understanding through speech, it is self-evident that their rule must include veracity. In like manner, it is self-evident from the same consideration of social relationship, that each man should abstain from violence and anger towards others, that is, _love his fellow men_.

Remarking on the plea of the utilitarian, that truth may be justified by the intolerable consequences of its habitual violation, he urges that this is no reason against its being intuitively perceived; just as the axioms of geometry, although intuitively felt, are confirmed by showing the incongruities following on their denial. He repeats the common allegation in favour of _a priori_ principles generally, that no consideration of evil consequences would give the sense of _universality_ of obligation attaching to the fundamental moral maxims; and endeavours to show that his favourite antithesis of _Idea_ and _Fact_ conciliates the internal essence and the external conditions of morality. The Idea is invariable and universal; the Fact, or outward circumstances, may vary historically and geographically. Morality must in some measure be dependent on Law, but yet there is an Idea of Justice above law.

It very naturally occurred to many readers of Whewell's scheme, that in so far as he endeavours to give any reason for the foundations of morality, he runs in a vicious circle. He proposes to establish his supreme universal rule, by showing it to be only a summing up of certain rules swaying the several portions or departments of our nature--Veracity, Justice, &c., while, in considering the obligation of these rules, he assumes that man is a moral being, which is another way of saying that he is to be under a supreme moral rule. In his latest edition, the author has replied to this charge, but so briefly as to cast no new light on his position. He only repeats that the Supreme rule of Human Action is given by the constitution and conditions of human nature. His ethical principle may be not unfairly expressed by saying, that he recognizes a certain intrinsic fitness in exercising the organ of speech according to its social uses, that is, in promoting a right understanding among men; and so with Justice, as the fitness of property, and Humanity, as the fitness of the Affections. This fitness is intuitively felt. Human happiness is admitted to be a consequence of these rules; but happiness is not a sufficient end in itself; morality is also an end in itself. Human happiness is not to be conceived or admitted, except as containing a moral element; in addition to the direct gratifications of human life, we must include the delight of virtue. [How men can be compelled to postpone their pleasurable sense of the good things of life, till they have contracted a delight in virtue for its own sake, the author does not say. It has been the great object of moralists in all ages, to impart by _education_ such a state of mind as to spoil the common gratifications, if they are viciously procured; the comparatively little success of the endeavour, shows that nature has done little to favour it.]

The foregoing is an abstract of the Introduction to the 4th Edition of the Elements of Morality. We shall present the author's views respecting the other questions of Morality in the form of the usual summary.

I.--As regards the Standard, enough has been already indicated.

II.--The Psychology of the Moral Faculty is given by Whewell as part of a classification of our Active Powers, or, as he calls them, Springs of Action. These are: I.--The _Appetites_ or Bodily Desires, as Hunger and Thirst, and the desires of whatever things have been found to gratify the senses. II.--The _Affections_, which are directed to persons; they fall under the two heads Love and Anger. III.--The _Mental Desires_, having for their objects certain abstractions. They are the desire of Safety, including Security and Liberty; the desire of Having, or Property; the desire of Society in all its forms--Family Society and Civil Society, under which is included the need of Mutual Understanding; the desire of Superiority; and the Desire of Knowledge. IV.--The _Moral Sentiments_. Our judgment of actions as right or wrong is accompanied by certain Affections or Sentiments, named Approbation and Disapprobation, Indignation and Esteem; these are the Moral Sentiments. V.--The _Reflex Sentiments_, namely, the desires of being Loved, of Esteem or Admiration, of our own Approval; and generally all springs of action designated by the word _self_--for example, self-love.

With regard to the Moral Sentiment, or Conscience, in particular, the author's resolution of Morality into Moral Rules, necessarily supposes an exercise of the Reason, together with the Affections above described. He expressly mentions 'the _Practical_ Reason, which guides us in applying Rules to our actions, and in discerning the consequences of actions.' He does not allow Individual Conscience as an ultimate or supreme authority, but requires it to be conformed to the Supreme Moral Rules, arrived at in the manner above described.

On the subject of Disinterestedness, he maintains a modification of Paley's selfish theory. He allows that some persons are so far disinterested as to be capable of benevolence and self-sacrifice, without any motive of reward or punishment; but 'to require that all persons should be such, would be not only to require what we certainly shall not find, but to put the requirements of our Morality in a shape in which it cannot convince men.' Accordingly, like Paley, he places the doctrine that 'to promote the happiness of others will lead to our own happiness,' exclusively on the ground of Religion. He honours the principle that 'virtue _is_ happiness,' but prefers for mankind generally the form, 'virtue _is the way_ to happiness.' In short, he places no reliance on the purely Disinterested impulses of mankind, although he admits the existence of such.

III.--He discusses the Summum Bonum, or Happiness, only with reference to his Ethical theory. The attaining of the objects of our desires yields Enjoyment or Pleasure, which cannot be the supreme end of life, being distinguished from, and opposed to, Duty. Happiness is Pleasure and Duty combined and harmonized by Wisdom. 'As moral beings, our Happiness must be found in our Moral Progress, and in the consequences of our Moral Progress; we must be happy by being virtuous.'

He complains of the moralists that reduce virtue to Happiness (in the sense of human pleasure), that they fail to provide a measure of happiness, or to resolve it into definite elements; and again urges the impossibility of calculating the whole consequences of an action upon human happiness.

_IV_.--With respect to the Moral Code, Whewell's arrangement is interwoven with his derivation of moral rules. He enumerates five Cardinal Virtues as the substance of morality:--BENEVOLENCE, which gives expansion to our _Love_; JUSTICE, as prescribing the measure of our _Mental Desires_; TRUTH, the law of _Speech_ in connexion with its purpose; PURITY, the control of the _Bodily Appetites_; and ORDER (obedience to the Laws), which engages the _Reason_ in the consideration of Rules and Laws for defining Virtue and Vice. Thus the five leading branches of virtue have a certain parallelism to the five chief classes of motives--Bodily Appetites, Mental Desires, Love and its opposite, the need of a Mutual Understanding, and Reason.

As already seen, he considers it possible to derive every one of these virtues from the consideration of man's situation with reference to each:--_Benevolence_, or Humanity, from our social relationship; _Justice_, from the nature of Property; _Truth_, from, the employment of Language for mutual Understanding; _Purity_, from considering the lower parts of our nature (the Appetites) as governed by the higher; and _Order_, from the relation of Governor and Governed. By a self-evident, intuitive, irresistible consideration of the circumstances of the case, we are led to these several virtues in the detail, and their sum is the Supreme Rule of Life.

Not content with these five express moral principles, he considers that the Supreme Law requires, as adjuncts, two other virtues; to these he gives the names EARNESTNESS, or Zeal, and MORAL PURPOSE, meaning that everything whatsoever should be done for _moral ends_.

V.--The relation of Ethics to Politics in Whewell's system is one of intimacy, and yet of independence. The Laws of States supply the materials of human action, by defining property, &c., for the time being; to which definitions morality must correspond. On the other hand, morality supplies the Idea, or ideal, of Justice, to which the Laws of Society should progressively conform themselves. The Legislator and the Jurist must adapt their legislation to the point of view of the Moralist; and the moralist, while enjoining obedience to their dictates, should endeavour to correct the inequalities produced by laws, and should urge the improvement of Law, to make it conformable to morality. The Moral is in this way contrasted with the _Jural_, a useful word of the author's coining. He devotes a separate Book, entitled 'Rights and Obligations,' to the foundations of Jurisprudence. He makes a five-fold division of Rights, grounded on his classification of the Springs of Human Action; Rights of _Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage, Government_; and justifies this division as against others proposed by jurists.

VI.--He introduces the Morality of Religion as a supplement to the Morality of Reason. The separation of the two, he remarks, 'enables us to trace the results of the moral guidance of human Reason consistently and continuously, while we still retain a due sense of the superior authority of Religion.' As regards the foundations of Natural and Revealed Religion, he adopts the line of argument most usual with English Theologians.


JAMES FREDERICK FERRIER. [1808-64.]

In his 'Lectures on Greek Philosophy' (Remains, Vol. I.), Ferrier has indicated his views on the leading Ethical controversies.

These will appear, if we select his conclusions, on the three following points:--The Moral Sense, the nature of Sympathy, and the Summum Bonum.

1. He considers that the Sophists first distinctly broached the question--What is man by nature, and what is he by convention or fashion?

'This prime question of moral philosophy, as I have called it, is no easy one to answer, for it is no easy matter to effect the discrimination out of which the answer must proceed. It is a question, perhaps, to which no complete, but only an approximate, answer can be returned. One common mistake is to ascribe more to the natural man than properly belongs to him, to ascribe to him attributes and endowments which belong only to the social and artificial man. Some writers--Hutcheson, for example, and he is followed by many others--are of opinion that man naturally has a conscience or moral sense which discriminates between right and wrong, just as he has naturally a sense of taste, which distinguishes between sweet and bitter, and a sense of sight, which discriminates between red and blue, or a sentient organism, which distinguishes between pleasure and pain. That man has by nature, and from the first, the possibility of attaining to a conscience is not to be denied. That lie has within him by birthright something out of which conscience is developed, I firmly believe; and what this is I shall endeavour by-and-by to show when I come to speak of Sokrates and his philosophy as opposed to the doctrines of the Sophists. But that the man is furnished by nature with a conscience ready-made, just as he is furnished with a ready-made sensational