Studies in Forensic Psychiatry, Bernard Glueck [little bear else holmelund minarik .txt] 📗

of an abnormal psychic make-up. Furthermore, far from believing, as of old, that the proverbially insane is supposed to be totally devoid of discretion in his conduct, we know that there may be a good deal of method in madness, and that even the frankly insane malinger mental symptoms when the occasion requires it. No experienced psychiatrist would today, for instance, consider the oft-quoted story of the alleged madness of Ulysses as evidence of malingering.

The story is told that Ulysses, in order to escape the Trojan war, feigned insanity. He yoked a bull and a horse together, plowed the seashore, and sowed salt instead of grain. Palamedes detected this deception by placing the infant son of the King of Ithaca in the line of the furrow and observing the pretended lunatic turn the plow aside, an act of discretion which was considered sufficient proof that his madness was not real. Without attempting to pass upon the case of Ulysses, we may say without fear of contradiction that no one would today depend upon such criteria. Experience teaches us that an individual may be very seriously mentally affected and at the same time show sufficient discretion of conduct to avoid threatening danger and to seek those means which best subserve his immediate needs and wants. Not only is this true, but we have arrived at a stage where we are prone to look upon a great many of the psychoses as the direct expressions of the individual’s wish—as a haven sought out by himself within which he seeks shelter from the tempests of life. One of my patients tells me that the gun which he used in the alleged homicide was not loaded with bullets, but with paper wadding put there by his enemies, hence his alleged victim could not have been killed; in fact, he knows that this man is alive and having a good time on the money furnished him by his, the patient’s, enemies. Another instance is that of a colored man who is serving a life sentence for murder. Among the many symptoms which this fairly advanced dementia præcox case shows is the one that he considers himself a white man; that his dark color is due to some paint which he used in order to disguise himself; and that, inasmuch as the murder with which he is charged was supposed to have been committed by a colored man, he is not guilty of it. The motives here are quite obvious. Both these individuals find life much more bearable believing, as they do, in their innocence of the crimes imputed to them. Many other examples could be cited to prove that symptoms in mental disease do serve a definite purpose; that there may be indeed considerable method in madness.

Nevertheless, the observation is not uncommon that whenever such method is detected under circumstances where some ulterior motive may be ascribed to it the lay mind, and not infrequently psychiatrically-trained physicians, are at once ready to question the genuineness of the symptoms. It is the more curious that the so-called “insanity dodge” cry is frequently raised under circumstances where it would seem to be the least justifiable, as, for instance, in the case of an individual battling for his life before the bar of justice.

A little inquiry, however, into this phenomenon will help us to understand it better. It has its root primarily in that very common tendency of man to impute to his neighbor a type of behavior, a form of reaction, of which he would gladly avail himself were he in his neighbor’s place, and the weapon he would use under the circumstances would very likely be that exquisitely human trait, deceit, malingering. It is a weapon which has played a tremendous part in the evolutionary struggle, not only of man but of all living things; in a broader sense, it may be looked upon as an organic function, as an endowment, thanks to which the weak, inferior being is able to avoid the danger of becoming the prey of the stronger, superior being. This function is very well illustrated in those animals which are able to acquire the color of their immediate surroundings in order to render themselves more difficult of detection. It is common among various insects, reptiles, and amphibians. The chameleon may be especially mentioned in this connection. Even the eggs acquire, in the process of natural selection, the color of the place where they are deposited, and the cuckoo which is about to cheat a couple of another species by placing her eggs in their nest for them to hatch selects that species the color of whose eggs most closely resembles that of her own, in order to assure herself of the success of the deception. The simulation and malingering practiced by the fox is common knowledge. Malingering, an instinctive function originally, has, in the process of evolution, become an act of reason with certain animals. One is forced to believe, from a survey of mythological writings, that primitive man must have had recourse to simulation and all else that this term stands for whenever he was confronted with an especially difficult problem in his struggles for existence. To the gods was attributed, among other special propensities, the ability to assume any shape or form, else how could they have performed all those miraculous escapades? Thus we are told that Jove transformed himself into an eagle when he carried off Ganymede. Achilles, the son of a goddess, sought to avoid the iniquitous fate which drove him to Troy by disguising himself as a woman. Deception is a common weapon of defense with the savage and with the inferior races of today. It is the tool by means of which these individuals render things as they want them to be; it is with them the means for a more direct, less difficult, less tedious solution of the problems of life.

The child in whose development the various steps of phylogeny are recapitulated shows this tendency to deception, to simulation, and dissimulation in a very pronounced degree. Lombroso, who was the first to demonstrate that so-called moral insanity is but a continuation of childhood without the adjunct of education, cites many facts, not excepting his own example, to show that the child is naturally drawn to fraud, to deception, to simulation. The child simulates either because of fear of injury and punishment or because of vanity or jealousy. Ferrari,[3] in his excellent work on juvenile delinquency, discusses the various motives for deception and malingering in the child. According to him, deception is, first of all, instinctive with the child. It malingers because of weakness, playfulness, imitation, egotism, jealousy, envy, and revenge. Deception frequently forms for it the only available weapon of defense against the parents and teachers.

Penta[4] cites many well-authenticated cases of malingering of mental symptoms in children. Of special interest is Malmstein’s case of a girl of eight years who, in order to deceive her father and render him less severe in his treatment of her, and in order to gain the sympathy of those in the house who were in the habit of giving her sweets, feigned complete muteness for five months, after which time, no longer able to resist the desire to speak, she went into the woods, where, believing herself unobserved, she began to sing. St. Augustine, in his confessions, speaks of his childhood in the following manner: “I cheated with innumerable lies my teachers and parents from a love of play and for the purpose of being amused.”[B] Penta, after a thorough discussion of the subject of malingering in children, comes to the conclusion that children use all the diverse forms of fraud, from simple lying to simulation, much more frequently than is believed or known. It may with them as with some lower animals simply be an instinctive playfulness, a habit or a necessity, as a weapon consciously and voluntarily wielded. This inherent tendency is, of course, modified to a considerable extent by the environment under which the child was brought up. Finally, the independence which the growing human being acquires from this form of reaction is in direct proportion to the ability he has acquired through education and precept to meet life’s problems squarely in the face. We will see, later on, how the type of individual who is most likely to malinger has in reality never fully outgrown his childhood; that his reactions to the problems of everyday life are largely infantile in character.