Angelic Wisdom about Divine Providence, Emanuel Swedenborg [best ereader for graphic novels .txt] 📗

time is like a passing shadow to the joy and bliss of life in eternity and for eternity. A man can think so if he will, for he has rationality and liberty, and the Lord, from whom he has the two faculties, constantly enables him to do so.

74. (ii) Whatever a man does in freedom, whether with reason or not, provided it is according to his reason, seems to him to be his. Nothing makes so clear what rationality and liberty are, which are proper to the human being, as to compare man and beast. Beasts do not have any rationality or faculty of understanding, or any liberty or faculty of willing freely. They do not have understanding or will, therefore, but instead of understanding they have knowledge and instead of will affection, both of these natural. Not having the two faculties, animals do not have thought, but instead an internal sight which makes one with their external sight by correspondence.

[2] Every affection has its mate, its consort, so to speak. An affection of natural love has knowledge, one of spiritual love has intelligence, and one of celestial love, wisdom. Without its mate or consort an affection is nothing, but is like esse apart from existere or substance without form, of which nothing can be predicated. Hence there is in every created thing something referable to the marriage of good and truth, as we have shown several times. In beasts it is a marriage of affection and knowledge; the affection is one of natural good, and the knowledge is knowledge of natural truth.

[3] Affection and knowledge in beasts act altogether as one. Their affection cannot be raised above their knowledge, nor the knowledge above the affection; if they are raised, they are raised together. Nor have animals a spiritual mind into which, or into the heat and light of which, they can be raised. Thus they have no faculty of understanding or rationality, or faculty of freely willing or liberty, and nothing more than natural affection with its knowledge. Their natural affection is that of finding food and shelter, of propagating, of avoiding and guarding against injury, together with the knowledge needed for this. As this is their kind of existence, they cannot think, "I will this but not that," or "I know this but not that," still less, "I understand this" or "I love that." They are borne along by affection and its knowledge without rationality and liberty. It is not from the natural world that they are borne along so, but from the spiritual world. Nothing can exist in the natural world that does not have its connection with the spiritual world: thence is every cause that accomplishes an effect. On this see also some things below (n. 96).

75. It is otherwise with man, who has affections not only of natural love, but also of spiritual and celestial loves. For man's mind is of three degrees, as was shown in Part III of the treatise Divine Love and Wisdom. Man can be raised therefore from natural knowledge into spiritual intelligence and on into celestial wisdom. From the two, intelligence and wisdom, he can look to the Lord, be conjoined with Him, and thereby live to eternity. This elevation as to affection would not be possible did he not from rationality have the power to raise the understanding, and from liberty the power to will this.

[2] By means of the two faculties man can think in himself about what he perceives outside him through the senses, and can also think on high about what he thinks below. Anyone can say, "I have thought and I think so and so," "I have willed and I will so and so," "I understand that this is a fact," "I love this for what it is," and so on. Obviously, man thinks above his thought, and sees it, as it were, below him. This comes to him from rationality and liberty; from rationality he can think on high, and from liberty he can will so to think. Unless he had liberty to think so, he would not have the will, nor the thought from it.

[3] Those, therefore, who will to understand only what is of the world and nature and not what moral and spiritual good and truth are, cannot be raised from knowledge into intelligence, still less into wisdom, for they have stifled those faculties. They render themselves no longer men except that they can understand if they wish, and can also will, by virtue of the implanted rationality and liberty; from the two capacities it is that one can think and from thought speak. In other respects, they are not men but beasts, and some, in their abuse of those faculties, are worse than beasts.

76. From an unclouded rationality anyone can see or grasp that without the appearance that it is his own a man cannot be in any affection to know or to understand. Every joy and pleasure, thus everything of the will, is from an affection of some love. Who can wish to know or to understand anything except that an affection of his takes pleasure in it? Who can feel this pleasure unless what he is affected by seems to be his? Were it not his, but another's altogether, that is, if another from his affection should infuse something into his mind when he himself felt no affection for knowing or grasping it, would he receive it? Indeed, could he receive it? Would he not be like one called a dullard or a clod?

[2] It should be manifest then that although everything that a man perceives, thinks, knows and, according to perception, wills and does, flows into him, nevertheless it is of the Lord's divine providence that it seems to be the man's. Otherwise, as we said, a man would not receive anything and so could be given no intelligence or wisdom. It is known that all good and truth are the Lord's and not man's, and yet appear to be man's. As good and truth so appear, so do all things of the church and of heaven, and all things of love and wisdom, and all things of charity and faith; yet none of them is man's. No one can receive them from the Lord unless it seems to him that he perceives them for himself. Plainly, the truth of the matter is that whatever a man does in freedom, whether with reason or not, provided only that it accords with his reason, seems to him to be his.

77. Who cannot from his faculty called rationality understand that a given good is serviceable to society, and a given evil harmful to society? That, for example, justice, sincerity, the chastity of marriage are serviceable to it, and injustice, insincerity, and misconduct with the wives of others, harmful? Consequently that these evils are in themselves injuries, and those goods in themselves benefits? Who then cannot make this a matter of his reason if only he will? He has rationality and he has liberty; the two faculties are bared, show, take charge and enable him to perceive and do in the measure that he avoids those evils because they are evils. So far as a man does this he looks on those goods as a friend looks on friends.

[2] By his faculty called rationality a man can conclude from this what goods are useful to society in the spiritual world and what evils are hurtful there, if instead of evils he sees sins and instead of goods works of charity. This he can also make a matter of his reason if he will, since he has liberty and rationality. His rationality and liberty emerge, become manifest, take charge and give him perception and power so far as he shuns evils as sins. So far as he does this he regards the goods of charity as neighbor regards neighbor in mutual love.

[3] For the sake of reception and union the Lord wills that whatever a man does freely according to reason shall seem to him to be his; this agrees with reason itself. It follows that a man can from his reason will something on the ground that it means his eternal happiness and can perform it by the Lord's divine power, implored by him.

78. (iii) Whatever a man does in freedom according to his thought is appropriated to him as his and remains. The reason is that a man's own and his freedom make one. His proprium is of his life, and what he does from his life he does in freedom. His proprium is also of his love, for love is one's life, and what he does from his life's love he does in freedom. We speak of his acting in freedom "according to his thought" because what is of his life or love he also thinks and confirms by thought, and what is so confirmed he does in freedom then according to thought. What a man does, he does from the will by the understanding; freedom is of the will and thought is of the understanding.

[2] A man can also act freely contrary to reason, likewise not freely in accord with reason: then nothing is appropriated to him—what he does is only of the mouth and body, not of the spirit or heart; only what is of the spirit and heart, when it is also of the mouth and body, is appropriated. The truth of this can be illustrated by many things, but this is not the place.

[3] By being appropriated to man is meant entering his life and becoming part of it, consequently becoming his own. It will be seen in what follows that there is nothing, however, which is man's very own; it only seems to him as if it were. Only this now: all the good a man does in freedom according to reason is appropriated to him as if it were his because it seems to be his in that he thinks, wills, speaks and does it. Good is not man's, however, but the Lord's with man (above, n. 76). How evil is appropriated to man will appear in a section of its own.

79. We said that what a man does in freedom in accord with his thought also remains. For nothing that a man has appropriated to himself can be eradicated; it has been made part of his love and at the same time of his reason, or of his will and at the same time of his understanding, and so of his life. It can be put aside indeed, but not cast out; put aside, it is borne from center to periphery, where it stays; this is what we mean by its remaining.

[2] If, for example, in boyhood or youth, a man appropriated an evil to himself by doing it with enjoyment from love of it—a fraud, blasphemy, revenge, or fornication—having done it freely with the assent of thought, he made it his; but if later he repents, shuns it and considers it a sin to be averse from, and so desists from it freely according to reason, then the opposite good is appropriated to him. Good then takes the center and removes evil to the periphery, farther according to his aversion and abhorrence for it. Still the evil cannot be so thrust out that one can say it is extirpated; it may indeed in that removal seem extirpated. What occurs is that the man is withheld from the evil by the Lord and held in good. This can happen with all inherited evil and all a man's actual evil.

[3] I have seen this verified by the experience of some in heaven who thought they were without evil, being held in good as they were by the Lord. Lest they should believe that the good in which they were was their own, they were let down from heaven and let into their evils until they acknowledged that of themselves they were in evil, and in good only from the Lord. Upon this acknowledgment they were returned to heaven.

[4] Be it known, therefore, that goods are appropriated to man only in that they are constantly with him from the Lord, and that as a man acknowledges this the Lord grants that good shall seem to be the man's, that is, that it shall seem to him that he loves the neighbor or has charity, believes or has faith, does good and understands truth, thus is wise, of himself. From this an enlightened person may see the nature and the strength of the appearance in which the Lord wills man to be. The Lord wills it for salvation's sake, for without that appearance no one can be saved. Also see what was shown above on the subject (nn. 42-45).