Meditations, Marcus Aurelius [websites to read books for free TXT] 📗

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same things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as

strange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they?

Nowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way; and why

dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature to those

who cause them and those who are moved by them; and why art thou not

altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things which

happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they will be a

material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and resolve to be

a good man in every act which thou dost: and remember….

 

59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble

up, if thou wilt ever dig.

 

60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in

motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining in

it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be

required also in the whole body. But all these things should be observed

without affectation.

 

61. The art of life is more like the wrestler’s art than the dancer’s, in

respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which

are sudden and unexpected.

 

62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to

have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt neither

blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their

approbation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and

appetites.

 

63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of truth;

consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and temperance and

benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most necessary to bear this

constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards all.

 

64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonor

in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does not

damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence is rational or

so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains let this remark

of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor everlasting,

if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if thou addest

nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that we do not

perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are the same as

pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched by heat, and

the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented about any of

these things, say to thyself that thou art yielding to pain.

 

65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman as they feel towards men.

 

66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to Socrates?

For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death, and disputed

more skilfully with the Sophists, and passed the night in the cold with

more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, he

considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked in a swaggering

way in the streets—though as to this fact one may have great doubts if

it was true. But we ought to inquire what kind of a soul it was that

Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content with being just

towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on account of

men’s villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to any man’s ignorance,

nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his share out of the

universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his understanding

to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh.

 

67. Nature has not so mingled [the intelligence] with the composition of

the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing thyself

and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own; for it

is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as such by no

one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too, that very little

indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because thou hast

despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge of

nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being both free and

modest, and social and obedient to God.

 

68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest

tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as much

as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members of

this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the

mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity and

in a just judgment of all surrounding things and in a ready use of the

objects which are presented to it, so that the judgment may say to the

thing which falls under its observation: This thou art in substance

[reality], though in men’s opinion thou mayest appear to be of a

different kind; and the use shall say to that which falls under the hand:

Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me that which presents

itself is always a material for virtue both rational and political, and

in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs to man or God. For

everything which happens has a relationship either to God or man, and is

neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt matter to work on.

 

69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every

day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor

playing the hypocrite.

 

70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a time

they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of them

bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways. But thou,

who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the bad,

and this too when thou art one of them?

 

71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness,

which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men’s badness, which is

impossible.

 

72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be

neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to

itself.

 

73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost

thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to

have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return?

 

74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act

according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by

doing it to others.

 

75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either

everything that takes place comes by way of consequence or [continuity];

or even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe

directs its own movement are governed by no rational principle. If this

is remembered, it will make thee more tranquil in many things (vi. 44;

ix. 28).

 

BOOK VIII.

 

1. This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty fame,

that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, or

at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher; but both to

many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from philosophy.

Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for

thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy plan of life also

opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw

away the thought, How thou shalt seem [to others], and be content if thou

shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. Observe

then what it wills, and let nothing else distract thee; for thou hast had

experience of many wanderings without having found happiness anywhere,—

not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment,

nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing what man’s nature requires. How

then shall a man do this? If he has principles from which come his

affects and his acts. What principles? Those which relate to good and

bad: the belief that there is nothing good for man which does not make

him just, temperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad which

does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned.

 

2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect to

me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone.

What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an intelligent

living being, and a social being, and one who is under the same law with

God?

 

3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with

Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with

things, and their causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling

principles of these men were the same [or conformable to their pursuits].

But as to the others, how many things had they to care for, and to how

many things were they slaves!

 

4. [Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even though

thou shouldst burst.

 

5. This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are

according to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou wilt

be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In the next place,

having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and at the

same time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what

man’s nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as it

seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and with

modesty and without hypocrisy.

 

6. The nature of the universal has this work to do,—to remove to that

place the things which are in this, to change them, to take them away

hence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not

fear anything new. All things are familiar [to us]; but the distribution

of them still remains the same.

 

7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well;

and a rational nature goes on its way well when in its thoughts it

assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements

to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and aversions to

the things which are in its power, and when it is satisfied with

everything that is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this

common nature every particular nature is a part, as the nature of the

leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in the plant the

nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not perception or

reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of man is part of a

nature which is not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and just,

since it gives to everything in equal portions and according to its

worth, times, substance, cause [form], activity and incident. But

examine, not to discover that any one thing