Ismailia, Sir Samuel White Baker [most inspirational books TXT] 📗

and be enabled to pass the shallows before the river should begin to fall. I therefore sent Mr. Higginbotham to Khartoum to engage vessels; I followed on 15th September, with the No. 10 steamer towing my diahbeeah--and ten empty vessels to bring up a supply of corn.

We reached Khartoum on the 21st Sept. at 9.30 a.m., to the astonishment of the governor and population, who could not understand why I had returned. I now met for the first time the Vicomte de Bizemont, who was to accompany the expedition. This gentleman had been intrusted by the Empress of the French with a very gracious token of her interest in the expedition, which he presented as a gift from her Majesty to my wife. I now heard for the first time the startling news of the war between France and Prussia. I found Dr. Gedge alive, but in a deplorable state of health. It was impossible for him to travel north, therefore he was carefully attended by the Greek physician to the forces, Dr. Georgis. I at once saw that there was no hope of recovery. Mr. Higginbotham had been exceedingly kind and attentive to his wants.

I was very well received by my old friend, Djiaffer Pacha, the governor-general, but as usual the work was all behind-hand, and Mr. Higginbotham had been in despair until my arrival. Only seven vessels were forthcoming. I had expected thirty! Thus, it would again be impossible to transport the camels that were indispensable for the transport of the steamers from Gondokoro. This was very heart-breaking. Instead of completing the expedition by a general direct move south with all material, transport animals, store, &c., in travelling order, the operation would extend over some years, for the simple reason that the government had not the means of transport. Even now the steamers had not arrived from Cairo. The fifteen large sloops had failed to pass the cataract; thus, I was reduced to the miserable open vessels of Khartoum, and even these were of an inferior description and few in number. Fortunately I had brought ten empty vessels with me from Tewfikeeyah, otherwise we should not have had sufficient transport for the necessary supply of corn. However, now that I had arrived, things began to move a little faster. I find this entry in my journal, dated "1st October, 1870. Thermometer, 6 a.m., 80 degrees; noon, 94 degrees. Wind, north. The fact of my having captured the boats of Kutchuk Ali and Agad with slaves on board, has determined a passive, but stubborn, resistance in Khartoum to the expedition. This is shared by the officials.

"Although I wrote to Djiaffer Pacha months ago requesting him to send me thirty vessels, there is not one actually ready, neither are there more than seven to be obtained. Even these are not prepared for the journey. The object appears to be to cause such delay as shall throw me back until the river shall be too low for the passage of the Bahr Giraffe.

"October 2.--I wrote an official letter to Djiaffer Pacha, protesting against delay, and reminding him of the Khedive's instructions."

The only authority who, I believe, takes a real interest in the expedition is Ismail Bey, who is a highly intellectual and clever man. This Bey is the President of the Council, and I have known him during many years. He speaks excellent French, and is more European in his ideas than any of my acquaintances.[*]


[*Footnote: Since this was written Ismail Bey has become Pacha, and is governor of the Khartoum province.]


The action that I had taken against the proceedings of the governor of Fashoda was very distasteful to the Khartoum public. I much regretted the necessity, but I could not have acted otherwise. This complication placed my friend, Djiaffer Pacha, in a most unpleasant position, as the Koordi of Fashoda was his employee; it would therefore appear that no great vigilance had been exercised by the governor-general at Khartoum, and suspicions might be aroused that the character and acts of the Fashoda governor must have been previously known to the Khartoum authorities.

The curtain began to rise, and disclosed certain facts of which I ought to have been informed many months ago, when I first arrived at Khartoum. I heard from Mr. Higginbotham that the principal trader of the White Nile (Agad) had a contract with the government, which gave him the exclusive right of trading throughout certain distant countries. This area comprised about NINETY THOUSAND SQUARE MILES! Thus, at the same time that I was employed by the Khedive to suppress the slave trade, to establish commerce, and to annex the Nile Basin, the White Nile countries that were to be annexed had already been leased by the governor-general of the Soudan for several thousand pounds sterling per annum, together with the monopoly of the ivory trade.

A country that was in no way connected with Egypt, and over which Egypt had no more authority than England has over China, had actually been leased-out to adventurers of the class known as merchants at Khartoum, but thoroughly well known to the authorities as slave-hunters.

It was hardly credible that such dust should be thrown in the eyes of the Khedive, after the stringent orders he had given; but Egypt is celebrated for dust; the Soudan is little else but dust, therefore we must make some allowance for the blindness of the authorities. My eyes had evidently been filled with Khartoum dust, for it was only now upon my return from Tewfikeeyah that I discovered that which should have been made known to me upon my first arrival from Cairo to command the expedition. It was the trader and lessee, Achmet Sheik Agad, who had applied to Mr. Higginbotham as a mediator, and he stated clearly a case of great hardship. He had paid annually about 3000L for the sole right of trading. Thus, if he paid rent for a monopoly of the ivory, and the government then started as traders in ivory in the country leased to him, he would be in the same position as a man who rented a cow at a fixed sum per week, but the owner, nevertheless, insisted upon a right to her milk.

It would be a hard case upon the traders at any rate, even should they trade with equal rights to the government.

There was no actual bartering of merchandise for ivory, neither was any merchandise shipped from Khartoum, except that required as clothing for the people who belonged to the slave-hunters' companies. If an honest, legitimate trade were commenced by the government, and law and order thoroughly established, it would become impossible for the slave hunters to exist in the White Nile districts. Their so-called trade consisted in harrying one country to procure cattle and slaves, which they exchanged for ivory in other districts. If a government were established, such razzias must cease at once--and the Khartoum traders would be without an occupation.

I had originally proposed that the districts of the White Nile south of latitude 14 degrees N. should be placed under my command; this, for some unexplained reason, was reduced to latitude 5 degrees N., thus leaving the whole navigable river free from Gondokoro to Khartoum, unless I should assume the responsibility of liberating slaves and seizing the slavers wherever I might find them. This power I at once assumed and exercised, although I purposely avoided landing and visiting the slave-hunters' stations that were not within my jurisdiction. I regarded the river as we regard the high seas.

It was clearly contrary to all ideas of equity that the government should purchase ivory in countries that had been leased to the traders. I was therefore compelled to investigate the matter with the assistance of Djiaffer Pacha, who had made the contract in the name of the government. It was then explained that the entire White Nile was rented by the traders. The government had assumed the right and monopoly of the river, and in fact of any part of Africa that could be reached, south of Khartoum; thus no trader was permitted to establish himself, or even to start from Khartoum for the interior, until he should have obtained a lease from the government. If Central Africa had been already annexed, and the Egyptian government had been established throughout the country, I should not have complained; but I now found that my mission from the Khedive placed me within "a house divided against itself." I was to annex a country that was already leased out by the government.

My task was to suppress the slave trade, when the Khartoum authorities well knew that their tenants were slave-hunters; to establish legitimate commerce where the monopoly of trade had already been leased to traders; and to build up a government upon sound and just principles, that must of necessity ruin the slave-hunting and ivory-collecting parties of Khartoum.

It was easy to conceive that my mission was regarded as fatal to the interests of the Soudan. Although the actual wording of the contracts was pure, and the lessees bound themselves to abstain from slave-hunting, and to behave in a becoming manner, it was thoroughly understood that they were simply to pay a good round sum per annum punctually, and that no questions would be asked. There were no authorities of the government in those distant countries, neither consular agents to send home unpleasant reports; thus, when fairly away from all restraint, the traders could act as they pleased. It appears hardly credible that although the wording of the contracts was almost holy, no examination of the vessels was made before their departure from Khartoum. Had the Soudan government been sincere in a determination to lease out the White Nile for the purpose of benefiting the country by the establishment of legitimate commerce, surely the authorities would have convinced themselves that the traders' vessels contained cargoes of suitable merchandise, instead of being loaded with ammunition, and manned by bands of armed pirates.

If the owner of a pack of wolves were to send them on a commission to gather wool from a flock of sheep, with the simple protection of such parting advice as "Begone, good wolves, behave yourselves like lambs, and do not hurt the mutton!" the proprietor of the pack would be held responsible for the acts of his wolves. This was the situation in the Soudan. The entire country was leased out to piratical slave-hunters, under the name of traders, by the Khartoum government; and although the rent, in the shape of large sums of money, had been received for years into the treasury of the Soudan, my expedition was to explode like a shell among the traders, and would at once annihilate the trade. I now understood the reason for the alteration in my proposed territorial limit from the 14 degrees N. lat. to the 5 degrees. Khartoum is in lat. 15 degrees 35' N. Gondokoro is N. lat. 4 degrees 54', thus, if my jurisdiction should be reduced to the south of Gondokoro, the usual traffic of the White Nile might continue in the north during my absence in the south, and the original contracts would be undisturbed.

It is a duty that I owe to the Khedive of Egypt to explain these details. It would at first sight appear that the expedition to suppress the slave-trade was merely a theatrical announcement to court the sympathy of Europe, but which, in reality, had no solidity. I am perfectly convinced that the Khedive was thoroughly sincere in his declared purpose of suppressing the slave-trade, not only as a humanitarian, but as an enlightened man of the world, who knew, from the example of the great Powers of Europe, that the time had arrived when civilization demanded the extinction of