Elements of Military Art and Science, Henry Wager Halleck [top young adult novels txt] 📗

As a general rule, troops marching for many days in succession will move at the rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day. In forced marches, or in pursuit of a flying enemy, they will average from twenty to twenty-five miles per day. And for only two or three days in succession, with favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be calculated on. Marches beyond this are unusual, and, when they do occur, are the result of extraordinary circumstances.

Convoy.—A convoy consists of provisions, military munitions, &c., sent from one point to another, under the charge of a detachment of troops, called an escort. When regular dépôts and magazines are established, with proper relations to the line of operations, convoys requiring particular escorts are seldom necessary, because the position of the army will cover the space over which the magazines are to be moved. But in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, or in a country whose inhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary, precautions of this kind should always be resorted to.

The size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature of the country and the imminence of the danger. The ground to be passed over should be previously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken up only after the most satisfactory reports. When once put in motion, the convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flankers, to give warning to the escort of the approach of the enemy. Small parties of cavalry are detached on all sides, but particularly in advance. The main body of the escort is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy while the other sides are guarded by subdivisions. In case of an attack by a large party, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensive field-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in this way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the convoy.

As a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by small successive convoys than by periodical and large ones. Even should some of the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt; but a large periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise of the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will venture much to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an important military operation. If the Prussian army, when besieging Olmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not have forced them to raise the siege and to retreat.

Napoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in position will require the daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of provisions.

The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is always very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on this point. Indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail, amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able and active enemy in pursuit. In such a case, the loss of the provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most terrible disasters. We will allude to two examples of this kind: the retreat of the English from Spain in 1809, and that of the French from Russia in 1812.

When Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his army from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores to be taken to the rear, and every possible arrangement to be made for their preservation and for the regular supplies of the army. But the want of discipline in his troops, and more especially the want of a proper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means for facilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's pursuit, prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. Much suffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops; a large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, and even the treasure of his army, amounting to some 200,000 dollars, was abandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting officer.

In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so admirably combined, that from Mentz to Moscow not a single estafette or convoy, it is said, was carried off in this campaign; nor was there a day passed without his receiving intelligence from France. When the retreat was begun, (after the burning of Moscow,) he had six lines of magazines in his rear; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' march from Moscow; those of the 2d line at Minsk and Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk; those of the 3d line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok; those of the 4th line at Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the 5th line at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Posen; those of the 6th line at Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. When the army left Moscow it carried with it provisions sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammunition, each piece of artillery being supplied with three hundred and fifty rounds; but the premature cold weather destroyed thirty thousand horses in less than three days, thus leaving the trains without the means of transportation or suitable escorts for their protection: the horrible sufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description.

The officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of great prudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very much depends upon the safe and timely arrival of the provisions and military stores which he may have in charge.

Castrametation.—Castrametation is, strictly speaking, the art of laying out and disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp of an army. The term is sometimes more extensively used to include all the means for lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and all the arrangements for cooking, &c., either in the field or in winter quarters. A camp, whether composed of tents or barracks, or merely places assigned for bivouacking, must be divided and arranged in such a way that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to be drawn up in order of battle; so that, on any sudden alarm, the troops can pass from it promptly, and form their line of battle without confusion. Suitable places must also be assigned for cooking, for baggage, and for provisions, military stores, and ammunitions.

The extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character of the ground and the means of defence, but as a general rule, it should never exceed the position which the army would occupy in the line of battle. The different arms should be encamped in the same order as that of battle; this order of course depending on the nature of the battle-ground. A corps d'armée is composed of battalions of infantry, squadrons of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and companies of engineer troops, and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of these elements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions.

The choice of ground for a camp must be governed, 1st, by the general rules respecting military positions, and, 2d, by other rules peculiar to themselves, for they may be variously arranged in a manner more or less suitable on the same position.

That the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and highest consideration.

It should also be commodious and dry: moist ground in the vicinity of swamps and stagnant waters, would endanger the health of the army: for the same reason it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshy by heavy rains, and the melting of snow.

The proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable streams, is important for furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life.

The proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood, materials for huts, for repairs of military equipments, for works of defence, &c.

Good water within a convenient distance, is also an essential element in the choice of ground for a camp; without this the soldiers' health is soon undermined. The proximity of running streams is also important for the purposes of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the filth of the camp.

The camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by any point within long cannon range; if bordering on a river or smaller stream, there should be space enough between them to form in order of battle; the communications in rear should offer the means of retreating in case of necessity, but should not afford facilities to the enemy to make his attack on that side.

If the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time, as for cantonments or winter-quarters, the greater must be the care in selecting its position and in the arrangement for the health and comfort of the soldiers. In the latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the engineer's art should always be called in play to form intrenchments, lines of abattis, inundations, &c., to render the position as difficult of access to the enemy as possible.

A bivouac is the most simple kind of camp. It consists merely of lines of fires, and huts for the officers and soldiers. These huts may be made of straw, of wood obtained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and other buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them of their timbers, doors, floors, &c. Troops may be kept in bivouac for a few days, when in the vicinity of the enemy, but the exposure of the soldier in ordinary bivouacs, especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous climate, is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover leads to much distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied, in the destruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life. If the position is to be occupied for any length of time, the huts should be arranged like tents, according to a regular system, and made comfortable for the troops. Such should always be the system adopted in camps of practice or manœuvre, in cantonments, winter-quarters, or in intrenched positions.

We have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents. These may do very well under the ordinary circumstances; but in the active operations of a campaign they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly encumbering the baggage-trains. It would seem preferable to resort to bivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night, and to construct a regular system of huts where a position is to be occupied for any length of time. This may be regarded as a general rule, but in certain countries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable.

Napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if not decisive of the question: "Tents," says he, "are not wholesome. It is better for the soldier to bivouac, because he can sleep with his feet towards the fire; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boards or a little straw. The ground upon which he lies will be rapidly dried in the vicinity of the fire. Tents are necessary for the superior officers, who have occasion to read and consult maps, and who ought to be ordered never to sleep in a house—a fatal abuse, which has given rise to so many disasters. All the European nations have so far followed the example of the French as to discard their tents; and if they be still used in camps of mere parade, it is because they are economical, sparing woods, thatched roofs, and villages. The shade of a tree, against the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against the rain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the tents for each battalion would load five horses, who would be much better employed in carrying provisions. Tents are a subject of observation for the enemies' spies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your numbers, and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occurs every