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age, "which neglects its army, under whatever pretext, is a government culpable in the eyes of posterity, for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and its country, instead of laying the foundation for its glory."

One of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, that the history of our relations with the Indian tribes from the beginning to the present hour, is one continued proof of the necessity of maintaining an efficient military force in time of peace, and that the treatment we received for a long series of years from European powers, was a most humiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dispense with these means of defence.

"Twice," says he, "we were compelled to maintain, by open war, our quarrel with the principal aggressors. After many years of forbearance and negotiation, our claims in other cases were at length amicably settled; but in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not without much delay and imminent hazard of war that the execution of the treaty was finally enforced. No one acquainted with these portions of our history, can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of the wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our assailants of the scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force."

"If," said Mr. Calhoun, "disregarding the sound dictates of reason and experience, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities."

These remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military establishment, in 1821, below the standard of thirteen thousand. Nevertheless, the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; and we were soon made to feel the consequences. It is stated, in a report of high authority, that if there had been two regiments available near St. Louis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk would have been easily avoided; and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage warfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly seven years would also have been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved the country, if two regiments had been available at the beginning of that conflict.[12]

[12]

We may now add to these remarks, that if our government had occupied the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with a well-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with Mexico might have been avoided; but to push forward upon Matamoras a small force of only two thousand, in the very face of a large Mexican army was holding out to them the strongest inducements to attack us. The temporary economy of a few thousands in reducing our military establishment to a mere handful of men, again results in a necessary expenditure of many millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of human life.

We must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates of reason or experience, maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and naval force, capable of being greatly expanded, in the event of danger, by the addition of new troops.

Much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy by the addition of new forces. The strength thus acquired is sometimes in even a far greater ratio than the increase of numbers. But it must be remembered that these new elements are, of themselves, far inferior to the old ones in discipline, steady courage, and perseverance. No general can rely on the accuracy of their movements in the operations of a campaign, and they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the critical moment on the field of battle. The same holds true with respect to sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war. There is this difference, however: an army usually obtains its recruits from men totally unacquainted with military life, while a navy, in case of sudden increase, is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with professional sailors, who, though unacquainted with the use of artillery, &c., on ship-board, are familiar with all the other duties of sea life, and not unused to discipline. Moreover, raw seamen and marines, from being under the immediate eye of their officers in time of action, and without the possibility of escape, fight much better than troops of the same character on land. If years are requisite to make a good sailor, surely an equal length of time is necessary to perfect the soldier; and no less skill, practice, and professional study are required for the proper direction of armies than for the management of fleets.

But some have said that even these skeletons of military and naval forces are entirely superfluous, and that a brave and patriotic people will make as good a defence against invasion as the most disciplined and experienced. Such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress, and some have even attempted to confirm them by historical examples.

There are instances, it is true, where disorganized and frantic masses, animated by patriotic enthusiasm, have gained the most brilliant victories. Here, however, extraordinary circumstances supplied the place of order, and produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwise would have been very unequal; but in almost every instance of this kind, the loss of the undisciplined army has been unnecessarily great, human life being substituted for skill and order. But victory, even with such a drawback, cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and disorderly forces. If the captain and crew of a steamship knew nothing of navigation, and had never been at sea, and the engineer was totally unacquainted with his profession, could we expect the ship to cross the Atlantic in safety, and reach her destined port? Would we trust our lives and the honor of our country to their care? Would we not say to them, "First make yourselves acquainted with the principles of your profession, the use of the compass, and the means of determining whether you direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor?" War is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. Its principles constitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences; and the general who understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses the means of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success.

History furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying upon undisciplined forces in the open field. Almost every page of Napier's classic History of the Peninsular War contains striking examples of the useless waste of human life and property by the Spanish militia; while, with one quarter as many regulars, at a small fractional part of the actual expense, the French might have been expelled at the outset, or have been driven, at any time afterwards, from the Peninsula.

At the beginning of the French Revolution the regular army was abolished, and the citizen-soldiery, who were established on the 14th of July, 1789, relied on exclusively for the national defence. "But these three millions of national guards," says Jomini, "though good supporters of the decrees of the assembly, were nevertheless useless for reinforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and utterly incapable of defending their own firesides." Yet no one can question their individual bravery and patriotism; for, when reorganized, disciplined, and properly directed, they put to flight the best troops in Europe. At the first outbreak of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, upholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, rushed forth against the maddened hordes of French democracy. The popular power, springing upward by its own elasticity when the weight of political oppression was removed, soon became too wild and reckless to establish itself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own protection. If the attacks of the enervated enemies of France were weak, so also were her own efforts feeble to resist these attacks. The republican armies repelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke of Brunswick; but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation, system, and skill; enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline; robbery produced military stores; and the dead bodies of her citizens formed épaulements against the enemy. Yet this was but the strength of weakness; the aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government; and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away before the combined opposition of Europe, when the great genius of Napoleon, with a strong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and binding them together into one consolidated mass, made France victorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire.

No people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic patriotism than the Americans during the war of our own Revolution. And yet our army received, even at that time, but little support from irregular and militia forces in the open field. Washington's opinions on this subject furnish so striking a contrast to the congressional speeches of modern political demagogues, who, with boastful swaggers, would fain persuade us that we require no organization or discipline to meet the veteran troops of Europe in the open field, and who would hurry us, without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers of the world—so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these men and the letters and reports of Washington, that it may be well for the cool and dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his memory by reference to the writings of Washington. The following brief extracts are from his letters to the President of Congress, December, 1776:

"The saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common course of events, would amply support a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. In my opinion, if any dependence is placed on the militia another year, Congress will be deceived. When danger is a little removed from them they will not turn out at all. When it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects; while the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to follow their example. Daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information. Short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. The militia come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last, at a critical moment."

These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, Savannah River, Camden, Guilford Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution; the great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its military results; the refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara and secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern militia from the field of Bladensburg.

But there is another side to this picture. If our militia have frequently failed to maintain their ground when drawn up in the open field, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara, Plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in connection with fortifications.

These examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value of a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, and ought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of defence as utterly

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