The Seventh Manchesters, S. J. Wilson [most important books to read TXT] 📗

In view of this,

therefore, it was necessary to crowd in rapid training in attack on this

principle, so that each man should be well acquainted with his function.

After the battle surplus had been eliminated the company commanders were

as follows:—“A” company, Capt. Nelson, “B” Lt. S. J. Wilson, “C” Capt.

Allen, M.C., and “D” Lieut. Gresty, M.C. Lt.-Col. Manger commanded the

battalion, while Capt. Creagh had returned and was Adjutant. Two days

before the attack Capt. Nelson went into hospital with dysentery which

had frequently recurred in a violent form during the preceding weeks. A

slight readjustment was thus demanded amongst the officers to give

every company a fair share of leadership and Lieut. Hammond was sent to

command “A” company.

 

Briefly the plan of attack was as follows. The divisional frontage was

covered by the 125th brigade on the right and the 127th brigade on the

left, with the remaining brigade in support. As far as the 127th brigade

was concerned, the attack was to be accomplished in five bounds. The

first objective, along the whole of the brigade front, was the work of

the 5th Manchesters, and consisted in capturing the German front line

which ran chiefly along Chapel Wood Switch. The next four objectives,

called for convenience the Red, Brown, Yellow and Blue Lines, were to

engage the attention of the 7th on the right and the 6th on the left of

the brigade front, and were to be taken by the leap-frog method by

companies. Thus, in the 7th, “C” company’s objective was the Red Line,

“A” the Brown, “D” the Yellow, and “B” the Blue Line. These lines were

by no means parallel to one another, their shape being largely

controlled by the configuration of the ground and the German trenches.

It is also important to note that the Hindenburg system was being taken

in enfilade on this part of the front. Two or three great parallel

trenches ran along in the direction of the advance, and they were full

of deep dug-outs capable of holding thousands of men. Our main security

lay in the fact that a simultaneous attack was taking place along a

widely extended front, and the enemy would not be able to fill these

dug-outs with counter-attacking troops drawn from other fronts.

 

[Illustration: ATTACK ON THE HINDENBURG LINE, SEPT. 27th, 1918.]

 

Space does not allow of a detailed description of the orders for attack,

but it can easily be imagined that they were pretty considerable in view

of the heavy work to be accomplished by the artillery. As this portion

of the German line was known to be powerfully defended by large numbers

of troops, extensive trench systems, dug-outs and wire, it was part of

the strategy of Foch to concentrate artillery here, and records showed

that on the two days September 27th and 28th shells were consumed at an

unprecedented rate. In our sector alone, the programme comprised the

capturing of 3,500 yards in depth of the most strongly defended ground

in France, including the vicinities of the famous Highland and Welsh

Ridges of terrible memory in the Battle of Cambrai. Every yard of this

ground was subjected to a continuous creeping shrapnel barrage lasting

for almost three hours, while moving steadily ahead of this was a

terrific bombardment by all calibres from 4.5 howitzers upwards upon the

enemy’s main trenches and supposed defence points. The brigade frontage,

measured north to south, was 1,250 yards, and this was equally divided

between the 6th and 7th. As we were going over one company behind

another, each company was responsible for nearly 700 yards—a very large

front considering our depleted numbers. There is no doubt, as far as we

were concerned, the task looked formidably ambitious.

 

On the morning of Sept. 26th final operation orders were issued, and

that night we moved up to our assembly positions in a huge dug-out near

Femy Wood, capable of holding the whole battalion. It was slow work

moving along the canal and across the Trescault-Havrincourt road, and it

is not surprising that eventually the intervals between platoons closed

up and the four companies were strung out in one long line. The

confidence felt in the success of the operations, was evident by the

fact that the 6-inch howitzers were installed in front of the Trescault

road within 500 yards of the enemy. Whilst we were assembling there

were motor lorries on the road unloading stacks of ammunition for them!

By the time the battalion had been packed into the dug-out dawn was

swiftly approaching, which meant the commencement of the battle, for

Zero for the third army was 5.25 a.m. The VIth corps, the 62nd division

of which touched up with our left, were to have three hours’ fighting

before we commenced, and for this reason we welcomed the shelter of the

dug-out while it was in progress. The configuration of the ground was

responsible for the manner in which the battle was to grow along the

whole front. The advance of the 127th brigade was to take place along

the shoulder of a long hill running broadly east to west. North of this

high ground was a long valley stretching through Ribecourt towards

Marcoing. Another shoulder similar to but higher than ours flanked the

valley on the north, and it was this, together with the commanding

village of Flesquieres, that the VIth corps were to make good before our

attack commenced. Again, the 125th brigade, who were on our right, and

also on the higher part of the shoulder, were to open the 42nd

divisional assault half an hour ahead of ourselves.

 

About 8 o’clock “C” company led the way out of the dug-out and took up

their assault positions near the front line. At the appointed hour,

following behind the 5th, they moved forward to the attack, in the

formation which we had practised so frequently, and which was the most

suitable for the large frontage that had to be covered. All four

platoons were in line, and each platoon was divided into four sections,

the two rifle sections on the flanks, and the two L.G. sections in the

middle and echeloned to the rear. This was the artillery formation

useful for covering the ground previous to the actual assault, each

section moving in file (_i.e._, two ranks) well opened out. When close

to the enemy position the platoons extended and formed two lines, with a

L.G. in the centre of each line, and riflemen on the flanks. Every

Company went over in this formation, and strict orders were issued that

no man was to enter the enemy trenches for the purpose of covering the

ground, but to keep out in the open, otherwise great confusion would

arise, and officers would lose control of their men.

 

Misfortune greeted “C” company from the start. Capt. Allen, M.C. and

2nd-Lt. Ray were killed immediately, and casualties were soon very

heavy. It was evident the enemy was making the most of his superior

position and the clear sweep of ground. The remnants of the company

pushed on, however, and reached their objective. “A” company followed

and they also suffered severely from the moment they advanced out of

Ferny Wood. Then it was noticed that most of the machine gun fire was

from the right flank, and our men were being subjected to a terrible

enfilading fire as they moved across the open. All the officers became

casualties, Lt. Hammond wounded, 2nd-Lt. McAlmont wounded, 2nd-Lt. T.

Woods wounded, and 2nd-Lt. Carley, killed. The few men of the company,

now led by C.S.M. Joyce, reached the Red Line and joined “C” company,

which, Lt. Edge, M.C., having been hit, was now under the command of

2nd-Lt. Jones. It was impossible, with the small number of men,

scattered over a wide front, to continue the advance for the moment. “D”

company, moving up according to programme, were treated similarly to the

previous two companies and men began to drop long before they

anticipated meeting any resistance. Thus, before they had gone very far

2nd-Lt. Thrutchley and 2nd-Lt. Wright were wounded, which left Lt.

Gresty, M.C. and 2nd-Lt. Milne to carry on the leadership, a task which

they performed in fine style. They quickly arrived at the Red Line, and

then took cover for a short period. Soon after this, “B” company came

along, but on nearing the Red Line, they found many men of “D” turned

about firing rifles and L.G. towards their right rear. It was now

obvious that the ground to the right of us had not been cleared at all,

and the enemy was left free to work his will upon us from the higher

ground. By this time a tank had arrived and materially assisted us in

dealing with the problem. Gresty then decided to push on and his company

mounted the rising ground in front. From this point they unfortunately

swerved to the left, probably being influenced by a road which ran

diagonally across the front towards Ribecourt, but nothing could stop

their irresistible dash. As they crossed this road Milne, with a handful

of his platoon, added to our already considerable number of prisoners,

by capturing a large crowd of Huns.

 

With characteristic impetuosity, reminiscent of the La Signy Farm days,

Gresty and the men of “D” following up under the barrage, rushed across

the Brown Line and made for the Yellow Line. They were now only a small

gallant band but they were undaunted. Prisoners captured were told to go

down to the rear, which they did right gladly without an escort, so that

the assaulting party who now in formation and well-nigh in size, began

to resemble a Rugby football team, could preserve their strength. Two 77

m.m. guns lay in their path, and at their approach the Boche gunners

spiked them and made off, leaving them an easy prey to the 7th. After

this, Gresty decided that he was on his objective, as indeed he was, but

he was more or less in the 6th sector, and when he was quickly joined by

a company of the 6th he began to realise it. There was trouble on his

right, however, as well as from the front, and the small party of men

were disposed to defend the ground they had captured, a difficult enough

task in view of the fact that they had to find positions to face in two

or three different directions. Touch was obtained with the 62nd division

in Ribecourt, and it was found that the VIth corps had had great success

in their part of the battle, so that already the advance was proceeding

towards Marcoing.

 

“B” company’s effort was really a separate story. As soon as “D” company

had disappeared over the crest in front of the Red Line they continued

the advance. 2nd-Lt. Pearson was on the extreme right and he had been

instructed to keep touch with the L.F’s. From the beginning, however, he

had not seen them, and his platoon was moving along “in the air,” and

naturally meeting with strong resistance. They had not expected to meet

the enemy for another 1,500 yards if events had worked out “according to

plan,” but they were now fighting them at every step. Gallant deeds were

performed in dealing with Hun machine guns, and many prisoners were

taken, but greatest of all were the achievements of Pte. Jack White.

Single-handed he rushed a machine gun post, bayonetted the man on the

gun and pursued the remainder of the team with fire, inflicting

casualties. Later on he again rushed forward alone to a strongly held

trench, but was killed practically on the parapet. His name was

recommended for a V.C., but unfortunately nothing more was heard of it.

In view of the heavy casualties, Lt. Wilson went across to Pearson and

told him to close his platoon slightly towards the left, in order to

keep