History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

>became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could

endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw

themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if

they could, by commencing the present war. And though the

Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds on the fact of the breach

of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians, yet they sent to

Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be well with them if

they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him the answer

that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be

theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with them, whether

invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies

again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war. After

the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress had

been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing the

Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular the

Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed the cities

in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that it

might come too late to save Potidaea; they were present also on this

occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech:

 

“Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having

failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but

have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for

supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private

interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the

common welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by

all in other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings

with the Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against

them. The states more inland and out of the highway of communication

should understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers,

the result will be to injure the transit of their produce for

exportation and the reception in exchange of their imports from the

sea; and they must not be careless judges of what is now said, as if

it had nothing to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice

of the powers on the coast will one day be followed by the extension

of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own

interests are deeply involved in this discussion. For these reasons

they should not hesitate to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain

quiet, while they are not injured, brave men abandon peace for war

when they are injured, returning to an understanding on a favourable

opportunity: in fact, they are neither intoxicated by their success in

war, nor disposed to take an injury for the sake of the delightful

tranquillity of peace. Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights

is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of

repose to which you cling; while to conceive extravagant pretensions

from success in war is to forget how hollow is the confidence by which

you are elated. For if many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through

the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well

laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with

which we form our schemes is never completely justified in their

execution; speculation is carried on in safety, but, when it comes

to action, fear causes failure.

 

“To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is

under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint;

and after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We

have many reasons to expect success—first, superiority in numbers

and in military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying

obedience in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they

possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent

resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from

these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of

higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national;

while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength

lies more in men than in money. A single defeat at sea is in all

likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will

be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as

soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need scarcely

ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages

that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their

superiority in science must be removed by our practice. The money

required for these objects shall be provided by our contributions:

nothing indeed could be more monstrous than the suggestion that, while

their allies never tire of contributing for their own servitude, we

should refuse to spend for vengeance and self-preservation the

treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit to Athenian rapacity

and see employed for our own ruin.

 

“We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of

their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues,

which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified

positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be

foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon

definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances

to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the

struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he

who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also

reflect that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory

between rival neighbours, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy

in Athens that is a match for our whole coalition, and more than a

match for any of its members; so that unless as a body and as

individual nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous

stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and in detail.

That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have

no other end than slavery pure and simple; a word which Peloponnese

cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see

so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either

that we were justly so used, or that we put up with it from cowardice,

and were proving degenerate sons in not even securing for ourselves

the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and in allowing the

establishment in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual states

we think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do not know how

this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want

of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that

you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so

fatal in so many instances—a feeling which from the numbers that it

has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible.

 

“There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past

further than may be of service to the present. For the future we

must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling

our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of

labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have

a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that

what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly

advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and

promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the

struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to

break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to

be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been

outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by

aggression.

 

“Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it,

will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend

in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest

is the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay

not, therefore, to assist Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians,

which is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the

freedom of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when

waiting can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it

comes to be known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect

ourselves, like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not,

fellow allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the

wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its

immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it

will be succeeded. Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to

refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding

danger. We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established

in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a programme

of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us

then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and

freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved.”

 

Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having

now heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied

states present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted

for war. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at

once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the

means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and

that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time

occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed

before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun.

 

This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged

with complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as

possible, in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first

Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the

curse of the goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former

generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at

the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had

married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of

Megara. Now this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by

the god to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of

Zeus. Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his

friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he

seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant,

thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an

occasion appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the

grand festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a

question which he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer

to solve. For the Athenians also have a festival which is called the

grand festival of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz. , the Diasia. It is

celebrated outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real

victims but a number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country.

However, fancying he