A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

free. We do not seem to be so and seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that

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[Footnote 1: Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 352.]

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is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Ka@tha Upani@sad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas, the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with him, said, "O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget his anger against me." This being granted Naciketas asked the second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, "There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death of man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said, "It was inquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not compel me to this." Naciketas said, "Even by the gods was it inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said, "Choose sons and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of cattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wide expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest. Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure; those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments; the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death." Naciketas replied, "All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said." Yama said, "One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire, hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is

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what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good), are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happiness is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die; he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is not slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle, greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals its own nature [Footnote ref 1]." So long as the Self identifies itself with its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps the fruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principle of the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to have desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents of the gross body (annamaya ko@sa), the vital functions (prâ@namaya ko@sa) of life, the will and desire (manomaya) and the thoughts and ideas (vijñânamaya), and so long as he keeps himself in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he is one with his experience and there is no change and no movement. What this state is cannot be explained by the use of concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not

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[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.]

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whatever one knows as this and this (neti neti). In this infinite and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no meum and tuum. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, Maitreyî, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge" (B@rh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness.

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CHAPTER IV GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?

It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came one after another and offered their independent speculations on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon the influence of one school upon another or upon the general change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy. Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these were formulated just after the earliest Upani@sads had been composed or arranged.

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant half-sentences (sûtras) which did not elaborate the subject in detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed difficult to guess from the sûtras the extent of their significance, or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were originally intended by them. The sûtras of the Vedânta system, known as the S'ârîraka-sûtras or Brahma-sûtras of Bâdarâya@na for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high esteem and respect in which these writers of the sûtras were held by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to

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offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an example, the Nyâya system of philosophy consisting of a number of half-sentences or sûtras is attributed to Gautama, also called Ak@sapâda. The earliest commentary on these sûtras, called the Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya, was written by Vâtsyâyana. This work was sharply criticized by the Buddhist Di@nnâga, and to answer these criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary called the Bhâ@syavâttika [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the original force of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of the school. At this Vâcaspati Mis'ra wrote a commentary called Vârttika-tâtparya@tîkâ on this second commentary, where he tried to refute all objections against the Nyâya system made by other rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, called Nyâya-tâtparya@tîkâ, had another commentary called Nyâya-tâtparya@tîkâ-paris'uddhi written by the great Udayana. This commentary had another commentary called Nyâya-nibandha-prakâs'a written by Varddhamâna the son of the illustrious Ga@nges'a. This again had another commentary called Varddha-mânendu upon it by Padmanâbha Mis'ra, and this again had another named Nyâya-tâtparyama@n@dana by S'a@nkara Mis'ra. The names of Vâtsyâyana, Vâcaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great, but even they contented themselves by writing commentaries on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any

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[Footnote 1: I have preferred to spell Di@nnâga after Vâcaspati's Tâtparyatîkâ (p. I) and not Dignnâga as it is generally spelt.]

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original system. Even S'a@nkara, probably the greatest man of India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the Brahma-sûtras, the Upani@sads, and the Bhagavadgîtâ.

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared. Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was originally formulated in the sûtras had probably but few problems to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems in which the original views were more or less involved but to which no attention had been given before.

The contributions of the successive commentators served to make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system in the sûtras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if we take it along with its developments down to the beginning of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is necessity that each system should be studied and interpreted in all the growth it has acquired through the