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explaining why the four elements are called mahâbhûtas, Buddhagho@sa says: "Just as a magician (mâyâkâra) makes the water which is not hard appear as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold; just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves blue make themselves appear as blue (nîlam upâdâ rûpam), not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red or white (odâtam upâdârûpam), so on account of their similarity to the appearances created by the magician they are called mahâbhûta [Footnote ref 4]."

In the Sa@myutta Nikâya we find that the Buddha says, "O
Bhikkhus it is called rûpam because it manifests (rûpyati); how

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[Footnote 1: Sa@myutta Nikâya, III. 86, etc.]

[Footnote 2: Abhidhammatthasangaha, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]

[Footnote 3: Dhammasa@nga@ni, pp. 124-179.]

[Footnote 4: Atthasâlinî, p. 299.]

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does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rûpa [Footnote ref 1]."

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand what is meant by rûpa, I think we find that that which manifested itself to the senses and organs was called rûpa. No distinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations were "rûpa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sads nor in the Sâ@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and were therefore called rûpa; the forms of affection that appeared were also called rûpa; many other mental states or features which appeared with them were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 2]. The âyatanas or the senses were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 3]. The mahâbhûtas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they together with all that appeared in association with them were called rûpa and formed the rûpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials, sense-data, senses and sensations).

In Sa@myutta Nikâya (III. 101) it is said that "the four mahâbhûtas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the rûpakkhandha (rûpakkhandhassa paññâpanâya). Contact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of feelings (vedanâ); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the saññâkkhandha; sense-contact is also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sa@nkhârakkhandha. But nâmarûpa is the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the viññânakkhandha." Thus not only feelings arise on account of the sense-contact but saññâ and sa@nkhâra also arise therefrom. Saññâ is that where specific knowing or

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[Footnote 1: Sa@myutta Nikâya, III. 86.]

[Footnote 2: Khandhayamaka.]

[Footnote 3: Dhammasanga@ni, p. 124 ff.]

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conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.

Mrs. Rhys Davids writing on saññâ says: "In editing the second book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classification distinguishing between saññâ as cognitive assimilation on occasion of sense, and saññâ as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition (patigha-saññâ). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception on occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or name (adhivachânâ-saññâ) and is exercised by the sensus communis (mano), when e.g. 'one is seated…and asks another who is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through his speech.' Thus there are two stages of saññâ-consciousness, 1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they are by naming [Footnote ref 1]."

About sa@nkhâra we read in Sa@myutta Nikâya (III. 87) that it is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises (abhisa@nkharonti), it is that which conglomerated rûpa as rûpa, conglomerated saññâ as saññâ, sa@nkhâra as sa@nkhâra and consciousness (viññâna) as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises the conglomerated (sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti). It is thus a synthetic function which synthesises the passive rûpa, saññâ, sa@nkhâra and viññâna elements. The fact that we hear of 52 sa@nkhâra states and also that the sa@nkhâra exercises its synthetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show that probably the word sa@nkhâra is used in two senses, as mental states and as synthetic activity.

Viññâna or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa, as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage at which the intellectual process started and also the final resulting consciousness.

Buddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology says that "consciousness(citta)first comes into touch (phassa) with its object (âramma@na) and thereafter feeling, conception (saññâ) and volition (cetanâ) come in. This contact is like the pillars of a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it (dabbasambhârasadisâ). But it should not be thought that contact

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[Footnote 1: Buddhist Psychology, pp. 49, 50.]

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is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole consciousness (ekacittasmi@m) it cannot be said that this comes first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association with feeling (vedanâ), conceiving (saññâ) or volition (cetanâ); it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its function; or it has impact as its essential property in the sense of attainment, owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. For it is said in the Commentary:—"contact in the four planes of existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.' But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the function of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of the union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its effect is feeling (vedanâ); though it is generated by the objects it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing (anubhava) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out

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[Footnote 1: Atthasâlinî, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]

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whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or experience is its function [Footnote ref 1]."

The special feature of saññâ is said to be the recognizing (paccabhiññâ) by means of a sign (abhiññânena). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality (of aspects)—sabbasa@ngahikavasena. The work of volition (cetanâ) is said to be coordination or binding together (abhisandahana). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said 'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2]." It seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkhâra was separately designated as cetanâ (volition).

"When one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the pollen, so one could not say that the rûpa was 'I' or that the vedanâ was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I.' There is nowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'."

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[Footnote 1: Atthasâlinî, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.]

[Footnote 3: Samyutta Nikâya, III. 130.]

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Avijjâ and Âsava.

As to the question how the avijjâ (ignorance) first started there can be no answer, for we could never say that either ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning [Footnote ref 1]. Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by certain others. This mutual determination can only take place in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into being of the âsavas or depravities that the avijjâ came into being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (âsava) the avijjâ was destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. These âsavas are classified in the Dhammasa@nga@ni as kâmâsava, bhavâsava, di@t@thâsava and avijjâsava. Kâmâsava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavâsava means desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; di@t@thâsava means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are different; avijjâsava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its extinction and its means of extinction. Dhammasa@nga@ni adds four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior and posterior together, and their mutual dependence [Footnote ref 3]. Kâmâsava and bhavâsava can as Buddhagho@sa says be counted as one, for they are both but depravities due to attachment [Footnote ref 4].

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[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap.
XVII.), p. 175.]

[Footnote 2: M. N. I.p. 54. Childers translates "âsava" as "depravities" and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "âsava" in Skr. means "old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and the meaning that he gives to it is "cira pârivâsika@t@thena" (on account of its being stored up for a long time

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