A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space (parîcchinnâkâsa). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes

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[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga, pp. 295-314.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 314-315.]

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with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (pathamam jhânam) the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without any quivering. This state is called vicâra (steadily moving). The first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa's Visuddhimagga to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with a buoyant exaltation (pîti) and a steady inward bliss called sukha [Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this first jhâna roots out five ties of avijjâ, kamacchando (dallying with desires), vyâpâdo (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikicchâ (doubt). The five elements of which this jhâna is constituted are vitakka, vicâra, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).

When the sage masters the first jhâna he finds it defective and wants to enter into the second meditation (dutiyam jhânam), where there is neither any vitakka nor vicâra of the first jhâna, but the mind is in one unruffled state (ekodibhâvam). It is a much steadier state and does not possess the movement which characterized the vitakka and the vicâra stages of the first jhâna and is therefore a very placid state (vitakka-vicârakkhobha-virahe@na ativiya acalatâ suppasannatâ ca). It is however associated with pîti, sukha and ekaggatâ as the first jhâna was.

When the second jhâna is mastered the sage becomes disinclined towards the enjoyment of the pîti of that stage and becomes indifferent to them (upekkhako). A sage in this stage sees the objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all the âsavas of the sage become loosened (khî@nâsava). The enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the

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[Footnote 1: Where there is pîti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not necessarily be pîti. Vîsuddhimagga, p. 145.]

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mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes to turn back to the enjoyment of pîti again. The two characteristics of this jhâna are sukha and ekaggatâ. It should however be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here, the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it (atimadhhurasukhe sukhapâramippatte pi tatiyajjhâne upekkhako, na tattha sukhâbhisangena âka@d@dhiyati) [Footnote ref 1]. The earth ball (pa@thavî) is however still the object of the jhâna.

In the fourth or the last jhâna both the sukha (happiness) and the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by supreme and absolute indifference (upekkhâ) which was slowly growing in all the various stages of the jhânas. The characteristics of this jhâna are therefore upekkhâ and ekaggatâ. With the mastery of this jhâna comes final perfection and total extinction of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an arhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas, no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and sufferings—Nibbâna.

Kamma.

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha Nikâya also we read how Pâyâsi was trying to give his reasons in support of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3]." Some of his arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions we do not find at the time of the death of any person that his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

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[Footnote 1: Visuddhimagga, p. 163.]

[Footnote 2: Majjhima Nikâya, I.p. 296, and Visuddhimagga, pp. 167-168.]

[Footnote 3: Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 349; D. N. II. pp. 317 ff.]

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Pâyâsi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the Upani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In the Milinda Pañha, we find Nâgasena saying "it is through a difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree, some wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1]." We have seen in the third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by the Upani@sad sages.

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation. But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2]." Karma by itself without craving (ta@nhâ) is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Thus we read in the Mahâsatipa@t@thâna sutta, "even this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnote ref 3]." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it dwell [Footnote ref 4]." Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first ârya satya (noble truth).

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5]."

When the desire or craving (ta@nhâ) has once ceased the sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad

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[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 215.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 216-217.]

[Footnote 3: Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 340.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 341.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 341.]

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fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as Moggallâna did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of his desire [Footnote ref 1].

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and mind (kâyika, vâcika and mânasika). The root of this kamma is however volition (cetanâ) and the states associated with it [Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (vâcika) and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (mânasika) [Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into four classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity, (2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which contribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4].

Final extinction of sorrow (nibbâna) takes place as the natural result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallée Poussin has pointed out that in the Pâli texts Nibbâna has sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].

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[Footnote 1: See Kathâvatthu and Warren's Buddhism in Translations, pp, 221 ff.]

[Footnote 2: Atthasâlinî, p. 88.]

[Footnote 3: See Atthasâlinî, p. 90.]

[Footnote 4: See Atthasâlinî, p. 89.]

[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Valláe Poussin's article in the E. R.E. on
Nirvâ@na. See also Cullavagga, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's Psalms
of the early Buddhists, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; Dîgha,
II. 15; Udâna, VIII.; Sa@myutta, III. 109.]

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Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbâna in Pali Text Society Journal, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space (âkâsa) or consciousness (viññâna) attained to a state in which they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of Nibbâna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task to explain Nibbâna in terms of worldly experience, and there is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to think of a Tathâgata as existing eternally (s'âs'vata) or not-existing (as'âs'vata) or whether he is existing as well as not existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbâna is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.

Later Buddhistic writers like Nâgârjuna and Candrakîrtti took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There is no difference between the worldly stage (sa@msâra) and Nibbâna, for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during the sa@msâra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbâna.

Upani@sads and Buddhism.