Unconscious Memory(Fiscle Part-3), Samuel Butler [the best motivational books .txt] 📗
- Author: Samuel Butler
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Supposition Of Such An Elaborate Mental Mechanism--The Presence Of An
Unconscious Purpose Being Sufficient To Explain The Facts. The
Purpose Of The Bird, For Example, That Has Laid Her Eggs Is Constant,
And Consists In The Desire To Bring Her Young To Maturity. When The
Temperature Of The Air Is Insufficient To Effect This, She Sits Upon
Her Eggs, And Only Intermits Her Sittings In The Warmest Countries;
The Mammal, On The Other Hand, Attains The Fulfilment Of Its
Instinctive Purpose Without Any Co-Operation On Its Own Part. In
Warm Climates Many Birds Only Sit By Night, And Small Exotic Birds
That Have Built In Aviaries Kept At A High Temperature Sit Little
Upon Their Eggs Or Not At All. How Inconceivable Is The Supposition
Of A Mechanism That Impels The Bird To Sit As Soon As The Temperature
Falls Below A Certain Height! How Clear And Simple, On The Other
Hand, Is The View That There Is An Unconscious Purpose Constraining
The Volition Of The Bird To The Use Of The Fitting Means, Of Which
Process, However, Only The Last Link, That Is To Say, The Will
Immediately Preceding The Action Falls Within The Consciousness Of
The Bird!
In South Africa The Sparrow Surrounds Her Nest With Thorns As A
Defence Against Apes And Serpents. The Eggs Of The Cuckoo, As
Regards Size, Colour, And Marking, Invariably Resemble Those Of The
Birds In Whose Nests She Lays. Sylvia Ruja, For Example, Lays A
White Egg With Violet Spots; Sylvia Hippolais, A Red One With Black
Spots; Regulus Ignicapellus, A Cloudy Red; But The Cuckoo's Egg Is In
Each Case So Deceptive An Imitation Of Its Model, That It Can Hardly
Be Distinguished Except By The Structure Of Its Shell.
Huber Contrived That His Bees Should Be Unable To Build In Their
Usual Instinctive Manner, Beginning From Above And Working Downwards;
On This They Began Building From Below, And Again Horizontally. The
Outermost Cells That Spring From The Top Of The Hive Or Abut Against
Its Sides Are Not Hexagonal, But Pentagonal, So As To Gain In
Strength, Being Attached With One Base Instead Of Two Sides. In
Autumn Bees Lengthen Their Existing Honey Cells If These Are
Insufficient, But In The Ensuing Spring They Again Shorten Them In
Order To Get Greater Roadway Between The Combs. When The Full Combs
Have Become Too Heavy, They Strengthen The Walls Of The Uppermost Or
Bearing Cells By Thickening Them With Wax And Propolis. If Larvae Of
Working Bees Are Introduced Into The Cells Set Apart For Drones, The
Working Bees Will Cover These Cells With The Flat Lids Usual For This
Kind Of Larvae, And Not With The Round Ones That Are Proper For
Drones. In Autumn, As A General Rule, Bees Kill Their Drones, But
They Refrain From Doing This When They Have Lost Their Queen, And
Keep Them To Fertilise The Young Queen, Who Will Be Developed From
Larvae That Would Otherwise Have Become Working Bees. Huber Observed
That They Defend The Entrance Of Their Hive Against The Inroads Of
The Sphinx Moth By Means Of Skilful Constructions Made Of Wax And
Propolis. They Only Introduce Propolis When They Want It For The
Chapter 8 Pg 90Execution Of Repairs, Or For Some Other Special Purpose. Spiders And
Caterpillars Also Display Marvellous Dexterity In The Repair Of Their
Webs If They Have Been Damaged, And This Requires Powers Perfectly
Distinct From Those Requisite For The Construction Of A New One.
The Above Examples Might Be Multiplied Indefinitely, But They Are
Sufficient To Establish The Fact That Instincts Are Not Capacities
Rolled, As It Were, Off A Reel Mechanically, According To An
Invariable System, But That They Adapt Themselves Most Closely To The
Circumstances Of Each Case, And Are Capable Of Such Great
Modification And Variation That At Times They Almost Appear To Cease
To Be Instinctive.
Many Will, Indeed, Ascribe These Modifications To Conscious
Deliberation On The Part Of The Animals Themselves, And It Is
Impossible To Deny That In The Case Of The More Intellectually Gifted
Animals There May Be Such A Thing As A Combination Of Instinctive
Faculty And Conscious Reflection. I Think, However, The Examples
Already Cited Are Enough To Show That Often Where The Normal And The
Abnormal Action Springs From The Same Source, Without Any
Complication With Conscious Deliberation, They Are Either Both
Instinctive Or Both Deliberative. {99} Or Is That Which Prompts The
Bee To Build Hexagonal Prisms In The Middle Of Her Comb Something Of
An Actually Distinct Character From That Which Impels Her To Build
Pentagonal Ones At The Sides? Are There Two Separate Kinds Of Thing,
One Of Which Induces Birds Under Certain Circumstances To Sit Upon
Their Eggs, While Another Leads Them Under Certain Other
Circumstances To Refrain From Doing So? And Does This Hold Good Also
With Bees When They At One Time Kill Their Brethren Without Mercy And
At Another Grant Them Their Lives? Or With Birds When They Construct
The Kind Of Nest Peculiar To Their Race, And, Again, Any Special
Provision Which They May Think Fit Under Certain Circumstances To
Take? If It Is Once Granted That The Normal And The Abnormal
Manifestations Of Instinct--And They Are Often Incapable Of Being
Distinguished--Spring From A Single Source, Then The Objection That
The Modification Is Due To Conscious Knowledge Will Be Found To Be A
Suicidal One Later On, So Far As It Is Directed Against Instinct
Generally. It May Be Sufficient Here To Point Out, In Anticipation
Of Remarks That Will Be Found In Later Chapters, That Instinct And
The Power Of Organic Development Involve The Same Essential
Principle, Though Operating Under Different Circumstances--The Two
Melting Into One Another Without Any Definite Boundary Between Them.
Here, Then, We Have Conclusive Proof That Instinct Does Not Depend
Upon Organisation Of Body Or Brain, But That, More Truly, The
Organisation Is Due To The Nature And Manner Of The Instinct.
On The Other Hand, We Must Now Return To A Closer Consideration Of
The Conception Of A Psychical Mechanism. {100} And Here We Find That
This Mechanism, In Spite Of Its Explaining So Much, Is Itself So
Obscure That We Can Hardly Form Any Idea Concerning It. The Motive
Enters The Mind By Way Of A Conscious Sensual Impression; This Is The
First Link Of The Process; The Last Link {101} Appears As The
Conscious Motive Of An Action. Both, However, Are Entirely Unlike,
And Neither Has Anything To Do With Ordinary Motivation, Which
Chapter 8 Pg 91Consists Exclusively In The Desire That Springs From A Conception
Either Of Pleasure Or Dislike--The Former Prompting To The Attainment
Of Any Object, The Latter To Its Avoidance. In The Case Of Instinct,
Pleasure Is For The Most Part A Concomitant Phenomenon; But It Is Not
So Always, As We Have Already Seen, Inasmuch As The Consummation And
Highest Moral Development Of Instinct Displays Itself In Self-
Sacrifice.
The True Problem, However, Lies Far Deeper Than This. For Every
Conception Of A Pleasure Proves That We Have Experienced This
Pleasure Already. But It Follows From This, That When The Pleasure
Was First Felt There Must Have Been Will Present, In The
Gratification Of Which Will The Pleasure Consisted; The Question,
Therefore, Arises, Whence Did The Will Come Before The Pleasure That
Would Follow On Its Gratification Was Known, And Before Bodily Pain,
As, For Example, Of Hunger, Rendered Relief Imperative? Yet We May
See That Even Though An Animal Has Grown Up Apart From Any Others Of
Its Kind, It Will Yet None The Less Manifest The Instinctive Impulses
Of Its Race, Though Experience Can Have Taught It Nothing Whatever
Concerning The Pleasure That Will Ensue Upon Their Gratification. As
Regards Instinct, Therefore, There Must Be A Causal Connection
Between The Motivating Sensual Conception And The Will To Perform The
Instinctive Action, And The Pleasure Of The Subsequent Gratification
Has Nothing To Do With The Matter. We Know By The Experience Of Our
Own Instincts That This Causal Connection Does Not Lie Within Our
Consciousness; {102a} Therefore, If It Is To Be A Mechanism Of Any
Kind, It Can Only Be Either An Unconscious Mechanical Induction And
Metamorphosis Of The Vibrations Of The Conceived Motive Into The
Vibrations Of The Conscious Action In The Brain, Or An Unconscious
Spiritual Mechanism.
In The First Case, It Is Surely Strange That This Process Should Go
On Unconsciously, Though It Is So Powerful In Its Effects That The
Will Resulting From It Overpowers Every Other Consideration, Every
Other Kind Of Will, And That Vibrations Of This Kind, When Set Up In
The Brain, Become Always Consciously Perceived; Nor Is It Easy To
Conceive In What Way This Metamorphosis Can Take Place So That The
Constant Purpose Can Be Attained Under Varying Circumstances By The
Resulting Will In Modes That Vary With Variation Of The Special
Features Of Each Individual Case.
But If We Take The Other Alternative, And Suppose An Unconscious
Mental Mechanism, We Cannot Legitimately Conceive Of The Process
Going On In This As Other Than What Prevails In All Mental Mechanism,
Namely, Than As By Way Of Idea And Will. We Are, Therefore,
Compelled To Imagine A Causal Connection Between The Consciously
Recognised Motive And The Will To Do The Instinctive Action, Through
Unconscious Idea And Will; Nor Do I Know How This Connection Can Be
Conceived As Being Brought About More Simply Than Through A Conceived
And Willed Purpose. {102b} Arrived At This Point, However, We Have
Attained The Logical Mechanism Peculiar To And Inseparable From All
Mind, And Find Unconscious Purpose To Be An Indispensable Link In
Every Instinctive Action. With This, Therefore, The Conception Of A
Mental Mechanism, Dead And Predestined From Without, Has Disappeared,
Chapter 8 Pg 92And Has Become Transformed Into The Spiritual Life Inseparable From
Logic, So That We Have Reached The Sole Remaining Requirement For The
Conception Of An Actual Instinct, Which Proves To Be A Conscious
Willing Of The Means Towards An Unconsciously Willed Purpose. This
Conception Explains Clearly And Without Violence All The Problems
Which Instinct Presents To Us; Or More Truly, All That Was
Problematical About Instinct Disappears When Its True Nature Has Been
Thus Declared. If This Work Were Confined To The Consideration Of
Instinct Alone, The Conception Of An Unconscious Activity Of Mind
Might Excite Opposition, Inasmuch As It Is One With Which Our
Educated Public Is Not Yet Familiar; But In A Work Like The Present,
Every Chapter Of Which Adduces Fresh Facts In Support Of The
Existence Of Such An Activity And Of Its Remarkable Consequences, The
Novelty Of The Theory Should Be Taken No Farther Into Consideration.
Though I So Confidently Deny That Instinct Is
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