History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

be some son or relative of Phormio.

As the ships coasted along shore they ravaged the seaboard of Laconia;

after which Asopius sent most of the fleet home, and himself went on

with twelve vessels to Naupactus, and afterwards raising the whole

Acarnanian population made an expedition against Oeniadae, the fleet

sailing along the Achelous, while the army laid waste the country. The

inhabitants, however, showing no signs of submitting, he dismissed the

land forces and himself sailed to Leucas, and making a descent upon

Nericus was cut off during his retreat, and most of his troops with

him, by the people in those parts aided by some coastguards; after

which the Athenians sailed away, recovering their dead from the

Leucadians under truce.

 

Meanwhile the envoys of the Mitylenians sent out in the first ship

were told by the Lacedaemonians to come to Olympia, in order that

the rest of the allies might hear them and decide upon their matter,

and so they journeyed thither. It was the Olympiad in which the

Rhodian Dorieus gained his second victory, and the envoys having

been introduced to make their speech after the festival, spoke as

follows:

 

“Lacedaemonians and allies, the rule established among the

Hellenes is not unknown to us. Those who revolt in war and forsake

their former confederacy are favourably regarded by those who

receive them, in so far as they are of use to them, but otherwise

are thought less well of, through being considered traitors to their

former friends. Nor is this an unfair way of judging, where the rebels

and the power from whom they secede are at one in policy and sympathy,

and a match for each other in resources and power, and where no

reasonable ground exists for the rebellion. But with us and the

Athenians this was not the case; and no one need think the worse of us

for revolting from them in danger, after having been honoured by

them in time of peace.

 

“Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech,

especially as we are asking for alliance; because we know that there

can never be any solid friendship between individuals, or union

between communities that is worth the name, unless the parties be

persuaded of each other’s honesty, and be generally congenial the

one to the other; since from difference in feeling springs also

difference in conduct. Between ourselves and the Athenians alliance

began, when you withdrew from the Median War and they remained to

finish the business. But we did not become allies of the Athenians for

the subjugation of the Hellenes, but allies of the Hellenes for

their liberation from the Mede; and as long as the Athenians led us

fairly we followed them loyally; but when we saw them relax their

hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the subjection of the allies,

then our apprehensions began. Unable, however, to unite and defend

themselves, on account of the number of confederates that had votes,

all the allies were enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians, who

continued to send our contingents as independent and nominally free.

Trust in Athens as a leader, however, we could no longer feel, judging

by the examples already given; it being unlikely that she would reduce

our fellow confederates, and not do the same by us who were left, if

ever she had the power.

 

“Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith

in their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their

subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would

naturally chafe under this solitary instance of independence as

contrasted with the submission of the majority; particularly as they

daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute. Now the only sure

basis of an alliance is for each party to be equally afraid of the

other; he who would like to encroach is then deterred by the

reflection that he will not have odds in his favour. Again, if we were

left independent, it was only because they thought they saw their

way to empire more clearly by specious language and by the paths of

policy than by those of force. Not only were we useful as evidence

that powers who had votes, like themselves, would not, surely, join

them in their expeditions, against their will, without the party

attacked being in the wrong; but the same system also enabled them

to lead the stronger states against the weaker first, and so to

leave the former to the last, stripped of their natural allies, and

less capable of resistance. But if they had begun with us, while all

the states still had their resources under their own control, and

there was a centre to rally round, the work of subjugation would

have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them some

apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or

with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which

we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being also

helped us to maintain our independence. However, we did not expect

to be able to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out,

from the examples that we had had of their conduct to the rest.

 

“How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we

had here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made

them court us in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary

basis of confidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having

more share than friendship in detaining us in the alliance; and the

first party that should be encouraged by the hope of impunity was

certain to break faith with the other. So that to condemn us for being

the first to break off, because they delay the blow that we dread,

instead of ourselves delaying to know for certain whether it will be

dealt or not, is to take a false view of the case. For if we were

equally able with them to meet their plots and imitate their delay, we

should be their equals and should be under no necessity of being their

subjects; but the liberty of offence being always theirs, that of

defence ought clearly to be ours.

 

“Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and the reasons of

our revolt; clear enough to convince our hearers of the fairness of

our conduct, and sufficient to alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to

some means of safety. This we wished to do long ago, when we sent to

you on the subject while the peace yet lasted, but were balked by your

refusing to receive us; and now, upon the Boeotians inviting us, we at

once responded to the call, and decided upon a twofold revolt, from

the Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the latter in

harming the former, but to join in their liberation, and not to

allow the Athenians in the end to destroy us, but to act in time

against them. Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely and

without preparation—a fact which makes it all the more incumbent on

you to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy relief, in order

to show that you support your friends, and at the same time do harm to

your enemies. You have an opportunity such as you never had before.

Disease and expenditure have wasted the Athenians: their ships are

either cruising round your coasts, or engaged in blockading us; and it

is not probable that they will have any to spare, if you invade them a

second time this summer by sea and land; but they will either offer no

resistance to your vessels, or withdraw from both our shores. Nor must

it be thought that this is a case of putting yourselves into danger

for a country which is not yours. Lesbos may appear far off, but

when help is wanted she will be found near enough. It is not in Attica

that the war will be decided, as some imagine, but in the countries by

which Attica is supported; and the Athenian revenue is drawn from

the allies, and will become still larger if they reduce us; as not

only will no other state revolt, but our resources will be added to

theirs, and we shall be treated worse than those that were enslaved

before. But if you will frankly support us, you will add to your

side a state that has a large navy, which is your great want; you will

smooth the way to the overthrow of the Athenians by depriving them

of their allies, who will be greatly encouraged to come over; and

you will free yourselves from the imputation made against you, of

not supporting insurrection. In short, only show yourselves as

liberators, and you may count upon having the advantage in the war.

 

“Respect, therefore, the hopes placed in you by the Hellenes, and

that Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we stand as very suppliants;

become the allies and defenders of the Mitylenians, and do not

sacrifice us, who put our lives upon the hazard, in a cause in which

general good will result to all from our success, and still more

general harm if we fail through your refusing to help us; but be the

men that the Hellenes think you, and our fears desire.”

 

Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing them out,

the Lacedaemonians and confederates granted what they urged, and

took the Lesbians into alliance, and deciding in favour of the

invasion of Attica, told the allies present to march as quickly as

possible to the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces; and

arriving there first themselves, got ready hauling machines to carry

their ships across from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, in

order to make their attack by sea and land at once. However, the

zeal which they displayed was not imitated by the rest of the

confederates, who came in but slowly, being engaged in harvesting

their corn and sick of making expeditions.

 

Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy

were due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show

him that he was mistaken, and that they were able, without moving

the Lesbian fleet, to repel with ease that with which they were

menaced from Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking the

citizens of Athens, except the knights and Pentacosiomedimni, and

the resident aliens; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their

power, and made descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A

disappointment so signal made the Lacedaemonians think that the

Lesbians had not spoken the truth; and embarrassed by the

non-appearance of the confederates, coupled with the news that the

thirty ships round Peloponnese were ravaging the lands near Sparta,

they went back home. Afterwards, however, they got ready a fleet to

send to Lesbos, and ordering a total of forty ships from the different

cities in the league, appointed Alcidas to command the expedition in

his capacity of high admiral. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred

ships, upon seeing the Lacedaemonians go home, went home likewise.

 

If, at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the

largest number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever

possessed at any one moment, she had as many or even more when the war

began. At that time one hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; a

hundred more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides those employed

at Potidaea and in other places; making a grand total of two hundred

and fifty vessels employed on active service in a single summer. It

was this, with Potidaea, that most exhausted her revenues—Potidaea

being blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each drawing two

drachmae