History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗
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the allies, instead of hesitating in such a moment to sacrifice
their ships for Lacedaemon in return for her many benefits, to run
them boldly aground, land in one way or another, and make themselves
masters of the place and its garrison.
Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to
run his ship ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was
endeavouring to land, when he was cut down by the Athenians, and after
receiving many wounds fainted away. Falling into the bows, his
shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was
picked up by the Athenians, and afterwards used for the trophy which
they set up for this attack. The rest also did their best, but were
not able to land, owing to the difficulty of the ground and the
unflinching tenacity of the Athenians. It was a strange reversal of
the order of things for Athenians to be fighting from the land, and
from Laconian land too, against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea;
while Lacedaemonians were trying to land from shipboard in their own
country, now become hostile, to attack Athenians, although the
former were chiefly famous at the time as an inland people and
superior by land, the latter as a maritime people with a navy that had
no equal.
After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next,
the Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their
ships to Asine for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their
aid, in spite of its height, the wall opposite the harbour, where
the landing was easiest. At this moment the Athenian fleet from
Zacynthus arrived, now numbering fifty sail, having been reinforced by
some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels.
Seeing the coast and the island both crowded with heavy infantry,
and the hostile ships in harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a
loss where to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the desert
island of Prote, not far off, where they passed the night. The next
day they got under way in readiness to engage in the open sea if the
enemy chose to put out to meet them, being determined in the event
of his not doing so to sail in and attack him. The Lacedaemonians
did not put out to sea, and having omitted to close the inlets as they
had intended, remained quiet on shore, engaged in manning their
ships and getting ready, in the case of any one sailing in, to fight
in the harbour, which is a fairly large one.
Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each
inlet, and falling on the enemy’s fleet, most of which was by this
time afloat and in line, at once put it to flight, and giving chase as
far as the short distance allowed, disabled a good many vessels and
took five, one with its crew on board; dashing in at the rest that had
taken refuge on shore, and battering some that were still being
manned, before they could put out, and lashing on to their own ships
and towing off empty others whosc crews had fled. At this sight the
Lacedaemonians, maddened by a disaster which cut off their men on
the island, rushed to the rescue, and going into the sea with their
heavy armour, laid hold of the ships and tried to drag them back, each
man thinking that success depended on his individual exertions.
Great was the melee, and quite in contradiction to the naval tactics
usual to the two combatants; the Lacedaemonians in their excitement
and dismay being actually engaged in a sea-fight on land, while the
victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push their success as
far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight from their ships. After
great exertions and numerous wounds on both sides they separated,
the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships, except those first taken;
and both parties returning to their camp, the Athenians set up a
trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks, and at once began to
cruise round and jealously watch the island, with its intercepted
garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, whose
contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before Pylos.
When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the
disaster was thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved
that the authorities should go down to the camp, and decide on the
spot what was best to be done. There, seeing that it was impossible to
help their men, and not wishing to risk their being reduced by
hunger or overpowered by numbers, they determined, with the consent of
the Athenian generals, to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send
envoys to Athens to obtain a convention, and to endeavour to get
back their men as quickly as possible.
The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon
the terms following:
That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to
the Athenians the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and
all in Laconia that were vessels of war, and should make no attack
on the fortification either by land or by sea.
That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland
to send to the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn
ready kneaded, that is to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint
of wine, and a piece of meat for each man, and half the same
quantity for a servant.
That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the
Athenians, and that no boat should sail to the island except openly.
That the Athenians should continue to the island same as before,
without however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the
Peloponnesian troops either by land or by sea.
That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the
slightest particular, the armistice should be at once void.
That the armistice should hold good until the return of the
Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens—the Athenians sending them thither
in a galley and bringing them back again—and upon the arrival of the
envoys should be at an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians
in the same state as they received them.
Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered
over to the number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly.
Arrived at Athens they spoke as follows:
“Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of
settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once
satisfactory to our interests, and as consistent with our dignity in
our misfortune as circumstances permit. We can venture to speak at
some length without any departure from the habit of our country. Men
of few words where many are not wanted, we can be less brief when
there is a matter of importance to be illustrated and an end to be
served by its illustration. Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may
say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and
wished to lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course
to be taken, addressed to intelligent judges. You can now, if you
choose, employ your present success to advantage, so as to keep what
you have got and gain honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid
the mistake of those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good
fortune, and are led on by hope to grasp continually at something
further, through having already succeeded without expecting it.
While those who have known most vicissitudes of good and bad, have
also justly least faith in their prosperity; and to teach your city
and ours this lesson experience has not been wanting.
“To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present
misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet
we are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able
to grant what we are now here to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been
brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads
turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have
always been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all
are equally liable. Accordingly, the prosperity which your city now
enjoys, and the accession that it has lately received, must not make
you fancy that fortune will be always with you. Indeed sensible men
are prudent enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they
would also keep a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so
far from staying within the limit to which a combatant may wish to
confine it, will run the course that its chances prescribe; and
thus, not being puffed up by confidence in military success, they
are less likely to come to grief, and most ready to make peace, if
they can, while their fortune lasts. This, Athenians, you have a
good opportunity to do now with us, and thus to escape the possible
disasters which may follow upon your refusal, and the consequent
imputation of having owed to accident even your present advantages,
when you might have left behind you a reputation for power and
wisdom which nothing could endanger.
“The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to
end the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and
intimate relations in every way and on every occasion between us;
and in return ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for
both parties not to stand out to the end, on the chance of some
favourable accident enabling the men to force their way out, or of
their being compelled to succumb under the pressure of blockade.
Indeed if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it
will be, not by the system of revenge and military success, and by
forcing an opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when
the more fortunate combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided
by gentler feelings conquers his rival in generosity, and accords
peace on more moderate conditions than he expected. From that
moment, instead of the debt of revenge which violence must entail, his
adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid in kind, and is
inclined by honour to stand to his agreement. And men oftener act in
this manner towards their greatest enemies than where the quarrel is
of less importance; they are also by nature as glad to give way to
those who first yield to them, as they are apt to be provoked by
arrogance to risks condemned by their own judgment.
“To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both
parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything
irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally,
personally as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that
we now offer you. While the issue is still in doubt, and you have
reputation and our friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of
our misfortune before anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled,
and for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant to the rest
of the Hellenes a remission from their sufferings, for which be sure
they will think they have chiefly you to thank. The war that they
labour under they know not which began, but the peace that concludes
it, as it depends on your decision, will by their gratitude be laid to
your door. By such a decision you can become firm friends with the
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