A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (mithyâjñâna) which consists in thinking as my own self that which is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge; when once the true knowledge of the six padârthas and as Nyâya says, of the proofs (pramâ@na), the objects of knowledge (prameya), and of the other logical categories of inference is attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (pratipak@sabhâvanâ), namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and ignorance about them (collectively called do@sa, cf. the kles'a of Patañjali) are also destroyed.

With the destruction of attachment actions (prav@rtti) for the

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[Footnote:1: See Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 190-204, Îs'varânumâna of Raghunâtha
S'iro@ma@ni and Udayana's Kusumâñjalî.]

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fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment, actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute happiness (ânanda), though really speaking the state of mukti can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].

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[Footnote 1: Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 499-533.]

MÎMÂ@MSÂ PHILOSOPHY [Footnote ref 1]

A Comparative Review.

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy looked at experience from a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our common sense experience should be considered as coming out of an original universal (e.g. prak@rti of the Sâm@khya). Space, time, the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many entities which have distinct and separate existence but which manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in substances. Knowledge (jñâna) which illuminates all things is regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and the objects of sense, knowledge (jñâna) is produced. Soul with Nyâya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc. inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action, class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as without it the different entities being without any principle of relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.

Sâ@mkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances, qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived

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[Footnote 1: On the meanirg of the word Mîmâ@msâ see Chapter IV.]

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that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge, willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocations did not bring about any new thing but brought about a phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them merely a form of subtle illuminating matter stuff. Sâ@mkhya holds however that there is a transcendent entity as pure consciousness and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matter into conscious thought or experience of a person.

But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has been pointed out by the Nyâya school in a very strong and emphatic manner. Even Sâ@mkhya did not try to prove that the existence of its transcendent puru@sa could be demonstrated in experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle towards virtue and emancipation. Sâ@mkhya had first supposed knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as puru@sa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by the inadequate analysis of consciousness (buddhi) as being non-intelligent and incessantly changing.

Nyâya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality, and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-conscious

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thought. Of course it is true that Sâ@mkhya had approached nearer to this view than Nyâya, but it had separated the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this could not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift—a transcendent illusion running on from beginningless time. These difficulties occurred because Sâ@mkhya soared to a region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common sense experience. The Nyâya position is of course much worse as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common sense experience that substances are different from qualities and actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is, to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and an account of experience should be given according to its verdict. No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction is ushered in by the Mîmâ@msâ system. The Mîmâ@msâ sûtras were written by Jaimini and the commentary (bhâ@sya) on it was written by S'abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made by Kumârila, who preceded the great S'a@nkarâcârya, and a disciple of Kumârila, Prabhâkara.

The Mîmâ@msâ Literature.

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in India in the Brâhma@nas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition

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had it, and this it seems gave rise to the sm@rti literature. Discussions and doubts became more common about the many intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and priests. These represent the beginnings of Mîmâ@msâ (lit. attempts at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's Mîmâ@msâ sûtras (which are with us the foundations of Mîmâ@msâ) are only a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from the references he gives to the views in different matters of other preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's Mîmâ@msâ sûtras were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work of the Mîmâ@msâ system. Commentaries were written on it by various persons such as Bhart@rmitra (alluded to in Nyâyaratnâkara verse 10 of S'lokavârttika), Bhavadâsa {Pratijñasûtra 63}, Hari and Upavar@sa (mentioned in S'âstradîpikâ). It is probable that at least some of these preceded S'abara, the writer of the famous commentary known as the S'abara-bhâ@sya. It is difficult to say anything about the time in which he flourished. Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current verse which speaks of King Vikramâditya as being the son of S'abarasvâmin by a K@sattriya wife. This bhâ@sya of S'abara is the basis of the later Mîmâ@msâ works. It was commented upon by an unknown person alluded to as Vârttikakâra by Prabhâkara and merely referred to as "yathâhu@h" (as they say) by Kumârila. Dr Ga@nganâtha Jhâ says that Prabhâkara's commentary B@rhatî on the S'abara-bhâ@sya was based upon the work of this Vârttikakâra. This B@rhatî of Prabhâkara had another commentary on it—@Rjuvimâlâ by S'alikanâtha Mis'ra, who also wrote a compendium on the Prabhâkara interpretation of Mîmâ@msâ called Prakara@napañcikâ. Tradition says that Prabhâkara (often referred to as Nibandhakâra), whose views are often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of Kumârila. Kumârila Bha@t@ta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary of S'a@nkara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent

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exposition of S'abara's bhâ@sya in three parts known as S'lokavârttika (dealing only with the philosophical portion of S'abara's work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as Tarkapâda), Tantravârttika (dealing with the remaining three chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and @Tup@tîkâ (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books) [Footnote ref 1]. Kumârila is referred to by his later followers as Bha@t@ta, Bha@t@tapâda, and Vârttikakâra. The next great Mîmâ@msâ scholar and follower of Kumârila was Ma@n@dana Mis'ra, the author of Vidhiviveka, Mîmâ@msânukrama@nî and the commentator of Tantravârttika, who became later on converted by S'a@nkara to Vedantism. Pârthasârathi Mis'ra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his S'âstradîpikâ, Tantraratna, and Nyâyaratnamâlâ following the footprints of Kumârila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumârila, the names of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of Kâs'ikâ and Somes'vara the author of Nyâyasudhâ deserve special notice. Râmak@r@s@na Bha@t@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the Tarkapâda of S'âstradîpikâ called the Yuktisnehapûra@nî-siddhânta-candrikâ and Somanâtha wrote his Mayûkhamâlikâ on the remaining chapters of S'âstradîpikâ. Other important current Mîmâ@msâ works which deserve notice are such as Nyâyamâlâvistara of Mâdhava, Subodhinî, Mîmâ@msâbâlaprakâs'a of S'a@nkara Bha@t@ta, Nyâyaka@nikâ of Vâcaspati Mis'ra, Mîmâ@msâparibhâ@sa by K@r@s@nayajvan, Mîmâ@msânyâyaprakâs'a by Anantadeva, Gâgâ Bha@t@ta's Bha@t@tacintâma@ni, etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the Mîmâ@msâ literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all Vedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the sm@rti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained by them. The legal side of the sm@rtis consisting of inheritance, proprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil