A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

of a tree with those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark) with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama. The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect) is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the association as cause and effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].

We perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was associated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion

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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjari on anumâna.]

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that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered the concomitance (vyâpti) of smoke and fire which we had observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the li@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its concomitance with fire (_t@rtîya-li@nga-parâmars'a) is thus the cause (anumitikara@na or anumâna) of the inference (anumiti). The concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called vyâpti. When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is called bahirvyâpti; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is called antarvyâpti. The Buddhists since they did not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyâpti view of concomitance to bahirvyâpti as a means of inference [Footnote ref 1].

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign (hetu) with the signate (sâdhya), how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (vyâptigraha) had been correct, and the observation of concomitance had been valid. The Mîmâ@msâ school held, as we shall see in the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. But Nyâya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically called anvayavyâpti and the latter vyatirekavyâpti. But even this is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,

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[Footnote 1: See Antarvyâptisamarthana, by Ratnâkaras'ânti in the Six
Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica, 1910.]

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or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke (yasmin sati bhavanam yato vinâ na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'ana@m, Nyâyamañjarî, p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of concomitance (vyâpti} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu, and there might be some other condition (upâdhi) associated with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire in green wood (ârdrendhana) produced smoke, but one might doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it. But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would have to be dispensed with (vyâghâta). Thus such doubts as lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or unsettle the notion of vyâpti or concomitance at which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The Buddhists and the naiyâyikas generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion of concomitance or vyâpti (vyâptigraha), but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance always depended on a relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence, whereas Nyâya held that neither the relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite a number of other types of inference which could not be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening other things would happen could certainly exist, even without the supposition of an identity of essence.

But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to

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[Footnote 1: See Tâtparya@tîkâ on anumâna and vyâptigraha.]

[Footnote 2: Tâtparya@tîkâ on vyâptigraha, and Tattvacintâma@ni of
Ga@nges'a on vyâptigraha.]

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infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyâya holds however that though different causes are often found to produce the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances, the special manner in which the water flows by small rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we see that Nyâya relied on empirical induction based on uniform and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists assumed a priori principles of causality or identity of essence. It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyâya works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves assured that there was no such upâdhi (condition) associated with the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sâdhya in a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition (upâdhi) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the validity of vyâpti, it is necessary that we must be assured that there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide experience (bhûyodars'ana).

Pras'astapâda in defining inference as the "knowledge of that (e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of the reason" described a valid reason (li@nga) as that which is connected with the object of inference (anumeya) and which exists wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases

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where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyâya qualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva and vipak@sâsattva of a valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapâda further quotes a verse to say that this is the same as what Kâs'yapa (believed to be the family name of Ka@nâda) said. Ka@nâda says that we can infer a cause from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We can infer by a reason because it is duly associated (prasiddhipûrvakatva) with the object of inference. What this association was according to Ka@nâda can also be understood for he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred or it has no concomitance with it (aprasiddha) or it has a doubtful existence sandigdha). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns. Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The first fallacy is a combination of pak@sâsattva and sapak@sâsattva, for not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but no horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva, for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, it seems that when Pras'astapâda says that he is giving us the view of Ka@nâda he is faithful to it. Pras'astapâda says that wherever there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke. When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that there is fire. But with regard to Ka@nâda's enumeration of types of inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect from the cause," etc., Pras'astapâda holds that these are not the only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides inference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics of one member of a class to another member of the same class), and sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is that where the previously known case and the inferred case is exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of flesh on its neck (sâsnâ), I can whenever I see the same hanging

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mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended to a different class of objects, it is called sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (svanis'citârtha) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then the inference is called parârthânumâna. We know that the distinction of svârthânumâna (inference for oneself) and parârthânumâna (inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists. Pras'astapâda does not make a sharp distinction of two classes of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is called parârthânumâna. But this need not be considered as an entirely new innovation of Pras'astapâda, for in IX. 2, Ka@nâda himself definitely alludes to this distinction (asyeda@m kâryyakâra@nasambandhas'câvayavâdbhavati). The five premisses which are called