A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen that Nyâya admits not only the substances and qualities but all kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).

The most important thing about the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika theory of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge is indeed arthaprakâs'a, revelation of objects, and it is called perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well. The senses according to Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are material and we have seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental (atîndriya) power (s'akti) than that of actual vibratory

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movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1]. The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called âlocanajñâna (sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character (sukhasâdhanatvasm@rti) and as a result of that I perceive the orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref 2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant cause (sahakâri). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind, yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact, it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process. Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals associated with them but also with negation. A perception is erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does not possess (atasmi@mstaditi) and right knowledge (pramâ) is that which presents an object with a character which it really has

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[Footnote 1:

_Na khalvatîndriyâ s'aktirasmâbhirupagamyate yayâ saha na kâryyasya sambandhajñânasambhava@h.

Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 69.]

[Footnote 2:

_Sukhâdi manasâ buddhvâ kapitthâdi ca cak@su@sâ tasya karanatâ tatra manasaivâvagamyate… …Sambandhagraha@nakâle yattatkapitthâdivi@sayamak@sajam jñânam tadupâdeyâdijñânaphalamiti bhâ@syak@rtas'cetasi sthitam sukhasâdhanatvajñânamupâdeyajñânam.

Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]

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(tadvati tatprakârakânubhava) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object, but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions that it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream that it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observes that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by illusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there is no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. This doctrine of illusion is known as viparîtakhyâti or anyathâkhyâti. What existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (h@rdaye parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhâsanam) [Footnote ref 5]. Later Vais'e@sika as interpreted by Pras'astapâda and S'rîdhara is in full agreement with Nyâya in this doctrine of illusion (bhrama or as Vais'e@sika calls it viparyaya) that the object of illusion is always the right thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6].

I have pointed out above that Nyâya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vâcaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal

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[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's Nyâyavârttika, p. 37, and Ga@nges'a's Tattvacintâma@ni, p. 401, Bibliotheca Indica.]

[Footnote 2: "Indriye@nâlocya marîcîn uccâvacamuccalato nirvikalpena g@rhîtvâ pas'câttatropaghâtado@sât viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo bhrânto jâyate tasmâdvijñânasya uvabhicâro nârthasya, Vâcaspati's Tâtparyatîkâ," p. 87.]

[Footnote 3: Nyâyamañjarî, p. 88.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. pp. 89 and 184.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 184.]

[Footnote 6: Nyâyakandalî, pp. 177-181, "S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@na do@sasahakârinâ rajatasa@mskârasacivena sâd@rs'yamanurundhatâ s'uktikâvi@sayo rajatâdhyavasâya@h k@rta@h."]

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it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange." The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and attribute (jâtyâdisvarûpâvagâhi na tu jâtyâdînâ@m mitho vis'e@sa@navis'e@syabhâvâvagâhîti yâvat) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinks that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary persons, for the association of the names and relations could be distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2]. S'rîdhara, in explaining the Vais'e@sika view, seems to be largely in agreement with the above view of Vâcaspati. Thus S'rîdhara says that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this," which can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3]. Vâcaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others, but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyâya writers however, following Ga@nges'a, hold an altogether different opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge means the knowledge of mere predication without any association with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual cognition and not a psychological stage. They would

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[Footnote 1: Tâtparya@tikâ, p. 81, also ibid. p. 91, "prathamamâlocito'rtha@h sâmânyavis'e@savân."]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p.84, "tasmâdvyutpannasyâpi nâmadheyasmara@nâya pûrvame@sitavyo vinaiva nâmadheyamarthapratyaya@h."]

[Footnote 3: _Nyâyakandalî,_p. 189 ff., "ata@h savikalpakamicchatâ nirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na sâmânyamâtram g@rh@nâti bhedasyâpi pratibhâsanât nâpi svalak@sa@namâtram sâmânyâkârasyâpi sa@mvedanât vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhânâcca, kintu sâmânya@m vis'e@sañcobhayamapi g@rh@nâti yadi paramida@m sâmânyamayam vis'e@sa@h ityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantarânusandhânavirahât, pi@ndântarânuv@rttigraha@nâddhi sâmânya@m vivicyate, vyâv@rttigraha@nâdvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h."]

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not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate (vis'i@s@tavais'i@styajñânam prati hi vis'e@sa@natâvacchedakaprakâra@m jñâna@m kâra@na@m) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected with universality or any other relations (jâtyâdiyojanârahita@m vais'i@s@tyânavagâhi ni@sprakârakam nirvikalpaka@m) [Footnote ref 2]. But this stage is never psychologically experienced (atîndriya) and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate with a subject. Thus Vis'vanâtha says in his Siddhântamuktâvalî, "the cognition which does not involve relationing cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the predicative quality (vis'e@sa@natâvacchedaka) of the predicate 'jug' which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative quality, the content [Footnote ref 3]." But in order that the knowledge of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at which the universal or the pure predication should be known and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be related to the particular with which it is associated.

But both the old and the new schools of Nyâya and Vais'e@sika admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception consists in the attribution of jâti (universal), gu@na (quality),

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[Footnote 1: Tattvacintâma@ni p. 812.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 809.]

[Footnote 3: Siddhântamuktâvalî on Bhâ@sâpariccheda kârikâ, 58.]

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kriyâ (action), nâma (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref 1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference of the Nyâya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyâya and Vais'e@sika believe jâti, gu@na and kriyâ to be different from substance and therefore the predicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vâcaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the association.