A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

the individual atoms which composed them. Now the hrasva parimâ@na of the dyads is not regarded as having a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct type of measure which is called small (hrasva). As accumulation of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness, grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the hrasva (small) parim_a@na ought to generate still more hrasva parim_a@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of the dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, the trya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also if the atomic and circular (parima@n@dala) size of the atoms is regarded as generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas, then the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomic than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness and the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect. But since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen to be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the measure of their effects, but it is their number which is the cause

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of the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparimâ@na, hrasva parimâ@na, mahat parimâ@na, and dîrgha parimâ@na. The parimâ@na of âkâs'a, kâla, dik and âtman which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimâ@nas of the atoms, âkâs'a, kâla, dik, manas, and âtman are regarded as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parimâ@nas as belonging to non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.

The eighth is p@rthaktva (mutual difference or separateness of things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation such as this jug is not this pot.

The ninth is sa@myoga (connection), that entity of gu@na by virtue of which things appear to us as connected.

The tenth is vibhâga (separation), that entity of gu@na which destroys the connection or contact of things.

The eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, paratva and aparatva, give rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote and near.

The other gu@nas such as buddhi(knowledge),sukha (happiness), du@hkha (sorrow), icchâ (will), dve@sa (antipathy or hatred) and yatna (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of gurutva (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The gu@na of sneha (oiliness) belongs to water. The gu@na of sa@mskâra is of three kinds, (i) vega (velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, (2) sthiti-sthâpaka (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) bhâvanâ is that quality of âtman by which things are constantly practised or by which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l]. Dharma is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. Adharma is

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[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda says that bhâvanâ is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the sa@mskâra becomes particularly strong. See Nyâyakandalî, p. 167. Ka@nâda however is silent on these points. He only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@mskâra, memory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]

[Footnote 2: Pras'astapâda speaks of dharma (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (nakarmasâmarthyam). Sacrifice etc. cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action is destroyed its power (sâmarthya) cannot last. So dharma is to be admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith (s'raddhâ), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods, fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by Pras'astapâda as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the yamas and niyamas (cf. Patañjali's Yoga) and attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padârthas attains a dharma which brings liberation (mok@sa). S'rîdhara refers to the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga account of the method of attaining salvation (Nyâyakandalî, pp. 272-280). See also Vallabha's Nyâyalilâvatî, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]

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the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a man to suffer. Ad@r@s@ta or destiny is that unknown quality of things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with their merits or demerits.

Karma means movement; it is the third thing which must be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. There are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction, (4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of karmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause the things to which they belong to move.

Sâmânya is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as sat or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na, and karma. This sameness is called sâmânya or jâti, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or karma. This highest genus sattâ (being) is called parajâti (highest universal), the other intermediate jâtis are called aparajâti (lower universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or still more intermediate jâtis such as gotvâjâti (the genus cow), nîlatvajâti (the genus blue). The intermediate jâtis or genera sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as pas'utva (animal jâti) and gotva (the cow jâti); here however gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jâti. The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jâti which from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

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This jâti or sâmânya thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent reality of sâmânya, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows (apoha). The perception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Sâmânya has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object [Footnote ref l]. This jâti is eternal or non-destructible, for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jâti, the latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].

Through vis'e@sa things are perceived as diverse. No single sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves. The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it

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[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditâs'oka says that there is no single thing running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the sâmânya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish jâti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent (yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat). Sâmânya is such, therefore sâmânya is non existent. No sâmânya can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no sâmânya can be pointed out as being externally perceptible —Sâmânyadûsanadikprasaritâ—in Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts. The Vedanta also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jâti as a separate substance. So it discards jâti. See Vedântaparibhâsâ, Sikhamani and Mamprabhâ, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's _Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]

[Footnote 2: Similarity (sâdrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in difference (tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhûyodharmavattvam).]

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is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them.

Samavâya, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and sâmânya, karana (cause) and kârya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jâti in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (yutasiddha), such as when I put my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavâya however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (ayutasiddha). This relation is thus a separate and independent category. This is not regarded as many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed but the samavâya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].

These six things are called the six padârthas or independent realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus

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[Footnote 1: The Vedânta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavâya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (Brahma-sûtrabhâ@sya II. ii. 13) that if a samavâya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samavâya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (anavasthâ). Nyâya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of anavasthâ—prâmâ@nikî (valid infinite, as in case of the question of the seed and the tree, or of the avidyâ and the passions), and another aprâmâ@nikî anavasthâ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]

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they admitted dravya,