A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing.

As the Nyâya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience and on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sâ@mkhya cosmology, but accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (bhûtas), earth (k@siti), water (ap), fire (tejas), and air (marut). These atoms are eternal; the fifth substance (âkâs'a) is all pervasive and eternal. It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf man though he has the âkâs'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense organ [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence of time (kâla) as extending from the past through the present to the

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[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyâya and Vais'e@sika referred to have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyâya in Bengal," by Mr. Cakravarttî in J.A.S.B. 1915.]

[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyâya and Vais'e@sika as the same system. Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already been treated.]

[Footnote 3: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 59-64.]

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endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sâ@mkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit of kâla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kâla as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi (buddhinirmâ@na) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But kâla in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing by itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself as past, present, and future. Sâ@mkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution (adhvan)_. The astronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika conception of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless substance which appears as many in association with the changes related to it [Footnote ref l].

The seventh substance is relative space (dik). It is that substance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kâla like dik is also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth substance is the soul (âtman) which is all-pervading. There are separate âtmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to âtman. Manas (mind) is the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory; all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition

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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 64-66, and Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 136-139. The Vais'e@sika sûtras regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]

[Footnote 2: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 66-69, and Nyayamañjarî, p. 140.]

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of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas the other things such as quality (gu@na), action (karma), sameness or generality (sâmânya), speciality or specific individuality (vis'e@sa) and the relation of inherence (samavâya) cannot show themselves without the help of substance (dravya). Dravya is thus the place of rest (âs'rayâ) on which all the others depend (âs'@rta). Dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa, and samavâya are the six original entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1]. When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref 2]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types or categories (padârtha), and held that the notion of each type was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in number—dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus call the book a substance (dravya); dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatva). So also gu@na and karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with Sâ@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say

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[Footnote 1: Abhâva (negation) as dependent on bhâva (position) is mentioned in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. Later Nyâya writers such as Udayana include abhâva as a separate category, but S'rîdhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhâva was not counted by Pras'astapâda as it was dependent on bhâva—"abhâvasya prthaganupades'a@h bhâvapâratantryât na tvabhâvât." Nyâyakandalî, p. 6, and Lak@sa@nâvalî, p. 2.]

[Footnote 2: "Tattvato jñâte@su bâhyâdhyâtmike@su vi@saye@su do@sadars'anât viraktasya samîhâniv@rttau âtmajñasya tadarthâni karmânyakurvatah tatparityâgasâdhanâni s'rutism@rtyuditâni asa@nkalpitaphalâni upâdadânasya âtmajñânamabhyasyata@h prak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati paripakvâtmajñânasyâtyantikas'arîraviyogasya bhâvât." Ibid. p. 7.]

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whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but Nyâya-Vais'e@sika would collect "all whiteness" under the name of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l]. They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate entities or categories.

The six Padârthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sâmânya,
Vis'e@sa, Samavâya.

Of the six classes of entities or categories (padârtha) we have already given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (gu@na) the first one called rûpa (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citra). Colours are found only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (nitya}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heat is applied, and this, S'rîdhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rûpa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus rûpatva (colourness), and the rûpa gu@na (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rûpa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye.

The second is rasa (taste), that quality of things which can be apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent (ka@tu), astringent (ka@sâya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and ap have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like rûpa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are apprehended by the tongue.

The third is gandha (odour), that quality which can be apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Water

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[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautrântika Buddhism, "yo yo vruddhâdhyâsavân nâsâveka@h." See Pa@n@ditâs'oka's Avayavinirâkarana, Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts.

[Footnote 2: The word "padârtha" literally means denotations of words.]

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or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence of earth materials.

The fourth is spars'a (touch), that quality which can be apprehended only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold, hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, and vâyu. The fifth s'abda (sound) is an attribute of âkâs'a. Had there been no âkâs'a there would have been no sound.

The sixth is sa@mkhyâ (number), that entity of quality belonging to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three, etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative oscillatory state of the mind (apek@sâbuddhi); thus when there are two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion—This is one jug and that is another jug. This is called apek@sâbuddhi; then in the two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (dvitva) and then an indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na) of dvitva in us and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs. The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a similar manner [Footnote ref 1].

The seventh is parimiti (measure), that entity of quality in things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is called parima@n@dala parimâ@na; it is eternal, and it cannot generate the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely; when two atoms generate a dyad (dvya@nuka) it is not the measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) and the hrasva (small) measure of the dyad molecule (dvya@nuka), for then the size (parimâ@na) of it would have been still smaller than the measure of the atom (parima@n@dala), whereas the measure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely the small (hrasva) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but then the number (sa@mkhyâ) of the atom should be regarded as bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (hrasva) measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka) compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure "small"

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[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced by
Pras'astapâda. Nyâya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkara
Mis'ra's Upaskâra, VII. ii. 8.]

[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms as eternal as in "paramâ@nus" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. The parima@n@dala parimâ@na is thus a variety of a@nuparimâ@na. The a@nuparimâ@na and the hrasvaparimâ@na represent the two dimensions of the measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and dîrgha are with reference to trya@nukas. See Nyâyakandalî, p. 133.]

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(hrasva) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (mahat) of the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these gross trya@nukas we find that the "great" measure of the trya@nukas is the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by them. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so much bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukas of mahat parimâ@na makes things of still more mahat parimâ@na. The measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahat but also as dîrgha (long) and this dîrgha parimâ@na has to be admitted as coexisting with mahat parimâ@na but not identical, for things not only appear as great but also as long (dîrgha). Here we find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulation of "great" (mahat) and "long" (dîrgha) parimâ@na, and hence the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater and longer than