A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or puru@sa. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self.

Nyâya-Vais`e@sika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (sâmagrî) which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus called pramâ@na or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge [Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing

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[Footnote 1: Govardhana's Nyâyabodhinî on Tarkasa@mgraha, pp. 9, 10.]

[Footnote 2: "Avyabhicârinîmasandigdhârthopalabdhi@m vidadhatî bodhâbodhasvabhâvâ sâmagrî pramâ@nam." Nyâyamañjarî, p. 12. Udyotakara however defined "pramâ@na" as upalabdhihetu (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyâpâra or movement of the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vâcaspati says: "siddhamindriyâdi, asiddhañca tatsannikar@sâdi vyâpârayannutpâdayan kara@na eva caritârtha@h kar@na@m tvindriyâdi tatsannikar@sâdi vâ nânyatra caritarthamiti sâk@sâdupalabdhâveva phale vyâprîyate." Tâtparya@tîkâ, p. 15. Thus it is the action of the senses as pramâ@na which is the direct cause of the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. "Pramât@rprameyayo@h. pramâne caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h. Pramât@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhetû kathañcit." Ibid. p. 16.]

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the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly. These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate cognition as qualification (vis'e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions, the knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things in upamâna, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblage of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception, capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations that is called pramâ@na.

Nyâya argues that in the Sâ@mkhya view knowledge originates by the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particular state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept (knowledge). The puru@sa to whom the knowledge belongs, however, neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental contact of the puru@sa with buddhi is but a mere semblance or appearance or illusion, then the Sâ@mkhya has to admit that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Sâ@mkhyists have precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.

There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should

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express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the object. The doctrine of the Vijñâna vâdins, that it is knowledge alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object in such a manner that knowledge as object should require the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on ad infinitum. Again if pramâ@na be defined as prâpa@na (capacity of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called pramâ@na. These views moreover do not explain the origin of knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes intellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendent element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena are produced [Footnote ref 2].

The four Pramâ@nas of Nyâya.

We know that the Carvâkas admitted perception (pratyak@sa)
alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the
Vais'e@sika admitted two sources, pratyak@sa and inference (anumâna);
Sâ@mkhya added s'abda (testimony) as the third source;

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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 12-26.]

[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gañges'a, a later naiyâyika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be successful, I call it valid knowledge. Tattvacintâma@ni, K. Tarkavâgîs'a's edition, Prâmâ@nyavâda.

"The Vais'e@sika sûtras tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramâ@na. The view that Vais'e@sika only admitted two pramâ@nas, perception and inference, is traditionally accepted, "pratyak@sameka@mcârvâkâ@h ka@nâdasugatau puna@h anumânañca taccâpi, etc." Pras'astapâda divides all cognition (buddhi) as vidyâ (right knowledge) and avidyâ (ignorance). Under avidyâ he counts sa@ms'aya (doubt or uncertainty), viparyaya (illusion or error), anadhyavasâya (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and svapna (dream). Right knowledge (vidyâ) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages (âr@sa). Interpreting the Vais'e@sika sûtras I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. Arthâpatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) are also classed as inference and upamâna (analogy) and aitihya (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]

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Nyâya adds a fourth, upamâna (analogy). The principle on which the four-fold division of pramâ@nas depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and s'abda are different pramâ@nas, though they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyâya thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamâna within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different pramâ@nas [Footnote ref 1].

Perception (Pratyak@sa).

The naiyâyikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of âkâs'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The cognitive senses (vâk, pâni, pâda, pâyu, and upastha) recognized in Sâ@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body.

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such

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[Footnote 1:

Sâmagrîbhedâi phalabhedâcca pramâ@nabheda@h Anye eva hi sâmagrîphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h Anye eva ca sâmagrîphale s'abdopamânayo@h. Nyâyamañjari, p. 33.]

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as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate [Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (s'abda-pramâ@na). That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact of the senses with the object is said to be the product of the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and (savikalpa) determinate. Indeterminate perception is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of perception in which it appears without any association with name. Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyak@sa. If at the time of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is held by the later naiyâyikas that we are not conscious of it directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first stage without which the determinate consciousness could not arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception. The contact of the sense with the object is regarded as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called sa@myoga, (2) contact with the gu@nas (qualities) through the thing (sa@myukta-samavâya) in which they inhere in samavâya (inseparable) relation, (3) contact with the gu@nas (such as colour etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness (rûpatva), which inhere in the gu@nas in the samavâya relation.

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[Footnote 1: Gañges'a, a later naiyâyika of great reputation, describes perception as immediate awareness (pratyak@sasya sâk@sâtkâritvam lak@sa@nam).]

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This species of contact is called sa@myukta-samaveta-samavâya, for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour is in samavâya relation, and in the specific colour there is the colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavâya relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavâya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory sense is âkâs'a and the sound exists in âkâs'a in the samavâya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavâya. (5) The generic character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavâya. (6) There is another kind of contact by which negation (abhâva) is perceived, namely sa@myukta vis'e@sa@na (as qualifying contact). This is so called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation. Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug is only a