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gu@na, karma and sâmânya, Vis'e@sa they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent before but was newly produced. This is what is called the doctrine of asatkâryavâda. This is just the opposite of the Sâ@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed nâbhâvo vidyate sata@h) and that the non-existent could never be produced (nâsato vidyate bhâvah). The objection to this view is that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anything that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].

It is held by Mîmâ@msâ that an unseen power resides in the cause which produces the effect. To this Nyâya objects that this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained by molecular movement (parispanda). There is nothing except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (anyathâsiddhis'ûnyasya niyatâpûrvavarttitâ). Unconditionality and invariability are indispensable for kâryakâra@na-bhâva or cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional upon something else (na svâtantrye@na). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour

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[Footnote 1: Nyâyamuñjari, p. 494.]

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of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable antecedents or what enters into the production of their co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and âkâs'a (ether) as the substrate and vâyu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar), the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded as causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral, secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of energy. This test the Nyâya would accept only in the sense of an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (parispanda eva bhautiko vyâpâra@h karotyartha@h atîndriyastu vyâparo nâsti. Jayanta's Mañjari Âhnika I), but would emphatically reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious causal power or efficiency (s'akti) [Footnote ref 1]." With Nyâya all energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyâya—its insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations of the different causal conditions—that these operations are of the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely repudiates the Sâ@mkhya conception of power or productive

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[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

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efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (atîndriya) and finds nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements of operative conditions (kâra@na-sâmagrî), and nothing in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1]. Certain general conditions such as relative space (dik), time (kâla), the will of Îs'vara, destiny (ad@r@s@ta) are regarded as the common cause of all effects (kâryatva-prayojaka). Those are called sâdhâra@na-kâra@na (common cause) as distinguished from the specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called sâdhâra@na kâra@na. It may not be out of place here to notice that Nyâya while repudiating transcendental power (s'akti) in the mechanism of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of metaphysical conditions like merit (dharma), which constitutes a system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical systems and order of nature.

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species, is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from a certain a priori principle like that of causality or identity of essence [Footnote ref 2].

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the samavâyi-kâra@na of the jug. Samavâya means as we have seen an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A kâra@na is called samavâyi when its materials are found inseparably connected with the materials of the effect. Asamavâyi-kâra@na is that which produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of the samavâyi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This colour of the clay is thus called the asamavâyi cause of the jug. Any quality (gu@na) or movement which existing in the samavâya cause in the samavâya relation determines the characteristics of the effect is called the asamavâyi-kâra@na. The instrumental

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[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

[Footnote 2: See for this portion Dr B.N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 263-266. Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha on Buddhism. Nyâyamañjarî Bhâ@sâ-pariccheda, with Muktâvalî and Dinakarî, and Tarkas@mgraha. The doctrine of Anyathâsiddhi was systematically developed from the time of Ga@nges'a.]

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nimitta and accessory (sahakâri) causes are those which help the material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel and the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakãri causes of the effect.

We know that the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika regards the effect as nonexistent, before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it holds that the gu@nas in the cause are the causes of the gu@nas in the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an extraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important exception is to be found in the case of the production of the parimâ@nas of dvya@nukas and trasare@nus which are not produced by the parimâ@nas of an a@nu or a dya@nuka, but by their number as we have already seen.

Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).

The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems except the Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. According to the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika view Îs'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings desires to bring about dissolution (sa@mhâreccho bhavati). Simultaneously with it the ad@r@s@ta force residing in all the souls and forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act (s'akti-pratibandha). As a result of this no further bodies, senses, or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Îs'vara) the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to the disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then all vâyu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated with dharma, adharma and past impressions (sa@mskâra) remain suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless, non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of manas. In the state of pralaya owing to the ad@r@s@ta of souls the

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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of pralaya and s@r@s@ti is found only in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika works, but the sûtras of both the systems seem to be silent on the matter.]

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atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the part of Îs'vara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.

At the time of creation, Îs'vara wishes to create and this desire of Îs'vara works in all the souls as ad@r@s@ta. This one eternal desire of Îs'vara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya) as accessory causes (sahakâri) helps the disintegration of atoms and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation. When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called ad@r@s@ta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this ad@r@s@ta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play. At the time of creation action first begins in the vâyu atoms by the kinetic function of this ad@r@s@ta, by the contact of the souls with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact with one another and the dvya@nukas are formed and then in a similar way the trya@nukas are formed, and thus vâyu originates. After vâyu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the gross form, the god Brahmâ and all the worlds are created by Îs'vara and Brahmâ is directed by Îs'vara to do the rest of the work. Brahmâ thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Îs'vara brings about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Îs'vara arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes or punishments according to good or bad deeds [Footnote ref 1]. Many Nyâya books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahmâ as deputy for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of men, or that it may be due to a mere play (lîlâ) of Îs'vara. Îs'vara is one, for if there were many Îs'varas they might quarrel. The will of Îs'vara not only brings about dissolution and creation,

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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 48-54.]

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but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen. The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions. Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire (icchâ) of Îs'vara may thus be compared with the icchâ of Îs'vara as we find it in the Yoga system.

Proof of the Existence of Îs'vara.

Sâ@mkhya asserts that the teleology of the prak@rti is sufficient to explain all order and

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