A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and mâyâ are to be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal matter, upâdâna and mâyâ as the entity evolving in pari@nâma. Vâcaspati Mis'ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of the world-appearance through mâyâ as associated with jîva. Mâyâ is thus only a sahakâri or instrument as it were, by which the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jîva as the manifold world of appearance. Prakâs'ânanda holds however in his Siddhânta Muktâvalî that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the product of mâyâ, which is both the instrumental and the upâdâna (causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect the principal Vedânta text that the only unchangeable cause is the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word mâyâ was used in the @Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the B@rhadâra@nyaka, Pras'na, and Svetâs'vatara Upani@sads the word means magic. It is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upani@sads

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the word mâyâ occurs only once in the B@rhadâra@nyaka and once only in the Pras'na. In early Pâli Buddhist writings it occurs only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhagho@sa uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nâgârjuna and the Lankâvatâra it has acquired the sense of illusion. In S'a@nkara the word mâyâ is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle of creation as a s'akti (power) or accessory cause, and as the phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.

It may also be mentioned here that Gau@dapâda the teacher of S'a@nkara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help of the mâyâ doctrine. The Upani@sads are permeated with the spirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not pay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or enquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gau@dapâda asserts clearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that the world does not exist in reality, that it is mâyâ, and not reality. When the highest truth is realized mâyâ is not removed, for it is not a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own airy nothing never to recur again. It was Gau@dapâda who compared the world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects seen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable of being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and unreal. The âtman says Gau@dapâda is at once the cognizer and the cognized, the world subsists in the âtman through mâyâ. As âtman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily follows that all experience is also illusory. S'a@nkara expounded this doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upani@sads and the Brahma-sûtra, but he seems to me to have done little more than making explicit the doctrine of mâyâ. Some of his followers however examined and thought over the concept of mâyâ and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable thereby substantially contributing to the development of the Vedânta philosophy.

Vedânta theory of Perception and Inference [Footnote ref 1].

Pramâ@na is the means that leads to right knowledge. If memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then

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[Footnote 1: Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra and his son Râmak@r@s@na worked out a complete scheme of the theory of Vedântic perception and inference. This is in complete agreement with the general Vedânta metaphysics. The early Vedântists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory. It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as worked out by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra he was largely indebted to the Mîmâm@sâ school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamâna s'abda and anupalabdhi also Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra accepted the Mîmâm@sâ view. The Vedantins, previous to Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra, had also tacitly followed the Mîmâm@sâ in these matters.]

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pramâ@na is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge (pramâ) in Vedânta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (abâdhitârthavi@sayajñânatva). Except when specially expressed otherwise, pramâ is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired (anadhigata) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedânta considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise, any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as having remained unchanged all through the series of moments. There is of course this difference between the same percept of a previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed. When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state representing the book is not changed every second, and hence there can be no such supposition that I am having separate mental states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous

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addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the absolute is realized.

When the anta@hkara@na (mind) comes in contact with the external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as it were into their forms, it is said that the anta@hkara@na has been transformed into a state (v@rtti) [Footnote 1]. As soon as the anta@hkara@na has assumed the shape or form of the object of its knowledge, the ignorance (ajñâna) with reference to that object is removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness (cit) shows the object which was so long hidden by ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object is thus the self-shining of the cit through a v@rtti of a form resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes that by the action of ajñâna, pure consciousness or being is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is but the transformation of ignorance (ajñâna), the former cannot manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The diversified objects of the world are but transformations of the principle of ajñâna which is neither real nor unreal. It is the nature of ajñâna that it veils its own creations. Thus on each of the objects created by the ajñâna by its creating (vik@sepa) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (âvara@na) capacity. But when any object comes in direct touch with anta@hkara@na through the senses the anta@hkara@na becomes transformed into the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil on that particular ajñâna form—the object, and as the self-shining cit is shining through the particular ajñâna state, we have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the ajñâna has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,

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[Footnote 1: Vedânta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The same anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called mânâs, buddhi, aha@mkâra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called mânâs, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mkâra, and as producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications or states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special kind of modification of ajñâna as anta@hkara@na).]

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etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajñâna forms so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation (abheda) of the subjective consciousness with the objective consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the specific mental states (tattadindriyayogyavi@sayâvacchinnacaitanyâbhinnatvam tattadâkâravi@sayâvacchinnajñânasya tattadams'e pratyak@satvam). This union in perception means that the objective has at that moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the anta@hkara@na is called jîvasâk@si.

Inference (anumâna), according to Vedânta, is made by our notion of concomitance (vyâptijñâna) between two things, acting through specific past impressions (sa@mskâra). Thus when I see smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is generated by the perception of two things together, when no case of the failure of concomitance is known (vyabhicârâjñâna) regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether subjective, the Vedântist does not emphasize the necessity of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (bhûyodars'anam sak@rddars'anam veti vis'e@so nâdara@nîya@h). Vedânta is not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference, but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedânta whether this concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases. The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance (anvayavyâpti) that the Vedânta allows. So the Vedânta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyâya supported, viz. anvayavyatireki (by joining agreement in presence with agreement in absence), kevalânvayi (by universal agreement where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and

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kevalavyatireki (by universal agreement in absence). Vedânta advocates three premisses, viz. (1) pratijña (the hill is fiery); (2) hetu (because it has smoke) and (3) d@rs@tânta (as in the kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyâya maintained [Footnote ref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedânta as being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false, we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (Brahmabhinnam sarvam mithyâ Brahmabhinnatvât yedevam tadevam yathâ s'uktirûpyam). First premiss (pratijñâ) all else excepting Brahman is false; second premiss (hetu) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss (dr@s@tânta) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnote ref 2].

Âtman, Jîva, Îs'vara, Ekajîvavâda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda.

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous (_svayamprakâs'a). But what does this mean? Vedânta defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but is yet immediate and direct with us (avedyatve sati aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam). Self-luminosity thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another. This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from