A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗
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[Footnote 1: See Vedântasâra and _Advaitabrahmasiddhi.]
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are only smaller states of ajñâna, whereas when the Brahma-knowledge dawns the ajñâna as a whole is removed. Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when this knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which at first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajñâna modification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed, only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its own true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a piece of wood would burn the whole city and after that would burn the very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledge would destroy all the illusory world-appearance and at last destroy even that final state [Footnote ref l].
The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as illusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is but limited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures also are but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a taste of which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The being of Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existent beings as the sattâ (being as class notion) of the naiyâyika, but the concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness and pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (sat) is pure bliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidyâ during mukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as the question, how the avidyâ came forth and stayed during the world-appearance. It is best to remember that the category of the indefinite avidyâ is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestation and destruction. Vedânta however believes that even when the true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a while, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it. Thus the emancipated person may walk about and behave like an ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longer acquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripe karmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body and there will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn of perfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of beginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any
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[Footnote 1:Siddhântales'a.]
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of the illusions subjective or objective which could make any knowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is called jîvanmukta, i.e. emancipated while living. For him all world-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alone in himself where everything else has vanished for ever from the stage [Footnote ref 1].
Vedânta and other Indian Systems.
Vedânta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyâya, and most of its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it. S'a@nkara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and inconsistencies in many of the Nyâya conceptions, such as the theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samavâya, the conception of jâti, etc [Footnote ref 2]. His followers carried it to still greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of S'rîhar@sa, Citsukha, Madhusûdana, etc. It was opposed to Mîmâ@msâ so far as this admitted the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika categories, but agreed with it generally as regards the pramâ@nas of anumâna, upamiti, arthâpatti, s'abda, and anupalabdhi. It also found a great supporter in Mîmâ@msâ with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting power of knowledge. But it differed from Mîmâ@msâ in the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate discussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to ordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties to perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest knowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties only so long as he was not fit for Vedânta instruction and studies.
With Sâ@mkhya and Yoga the relation of Vedânta seems to be very close. We have already seen that Vedânta had accepted all the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that were advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Vedânta and Sâ@mkhya was this that Sâ@mkhya believed, that the stuff of which the world consisted was a reality side by side with the puru@sas. In later times Vedânta had compromised so far with Sâ@mkhya that it also sometimes described mâyâ as being made up of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Vedânta also held that according to these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications
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[Footnote 1: See Pañcadas'î.]
[Footnote 2: See S'a@nkara's refutation of Nyâya, S'a@nkara-bhâ@sya, II. ii.]
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of the mâyâ. Thus Îs'vara is believed to possess a mind of pure sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in Vedânta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as Sâ@mkhya held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that mâyâ was believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it was indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial nothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long as it appeared. Prak@rti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrable as regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation, but even then it was believed to be a combination of positive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged to it with which it could be defined. Mâyâ however was undemonstrable, indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a separate category of the indefinite. Sâ@mkhya believed in the personal individuality of souls, while for Vedânta there was only one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the mâyâ transformations. There was an adhyâsa or illusion in Sâ@mkhya as well as in Vedânta; but in the former the illusion was due to a mere non-distinction between prak@rti and puru@sa or mere misattribution of characters or identities, but in Vedânta there was not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable creation. Causation with Sâ@mkhya meant real transformation, but with Vedânta all transformation was mere appearance. Though there were so many differences, it is however easy to see that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems during the Upani@sad period each was built up from very similar ideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested themselves into the present divergences of the two systems. Though S'a@nkara laboured hard to prove that the Sâ@mkhya view could not be found in the Upani@sads, we can hardly be convinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more he argues, the more we are led to suspect that the Sâ@mkhya thought had its origin in the Upani@sads. Sâ'a@nkara and his followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the s'ûnya of Nâgârjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of S`a@nkara to the self-luminosity of the Vijñânavâda Buddhism
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can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth in the accusations against S'a@nkara by Vijñâna Bhik@su and others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to think that S'a@nkara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñânavâda and S'ûnyavâda Buddhism with the Upani@sad notion of the permanence of self superadded.
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