Napoleon III and the French Second Empire, Roger Price [black books to read .TXT] 📗

was at its peak. Ministers were convoked twice a week to discuss an agenda drawn up by the Emperor. They provided information, he took decisions.

The tradition of ministerial responsibility to parliament (developed since 1814) was annulled and the Corps législatif rendered largely quiescent. These were years in which continued political repression and close cooperation with reactionary and clerical forces characterised the regime. Even during this period, however, implementation of governmental decisions was to be obstructed by a complex of often conflicting vested interest groups, as well as the practical difficulties of administrative control and finance, and by vacillation on the part of the head of state himself. Additionally, the new regime was dependent inescapably upon the

aristocratic and wealthy grands bourgeois servants of previous regimes. Most ministers were conservative ex-Orleanists (e.g. Magne, Fould, Rouher) or

representatives of the former dynastic opposition (Baroche). Of men who might be considered genuine Bonapartists, there were remarkably few. Napoléon’s

frustrations are said to have led to the exasperated comment: ‘What a government is mine! The Empress is Legitimist; Napoléon-Jérôme republican; Morny

Orleanist; I am myself a socialist. The only Bonapartist is Persigny and he is mad’

(Plessis 1985: 54). Implementation of policy decisions depended upon the

efficiency and goodwill of these men and of administrators drawn from similar backgrounds, and the Emperor was inevitably forced to make compromises.

The political system of Napoléon III

The power of an apparently monolithic, centralised, hierarchical administration was reduced substantially by a combination of vested interests, localism,

established habits and respect for the rule of law. The linchpin of the system – the Prefect, responsible for the whole range of government activities at departmental level – was himself subject to complex pressures from ministers, deputies,

competing administrative hierarchies, mayors and the local notables who gathered 28

regularly on an informal basis, at agricultural shows and at meetings of chambers of commerce and of the departmental councils ( conseils généraux). Dependent on their routine collaboration, especially during elections, the Prefect could not afford to ignore their wishes. The intention expressed by genuine Bonapartists, like the prefect of the Haute-Garonne Pietri in 1854, of replacing the patronage and influence of the old elites by that of the Prefect, as the direct representative of the Emperor himself, was rarely realised. To a substantial degree, prefects were assessed by their superiors according to their success in managing elections.

Election campaigns were the means of mobilising support. Electoral victory was vitally important for a regime which insisted upon its roots in popular sovereignty.

It was an essential source of legitimacy. Thus, every election took on a plebiscatory character and involved a judgement of the regime and its policies. This was not only the case in general elections, but also frequently those at departmental and municipal level, whenever the personality of the candidate or local circumstances gave the contest a political colouring. Until 1869, the essential distinguishing feature of the electoral system was the official candidature, far more systematically organised than under previous regimes. The government, through the agency of the Minister of the Interior and the prefects subordinate to him, took it upon itself to declare support for some candidates and to announce its hostility to others. Once selected, usually at the suggestion of the Prefect, the government’s candidate could expect active support from the entire administrative machine by means of the creative redrawing of constituency boundaries, the distribution of the official candidates ballot papers along with registration cards, and of oral and printed propaganda. Initially, this insisted upon the Emperor’s role in protecting France from the ‘red menace’, and then from around 1857 used the theme of prosperity, the progress of public works (particularly roads and railways) and the efforts of the regime to attenuate the misery caused by poor harvests. At the same time,

opponents were discriminated against. Their posters were torn down, the printers of opposition manifestos risked losing their all-important licenses, meetings were banned and potential candidates and their supporters were intimidated. Moderate opposition was tolerated, most notably in the republican and anti-clerical

newspaper Le Siècle, and at the opposite pole in the ultra- montane Catholic Univers edited by Louis Veuillot, but on condition that the regime itself was not challenged.

A major political problem, even in the 1850s, was the selection of official candidates. These needed to satisfy two main criteria – devotion to the regime and 29

possession of the local influence necessary for electoral success, although it was always possible that an excess of local influence might allow deputies like the right-wing Bonapartist Granier de Cassagnac in the Gers to become too

independent of the government. The number of suitably qualified candidates was generally limited. In practice, given the absence of a Bonapartist party, they were mainly former Orleanist or Legitimist notables. Additionally, the very act of selecting a particular individual was all too likely to cause disaffection among disappointed aspirants, with a cumulative effect over time. Thus, the authoritarian political system was always in danger of breaking down due to its inability to escape from dependence upon the established elites. Moreover, once these elites had recovered from their fear of ‘red’ revolution, they would demand the restitution of the share of political power they had enjoyed under the July Monarchy and the liberal institutions through which this could be manifested. As the former Orleanist prime minister Guizot warned:

an insurrection can be repressed with soldiers; an election won with peasants.

But the support of soldiers and peasants is not sufficient to rule. The cooperation of the upper classes who are naturally rulers is essential.

Napoléon appears to have hoped that the elites would genuinely rally to the new regime once its stability was assured. He was to be disappointed. Indeed, his very success in re-establishing social order would soon make the authoritarian regime appear redundant.

In the early years, political stability and strong government accompanied by growing economic prosperity certainly attracted considerable support. The

Emperor was able to pose as the ‘saviour of society’. Even Guizot had accepted