Napoleon III and the French Second Empire, Roger Price [black books to read .TXT] 📗

the defeat of the first Empire and, even more ambitiously, a recasting of the map of Europe based on the 32

principle of nationality, to involve in particular some sort of reconstitution of Poland, Italy and Germany as well as the territorial aggrandisement of France itself. As far as possible, these objectives were to be achieved through congresses of the powers but, if necessary, through engagement in limited war. The Crimean war in 1854 represented a first step, an alliance with Britain against Russia, the most reactionary of European states. Eventual military success considerably increased French prestige, although the Congress of Paris in 1856 did not result in revision of the treaties. War with the old rival Austria in 1859 brought further military successes at Magenta and Solferino in Northern Italy and a hastily concluded peace which united Lombardy to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Savoy and

could not prevent Italian nationalists from seizing power in the duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Modena and in the Papal Romagna. As a reward, the territories of Savoy and Nice lost in 1815 were, following plebiscites of their inhabitants, triumphantly restored to France. Popular images and songs celebrated this renewal of national glory. The return of the Imperial Guard and other military units to Paris from the Crimea on 29 December 1855 and from Italy on 14 August 1859, still in their battle-torn uniforms, carrying their tattered flags, with gaps in their ranks left by the dead , attracted enormous emotional crowds. The Emperor’s birthday on 15 August,

celebrated as a national holiday, provided another opportunity for military parades in every garrison town in France. Patriotic enthusiasm there undoubtedly was, but reports from both prefects and state prosecutors ( procureurs-généraux) also suggest that there were always substantial public misgivings about military adventure. The actual outbreak of war might be greeted with resigned acceptance, turning towards general support. However, as the Crimean war was prolonged, criticism revived and with it demands for a negotiated settlement. Similarly, during the Italian campaign, reports from the provinces following the victories at Magenta and Solferino reveal both a pride in French successes and widespread support for an immediate peace. Only committed republicans favoured the complete defeat of Austria. The government’s constant concern with the state of public opinion and particular anxiety about alienating normal supporters among the elites, business circles and the rural population, ensured that these reports were taken into account in official discussions of foreign policy, although their impact on decisions is difficult to establish. The despatch of an expeditionary force to Mexico in December 1861 – 30, 000 men by the end of 1862 – in pursuit of the dream of creating a French sphere of influence in the Americas at a time when the USA was fully absorbed with civil war, would prove to be beyond the public’s

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comprehension. It perfectly illustrated the danger, for a regime so constantly concerned with public opinion, of policy decisions which were difficult to justify as serving the nation’s vital interests. Not surprisingly, just as foreign policy initiatives judged by the public to be successful considerably enhanced the regime’s prestige, so failures could be extremely damaging.

Signs of dissent

During its first decade, the Second Empire enjoyed a broader consensus of support than its predecessors. Election results suggest that this reached its apogee in 1857

when official candidates obtained 89 per cent of the votes cast although, due to large-scale abstention, this represented only 60 per cent of registered voters. Even at this stage, however, prefects were increasingly anxious, especially about the cities in which supervision of the electorate was always so difficult. Much of the support for the regime, particularly from the elites, had always been conditional and far from wholehearted. It declined as the threat of a revolutionary upheaval diminished. The state prosecutor at Aix-en-Provence reported with regret, as early as 16 June 1855, that ‘if the government has few really dangerous enemies, the number of genuinely serious adherents upon whom it could count in a critical situation appears extremely restrained’. With order apparently restored, social elites would gradually, and initially with great restraint, increase their pressure for greater influence over political decision-making and for the re-establishment of a representative, parliamentary regime, both on principle and as a means of

protecting their special interests. The growing number of critics ranged from those who had initially welcomed the coup but who no longer saw the practical need for authoritarian government, to republicans who, for the most part, rejected the Empire and all its works.

In the first category were diverse ‘liberals’, the socially conservative

proponents of parliamentary government and of greater liberty for the press and local government. They expressed restrained criticism in newspapers like the Journal des Débats (circulation 12, 800 in 1861) or the Revue des Deux Mondes (circulation 12, 400). They were also well represented among the official deputies elected to the Corps législatif. Although established political personalities like Thiers or Rémusat continued to play influential roles, at local level informal liberal leadership frequently appears to have been undergoing renewal. This was due to the withdrawal from public life of those who had been disillusioned by the

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experience of the Second Republic, to the rallying of many, especially former Orleanists, to the imperial regime and because of the emergence of younger men especially from those excluded from office by the system of official candidature –

a new generation of ‘outs’. The liberal revival of the 1860s was being prepared.

Initially, the lead was given by Legitimists. Their criticism was frequently tolerated by the regime because as obvious conservatives they were not a threat to social order. Typically, theirs was an elite ‘party’ based upon personal relationships and voluntary associations rather than specific forms of political organisation.

Although instructed by the Comte de Chambord, the Legitimist pretender, to

abstain from politics, they were often too determined to take full advantage of their influence in local and national elections to adopt this purist stance. This was true both of landed elites in the