Discourses, Epictetus [the beginning after the end read novel TXT] 📗

he cannot at the same time exercise the contradictory powers of forcing man’s will and action; for this would be at the same time to give power and to take it away. Bishop Butler remarks (Analogy, chapter 5) “the present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice.” In fact all men are not convinced and cannot be convinced in the present constitution of things “what things are good and bad.” ↩

Something is perhaps wrong in the text here. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

In place of μεπαπίπτοντας Johann Schweighäuser suggests that Arrian wrote καὶ τἄλλα ὡσαύτως or something of the kind. On μεταπίπτοντας see book I chapter VII. ↩

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations vii 36. ↩

ὄψονται. See note 31. ↩

Johann Schweighäuser says that he has not observed that this proverb is mentioned by any other writer, and that he does not quite see the meaning of it, unless it be what he expresses in the Latin version (iv 10, 24), “alterum opus cum altero nihil commune habet.” I think that the context explains it: if you wish to obtain a particular end, employ the proper means, and not the means which do not make for that end. ↩

See note 432. Epictetus is making a parody of the verses of Pythagoras. See Johann Schweighäuser’s remarks on the words “He who has risen, etc.” I have of necessity translated κακοηφισάμενος in an active sense; but if this is right, I do not understand how the word is used so. ↩

See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on the text. By the Galilaeans it is probable that Epictetus means the Christians, whose obstinacy Marcus Aurelius also mentions (Meditations xi 3). Epictetus, a contemporary of St. Paul, knew little about the Christians, and only knew some examples of their obstinate adherence to the new faith and the fanatical behavior of some of the converts. That there were wild fanatics among the early Christians is proved on undoubted authority; and also that there always have been such, and now are such. The abuse of any doctrines or religious opinions is indeed no argument against such doctrines or religious opinions; and it is a fact quite consistent with experience that the best things are liable to be perverted, misunderstood, and misused. ↩

“This agrees with Ephesians 5:20: ‘Giving thanks always for all things to God.’ ” —⁠Elizabeth Carter. The words are the same in both except that the Apostle has εὐχαριστοῦντες, and Epictetus has χάριυ ἔχον. ↩

See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

He says that the body will be resolved into the things of which it is composed: none of them will perish. The soul, as he has said elsewhere, will go to him who gave it (note 502). But I do not suppose that he means that the soul will exist as having a separate consciousness. ↩

καρπιστήν, see book IV chapter I at 113. ↩

See note 129. ↩

“Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt,” Matthew 26:39. (Elizabeth Carter.) “Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect, when our will is lost and resolved up into his; when we rest in his will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good.” —⁠Bishop Butler, Sermon on the Love of God ↩

See note 672. ↩

I do not see the meaning of ὕστερον: it may perhaps mean “after leaving the school.” See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

Here Epictetus admits that there is some power in man which uses the body, directs and governs it. He does not say what the power is nor what he supposes it to be. “Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with.” —⁠Bishop Butler’s Analogy, chapter 1. ↩

The will of a fool does not make law, he says. Unfortunately it does, if we use the word law in the strict sense of law: for law is a general command from a person, an absolute king, for example, who has power to enforce it on those to whom the command is addressed or if not to enforce it, to punish for disobedience to it. This strict use of the word “law” is independent of the quality of the command, which may be wise or foolish, good or bad. But Epictetus does not use the word “law” in the strict sense. ↩

The word is λιφοστρώτοις, which means what we name Mosaic floors or pavements. The word λιφόστρωτον is used by John 19:13, and rendered in our version by “pavement.” ↩

This term (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) has been often used by Epictetus (book I chapter XXVI at 15, etc.), and by Marcus Aurelius. Here Epictetus gives a definition or description of it: it is the faculty by which we reflect and judge and determine, a faculty which no other animal has, a faculty which in many men is neglected, and weak because it is neglected; but still it ought to be what its constitution forms it to be: a faculty which “plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or