An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith [e book reader pdf TXT] 📗

be a tax upon the interest of money, proportioned to that

upon the rent of land; so that when the latter is at four

shillings in the pound, the former may be at four shillings in

the pound too. The tax at Hamburg, and the still more moderate

taxes of Underwald and Zurich, are meant, in the same manner, to

be taxes, not upon the capital, but upon the interest or neat

revenue of stock. That of Holland was meant to be a tax upon the

capital.

 

Taxes upon the Profit of particular Employments.

 

In some countries, extraordinary taxes are imposed upon the

profits of stock ; sometimes when employed in particular branches

of trade, and sometimes when employed in agriculture.

 

Of the former kind, are in England, the tax upon hawkers and

pedlars, that upon hackney-coaches and chairs, and that which the

keepers of alehouses pay for a licence to retail ale and

spiritous liquors. During the late war, another tax of the same

kind was proposed upon shops. The war having been undertaken, it

was said, in defence of the trade of the country, the merchants,

who were to profit by it, ought to contribute towards the support

of it.

 

A tax, however, upon the profits of stock employed in any

particular branch of trade, can never fall finally upon the

dealers (who must in all ordinary cases have their reasonable

profit, and, where the competition is free, can seldom have more

than that profit), but always upon the consumers, who must be

obliged to pay in the price of the goods the tax which the dealer

advances ; and generally with some overcharge.

 

A tax of this kind, when it is proportioned to the trade of the

dealer, is finally paid by the consumer, and occasions no

oppression to the dealer. When it is not so proportioned, but is

the same upon all dealers, though in this case, too, it is

finally paid by the consumer, yet it favours the great, and

occasions some oppression to the small dealer. The tax of

five shillings a-week upon every hackney coach, and that of ten

shillings a-year upon every hackney chair, so far as it is

advanced by the different keepers of such coaches and chairs, is

exactly enough proportioned to the extent of their respective

dealings. It neither favours the great, nor oppresses the smaller

dealer. The tax of twenty shillings a-year for a licence to

sell ale; of forty shillings for a licence to sell spiritous

liquors ; and of forty shillings more for a licence to sell wine,

being the same upon all retailers, must necessarily give some

advantage to the great, and occasion some oppression to the small

dealers. The former must find it more easy to get back the tax in

the price of their goods than the latter. The moderation of the

tax, however, renders this inequality of less importance; and it

may to many people appear not improper to give some

discouragement to the multiplication of little alehouses.

The tax upon shops, it was intended, should be the same upon all

shops. It could not well have been otherwise. It would have been

impossible to proportion, with tolerable exactness, the tax upon

a shop to the extent of the trade carried on in it, without such

an inquisition as would have been altogether insupportable in a

free country. If the tax had been considerable, it would have

oppressed the small, and forced almost the whole retail trade

into the hands of the great dealers. The competition of the

former being taken away, the latter would have enjoyed a monopoly

of the trade ; and, like all other monopolists, would soon have

combined to raise their profits much beyond what was necessary

for the payment of the tax. The final payment, instead of falling

upon the shopkeeper, would have fallen upon the consumer, with a

considerable overcharge to the profit of the shopkeeper. For

these reasons, the project of a tax upon shops was laid aside,

and in the room of it was substituted the subsidy, 1759.

 

What in France is called the personal taille, is perhaps, the

most important tax upon the profits of stock employed in

agriculture, that is levied in any part of Europe.

 

In the disorderly state of Europe, during the prevalence of the

feudal government, the sovereign was obliged to content himself

with taxing those who were too weak to refuse to pay taxes. The

great lords, though willing to assist him upon particular

emergencies, refused to subject themselves to any constant tax,

and he was not strong enough to force them. The occupiers of land

all over Europe were, the greater part of them, originally

bondmen. Through the greater part of Europe, they were gradually

emancipated. Some of them acquired the property of landed

estates, which they held by some base or ignoble tenure,

sometimes under the king, and sometimes under some other great

lord, like the ancient copy-holders of England. Others, without

acquiring the property, obtained leases for terms of years, of

the lands which they occupied under their lord, and thus became

less dependent upon him. The great lords seem to have beheld the

degree of prosperity and independency, which this inferior order

of men had thus come to enjoy, with a malignant and contemptuous

indignation, and willingly consented that the sovereign should

tax them. In some countries, this tax was confined to the lands

which were held in property by an ignoble tenure ; and, in this

case, the taille was said to be real. The land tax established by

the late king of Sardinia, and the taille in the provinces of

Languedoc, Provence, Dauphine, and Britanny ; in the generality

of Montauban, and in the elections of Agen and Condom, as well as

in some other districts of France; are taxes upon lands held in

property by an ignoble tenure. In other countries, the tax

was laid upon the supposed profits of all those who held, in farm

or lease, lands belonging to other people, whatever might be the

tenure by which the proprietor held them ; and in this case, the

taille was said to be personal. In the greater part of those

provinces of France, which are called the countries of elections,

the taille is of this kind. The real taille, as it is imposed

only upon a part of the lands of the country, is necessarily an

unequal, but it is not always an arbitrary tax, though it is so

upon some occasions. The personal taille, as it is intended to be

proportioned to the profits of a certain class of people, which

can only be guessed at, is necessarily both arbitrary and

unequal.

 

In France, the personal taille at present (1775) annually imposed

upon the twenty generalities, called the countries of elections,

amounts to 40,107,239 livres, 16 sous. {Memoires concernant les

Droits, etc tom. ii, p.17.} the proportion in which this sum is

assessed upon those different provinces, varies from year to

year, according to the reports which are made to the king’s

council concerning the goodness or badness of the crops, as well

as other circumstances, which may either increase or diminish

their respective abilities to pay. Each generality is divided

into a certain number of elections; and the proportion in which

the sum imposed upon the whole generatlity is divided among those

different elections, varies likewise from year to year, according

to the reports made to the council concerning their respective

abilities. It seems impossible, that the council, with the

best intentions, can ever proportion, with tolerable exactness,

either of these two assessments to the real abilities of the

province or district upon which they are respectively laid.

Ignorance and misinformation must always, more or less. mislead

the most upright council. The proportion which each parish ought

to support of what is assessed upon the whole election, and that

which each individual ought to support of what is assessed upon

his particular parish, are both in the same manner varied from

year to year, according as circumstances are supposed to require.

These circumstances are judged of, in the one case, by the

officers of the election, in the other, by those of the parish;

and both the one and the other are, more or less, under the

direction and influence of the intendant. Not only ignorance

and misinformation, but friendship, party animosity, and private

resentment, are said frequently to mislead such assessors. No man

subject to such a tax, it is evident, can ever be certain, before

he is assessed, of what he is to pay. He cannot even be certain

after he is assessed. If any person has been taxed who ought to

have been exempted, or if any person has been taxed beyond his

proportion, though both must pay in the mean time, yet if they

complain, and make good their complaints, the whole parish is

reimposed next year, in order to reimburse them. If any of

the contributors become bankrupt or insolvent, the collector is

obliged to advance his tax ; and the whole parish is reimposed

next year, in order to reimburse the collector. If the collector

himself should become bankrupt, the parish which elects him must

answer for his conduct to the receiver-general of the election.

But, as it might be troublesome for the receiver to prosecute the

whole parish, he takes at his choice five or six of the richest

contributors, and obliges them to make good what had been lost by

the insolvency of the collector. The parish is afterwards

reimposed, in order to reimburse those five or six. Such

reimpositions are always over and above the taille of the

particular year in which they are laid on.

 

When a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock in a particular

branch of trade, the traders are all careful to bring no more

goods to market than what they can sell at a price sufficient to

reimburse them from advancing the tax. Some of them withdraw a

part of their stocks from the trade, and the market is more

sparingly supplied than before. The price of the goods rises, and

the final payment of the tax falls upon the consumer. But when a

tax is imposed upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture,

it is not the interest of the farmers to withdraw any part of

their stock from that employment. Each farmer occupies a certain

quantity of land, for which he pays rent. For the proper

cultivation of this land, a certain quantity of stock is

necessary; and by withdrawing any part of this necessary

quantity, the farmer is not likely to be more able to pay either

the rent or the tax. In order to pay the tax, it can never be his

interest to diminish the quantity of his produce, nor

consequently to supply the market more sparingly than before. The

tax, therefore, will never enable him to raise the price of his

produce, so as to reimburse himself, by throwing the final

payment upon the consumer. The farmer, however, must have his

reasonable profit as well as every other dealer, otherwise he

must give up the trade. After the imposition of a tax of this

kind, he can get this reasonable profit only by paying less rent

to the landlord. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax,

the less he can afford to pay in the way of rent. A tax of this

kind, imposed during the currency of a lease, may, no doubt,

distress or ruin the farmer. Upon the renewal of the lease, it

must always fall upon the landlord.

 

In the countries where the personal taille takes place, the

farmer is commonly assessed in proportion to the stock which he

appears to employ in cultivation. He is, upon this account,

frequently afraid to have a good team