Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews, Peter Longerich [essential books to read TXT] 📗

the policies formulated in this meeting on 15 November, as expressed more than a year later by the representative of the

Foreign Office Bülow-Schwandte, was the ‘restriction of racial policy measures

to the Jews’. 69

Displacement from Public Life, 1933–4

43

Jewish Reactions to the First Phase of Persecution

The National Socialists’ policy of excluding the Jews from public life affected the

members of a minority that was by no means homogeneous. 70 At the beginning of the National Socialist dictatorship some half a million people were living in

Germany who professed membership of the Jewish community, and amongst

these were about 100,000 who did not have German citizenship (mostly immi-

grants from Poland and Russia, the so-called Ostjuden or Eastern Jews). In

addition there were more than 40,000 people who were not Jewish in the

confessional sense, but were regarded as Jews by the National Socialists on the

grounds of their origins or ancestry. 71

Whilst the German-Jewish minority was legally and culturally integrated, it is

impossible to overlook the particular social structure of this group, which distin-

guished it clearly from the rest of society. The large majority of Jews lived in large

cities, they were mainly members of the middle class, to a large extent of the educated

bourgeoisie, they were predominantly active in trade and commerce, and represented

a relatively large proportion of the professions. As far as religion was concerned, most

classed themselves as liberal Jews, although an ever greater degree of religious

indifference was manifest amongst Jews as it was amongst the rest of the population.

In sharp contrast to this group was an independent Eastern Jewish proletariat in

which orthodox religious conviction was comparatively well represented. 72

The identity of the overwhelming majority of the German Jews was founded on

their being firmly anchored in German culture and in both patriotic and liberal

convictions. The very name of the Jewish organization that counted the most

members, the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (literally

the Central Organization of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith) was itself an

expression of the belief predominant amongst German Jews that the process of

acculturation had been successfully completed, for the most part, and that the

development of a certain group identity did not represent isolation but was an

instrument for making a specific Jewish contribution to the well-being of the

German state.

In relation to this main general tendency, the Zionists—who reacted strongly

against the idea of a German-Jewish symbiosis—played a comparatively minor

role: the Zionist Organization for Germany had only some 20,000 members

around 1930.73

Even this brief overview suggests clearly that the majority of German Jews were

not inclined to abandon their position in Germany over-hastily, and they clung—

to the point of self-delusion—to the idea that the ‘seizure of power’ was a

temporary crisis that would blow over. Nonetheless, under the pressures of the

boycotts and the National Socialist terror during the phase of seizing power

44

Racial Persecution, 1933–1939

in 1933, an estimated 37,000 Jews left the Reich; politically active, younger, and

relatively prosperous Jews were comparatively over-represented amongst these

refugees. In 1934, because of the relatively calm situation, only some 23,000

Jews left. 74

A particular chapter in the history of German-Jewish emigration, in which a

clear signal was given for how far the new regime was prepared to work together

with the Zionist movement in this area, is the so-called ‘Haavara Agreement’

concluded in August 1933 by the Reich Finance Ministry, the Zionist Organization

for Germany, and the Anglo-Palestine Bank in Tel Aviv. This agreement estab-

lished special measures for circumventing the restrictive currency legislation that

banned the export of foreign currencies and therefore represented a considerable

hurdle for those wishing to emigrate. The wealth of Jewish émigrés that remained

in Germany was liquidated and an equivalent was transferred to the British

Mandate of Palestine in the form of exported German goods. These were then

sold, and from the proceeds the German émigrés were provided with the min-

imum level of capital that enabled them to count as ‘capitalists’ in the eyes of the

British authorities, which in turn guaranteed them fast-track immigration. Of the

approximately 50,000 German Jews who emigrated to Palestine before the begin-

ning of the war, several thousand were to profit from this agreement; in this way

German goods to the value of more than 100 million Reichsmark were exported to

Palestine, as well as to other countries. The regulated emigration of a not incon-

siderable proportion of the German Jews was therefore assured by means of a

consolidation of the German export market in the Near East, which from the

German perspective represented an important breakthrough against the attempts

of international Jewish groups, and others, to boycott German goods. 75

The decision by the majority of German Jews to hang on at first and stay where

they were was considerably influenced by the activities of Jewish organizations,

which will be investigated in more detail in the course of this overview. In the early

days of National Socialist rule, the Centralverein was unable to rid itself of the idea

that the continuing existence of the Jews in Germany could be safeguarded after

all, if necessary by accepting certain forms of legislative discrimination. It was not

until 1935 that the Centralverein (which had to alter its name after the Nuremberg

Laws)76 recognized the illusory nature of such beliefs and began urgently advocating emigration. It is certain, however, that the increasing level of activity on the

part of Jewish support organizations contributed to the decision to wait and see.

One consequence of the pressure on the German Jews was that for the first time

the heterogeneous Jewish minority in Germany formed a unified representative

body to coordinate the various efforts. At the beginning of 1932 the regional

organizations of the Jewish communities decided to create a national delegation

to safeguard their interests, but in practice it did not become active at that point.

Only in September 1933 did the umbrella organizations of the Jewish communities

in the individual German states, the Centralverein, the Jewish Veteran Organizations,

Displacement from Public Life, 1933–4

45

and the Zionist Organization form a Reichsvertretung or Reich Board of Deputies

of German Jews. The President was Rabbi Leo Baeck, universally recognized as a

leading figure in the intellectual life of German Jewry. 77

In addition, on the initiative of the Reich Board, the Central Committee for

Support and Development was created on 13 April, as a reaction against the

boycott. This Central Committee set itself the task of maintaining