Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, Henrik Lunde [new ebook reader TXT] 📗

Ruge was in the process of relocating his headquarters from Åndalsnes to North Norway and had no communications with Colonel Getz until May 3, by which time the situation had changed.

5 Getz, Nord-Trøndelag 1940, pp. 117 and 122. Getz notes that he sent messages to the 6th Division direct, via Sweden, and through the Allied headquarters but received no explanation for the orders. Sandvik relates that General Fleischer sent a letter to Getz on April 30 confirming that the order was genuine but that Getz never received the letter (Operasjonene, vol. 2, p.61).

6 Lindbäck-Larsen, Rapport, Section 8:4.

7 Getz, Nord-Trøndelag 1940, p. 140, entry for 0850 hours May 2.

8 Valentin Feurstein, Irrwege der Pflicht 1938-1945 (Munich, Verlag Welsermühl, 1963), p. 73.

9 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 150. He points out that the military investigating committee, in its review of Colonel Getz’ surrender, gave special weight to the fact that road connection to the north was severed by Fleischer. He goes on to state that Getz should have been the first to know that the destruction of the road northward had not been carried out. Getz, however, claims that the destruction had already started and this is why the 1/14th Inf left the battalion trains behind when it began its retreat into Nordland Province.

10 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 100, 106.

11 Quoted in Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen, p. 124. The order read: “Send as many troops as possible back to Mosjøen. Seek connection with units of the 6th Division in that area. The forces will thereafter come under General Fleischer. Destroy the roads thoroughly as the troops withdraw. Roadblocks must be defended.”

12 Quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 63.

13 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 289.

14 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 178 and Moulton, A Study of Warfare, p. 235.

15 Maurice Gustave Gamelin, Servir, (3 vols; Paris: Plon, 1946-47), vol. 3, pp. 366-367.

16 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 292.

17 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 648.

18 Marie Emile Béthouart, Cinq années d’espérance. Mémoires de guerre, 1939-1945. (Paris: Plon, 1968), pp. 31-32.

19 The 2nd Mountain Division, like the 3nd, was formed from units in the Austrian army after the incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich. The 2nd was formed from units of the 6th Austrian Mountain Division and German mountain troops in April 1938 and mobilized on August 26, 1939. Like the 3rd, it participated in the Polish Campaign as part of Army Group South. It was transferred to Germany at the conclusion of that campaign.

20 Karl Ruef, Odyssee, p. 54.

21 Feurstein, Irrwege der Pflicht, p. 71.

22 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 167.

23 London Gazette Supplement, 10 July 1947, 3173 as quoted in Jack Adams, The Doomed Expedition. The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 71.

24 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 297.

25 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 180; Moulton, Study of Warfare, p. 237; Adams, The Doomed Expedition, p. 73; and Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 84, n. 74.

26 HOK 916/40 quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 88.

27 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 150.

28 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 88-89.

29 Hubatsch, 215.

30 Ellinger, Den Forunderlige Krig, pp. 65-66. The morale in Ellinger’s company had deteriorated and some of the troops tried to leave on May 13. Ellinger decided it was better to operate with people who wanted to fight. He spoke to each platoon and told those who wished to leave to step forward and turn in their weapons. In the end, he had only 52 men left. The disarmed soldiers were sent to Mo where Roscher-Nielsen put them to work on a road-gang.

31 Lindbäck-Larsen, 6. division (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1946), p. 118.

32 Ruef, Odyssee, p. 63.

33 John Connell, Auchinleck (London: Cassell, 1959), pp.119-120. The instructions read, in part: “You will have had my telegram telling you that I wish the detachment at Mo to hold on to its position, and not withdraw. I think it most important that we should give up no more ground. I know the detachment is somewhat isolated at present, and I know the Germans may be in superior force to the south of you, but I am pretty sure that they are groping in the dark very much as we are, and I hope that when they come up against really determined opposition they will sit back and think about it.” 34 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 292.

35 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 115.

36 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 119; Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 184; and Adams, The Doomed Expedition, p. 69.

37 Adams, The Doomed Expedition, p. 70.

38 Report to the Naval Court of Inquiry, D.3A Reports of Losses of H.M. Ships. Effingham 17/5. Prepared on H.M. Transport Sobieski at Sea on May 20, 1940, paragraph 6.

Chapter 13

1 As quoted by Adams, The Doomed Expedition, p.17.

2 General Béthouart’s Journal de Marche, chapter 3, p. 38, as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 30.

3 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 31 and Loben E. H. Maund Assault from the Sea (London: Methuen, 1949), pp. 52, 58.

4 Instructions from the Secretary of State for War to Lieutenant General Auchinlek, found in Derry, The Campaign in Norway, Appendix A, pp. 259-260.

5 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, pp. 169-170.

6 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 295.

7 Maund, Assault from the Sea, p. 40.

8 Béthouart, Cinq années d’espérance, p. 51.

9 Moulton, Study of Warfare, p. 225.

10 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 162.

11 Büchner, Narvik, p. 93.

12 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 116.

13 Ruge, Felttoget, p. 209.

14 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p.116.

15 Büchner, Narvik, p. 103.

16 In his letter of May 12, Lieutenant Colonel Berg wrote, “An attack to the south is difficult from Læigastind-Gressvann. The mountain area is even without the possibility of cover and is under effective fire from German machinegun